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INTRODUCfiON

The late 1980's witnessed the birth of a chilling phrase: environmental racism.1 Surprisingly, the phrase was directed at the practices
of the guardians of the environment? in particular the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA)3 and mainstream national environmental
organizations.4 More important, the phrase connected two complicated social problems previously unconnected in the minds of many:
1. The coining of the phrase "environmental racism" is attributed to Dr. Benjamin
Chavis, former Executive Director of the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice, which released its landmark study documenting exposures to hazardous waste sites
in 1987.
[Dr. Chavis defines racism as] racial prejudice plus power. Racism is the intentional or unintentional use of power to isolate, separate and exploit others. This
use of power is based on a belief in superior racial origin, identity or supposed
racial characteristics. Racism confers certain privileges on and defends the dominant group, which in turn sustains and perpetuates racism. Both consciously and
unconsciously, racism is enforced and maintained by the legal, cultural, religious,
educational, economic, political, environmental and military institutions of societies. Racism is more than just a personal attitude; it is the institutionalized form
of that attitude.
Benjamin F. Chavis, Preface to CoMMISSION FOR RAciAL JuSTICE, UNITED CHuRCH OF
CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON
RAc iAL AND SOCIO-E CONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES ix-x (1987) [hereinafter Toxrc WASTES AND RACE].
2. In this article, the term "environmental protection" encompasses both the regulation of exposure to environmental hazards and enforcement of environmental laws.
3. See William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, E PA J., Mar.-Apr.
1992, at 18; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text.
4. See John H. Adams, The Mainstream Environmental Movement, EPA J., Mar.Apr. 1992, at 25, 25-26; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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environmental hazards and racial injustice. 5 Although the phrase was
new, the political movement that gave birth to it was not. Activists in
communities of color have been fighting the effects of environmental
racism in organized campaigns at the local level for many years. 6 Despite their efforts and decades of environmental regulation, communities of color are left with greater environmental hazards and less
rigorous environmental enforcement than exist in predominantly
White communities. 7 A similar pattern of unequal environmental
protection exists in low income communities. 8 Something has gone
wrong.
Apparently, neither Congress nor EPA officials contemplated
that the creation and administration of federal environmental
laws would allow a disproportionate burden9 to fall on minor5. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXJE: RACE, CLAss AND ENVIRONMEN·
TAL QuALITY 1-20 (1990) [hereinafter DuMPING IN DIXIE]. Environmental "time bombs"
in communities of color are not high on the agenda of mainstream environmentalists and
have not received much attention from mainstream civil rights advocates, but in the 1980's
a small cadre of African-American activists began to view environmental discrimination as
a civil rights issue. /d. at 14-17. EPA did not examine racial equity issues until the early
1990's. Even then, managers in EPA's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
were not aware of EPA's efforts and believed environmental equity awareness workshops
were necessary within EPA. See ENvn.. PRoTEcriON AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL Eourrv:
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, VOL. 2 SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 17 (1992} (hereinafter SUPPORTING DOCUMENT); ENVTL. PROTECfiON AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EO·
UJTY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, VoL. 1 WoRKGROUP REPORT TO TilE
ADMINISTRATOR (1992} (hereinafter WORKGROUP REPORT). The Workgroup Report and
the Supporting Document are collectively referred to as the "1992 EPA Report."
6. See DuMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5, at 37-73 (describing five organized campaigns in low income and middle income African-American communities in the southern
states that date to the early 1980's); see also SUPPORTING DocUMENT, supra note 5, at 90
(commenting on the long history of local efforts in communities of color).
7. See generally Toxrc WASTES AND RAcE, supra note 1; SuPPORTING DoCUMENT,
supra note 5; WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5; DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5; RACE
AND 11iE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter RAcE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDS]
(discussing disparate exposure to environmental hazards on the basis of race); Unequal
Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at Sl, SlS12 [hereinafter Unequal Protection] (discussing disparate enforcement of environmental
Jaws); CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM 11iE GRASSROOTS (Robert
D. Bullard ed., 1993) (hereinafter VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS); TOXIC STRUGGLES:
THE THEORY AND PRACfiCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Richard Hofrichter ed., 1993)
(hereinafter TOXIC STRUGGLES); UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
CoMMUNITIES OF CoLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
8. See supra note 7.
9. Burdens caused by environmental laws include price increases passed on to consumers, product limitation or unavailability, fewer employment opportunities, more governmental expenditures, and redistribution of environmental risks that results from some
forms of environmental control. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing Environmental Justice: The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 792-96 (1993).
The scope of this article is limited to disparate environmental risk in low income and minority communities and unequal enforcement of environmental laws.
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ityto and low income communities, or that these communities would
continue to suffer a disproportionate share of environmental
hazards.u Congress did anticipate, however, a risk of underenforcement of environmental laws due to lack of regulatory capacity.12 Consequently, federal legislation envisioned that private participation in
the enforcement of environmental laws would be an important aspect
of environmental regulation as an adjunct to public enforcement.13
Most major federal environmental laws contain special citizen suit
provisions, granting private citizens authority to prosecute civil actions
against polluters for violations of environmental laws and authority to
sue government officials for failure to perform nondiscretionary
duties. 14 Citizen suit provisions allow a private citizen more than a
challenge to arbitrary agency action; citizen suit provisions essentially
confer "private attorney general" status, allowing a citizen to proceed
on behalf of the general public.ts
Private enforcement has played and continues to play a key role
in environmental protection. Yet, individuals using citizen suit provisions are under no obligation to prosecute violators in any particular
manner, nor are they subject to governmental oversight, nor are they
held accountable to the general public. In theory at least, it is possible
for private enforcers to skew enforcement and exacerbate the effects
of environmental racism by prosecuting violations or challenging
agency inaction that affect only affluent, predominantly White communities. Private enforcement can mean that some communities have
the benefit of public and private enforcement resources while other
communities must rely solely upon public enforcement of environmental laws.
Given increasing evidence that minority and low income communities suffer disproportionately greater environmental hazards, it is
important to ask first, whether the scheme of private enforcement
contributes indirectly to unequal environmental protection, and
second, whether citizen suit provisions could provide one means to
address environmental inequities. The frequency of use of environmental citizen suits by low income and minority communities relative
10. For ease of reference, and to avoid awkward sentences, sometimes I use the
phrase "minority communities" instead of "communities of color." It is an unsatisfactory,
but widely understood term.
11. Major environmental laws lack legislative provisions specifically addressing distributional inequity to low income and minority communities, which suggests that the problem was not anticipated, or that there was insufficient political pressure brought to bear
upon the issue. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
15.

Id.
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to White, affluent communities is difficult, if not impossible, to measure empirically.16 However, characteristics ·of the scheme of private
enforcement,l? as well as the nature of the environmental justice
movement, 1s suggest that citizen suits are underutilized in the environmental justice context.1 9 This article attempts to examine the special problems that community-based groups in low income and
minority communities might encounter in prosecuting citizen suits
under highly technical environmental statutes.
To set the context for this inquiry, part II of this article describes
the environmental justice movement and investigates the charge that
communities of color are disproportionately and unjustly burdened
with environmental hazards. Part II also explores the differences in
perspective that underlie much of the conflict among environmental
justice activists, mainstream environmental organizations, and EPA.2o
Part II concludes with a look at social forces that have contributed to
environmental inequities and that might influence environmental enforcement efforts.
Part III examines the current scheme of private enforcement of
selected, major federal environmental laws through citizen lawsuit
16. Notice-to-sue provisions generally do not require the prospective plaintiff to provide information concerning the demographics of the location where the alleged violation
occurs. Interview with Robin Lancaster, EPA Office of Regulatory Enforcement, Toxics
and Pesticides, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Aug. 4, 1994); see also 40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (1994)
(contents of notice under Clean Water Act); id. § 254.3 (1994) (contents of notice under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)). A major study of citizen's suits
noted that often notices were incomplete and duplicative. See BuREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, E NVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN Surrs: CONFRONTING THE CORPORATION 19 (1988)
[hereinafter BNA REPORT).
17. For example, compare enforcement suits under the Clean Water Act with enforcement suits under the Clean Air Act and RCRA. See infra part II.B.l.
18. For example, only recently have environmental hazards in minority communities
been characterized as environmental issues rather than farrnworker, labor, or civil rights
issues. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling,
11 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 526-27 (1994) [hereinafter Environmental Justice Litigation].
19. Telephone Interview with Deeohn Ferris, Alliance for Washington Office for Environmental Justice (Aug. 17, 1994). Ms. Ferris concurs with a general assessment that
communities of color and low income communities are not using environmental citizen
suits as a concerted strategy. /d. In contrast, Ms. Ferris noted that there has been a recent
surge in complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and is personally aware of approximately 18 such lawsuits brought within the last few years. /d. Also, Scott Fulton,
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the EPA,
reported that although verification is difficult, it is his general sense that Clean Air Act and
RCRA citizen suits are underutilized, especially in the environmental justice context. Interview with Scott Fulton, EPA Deputy Assistant Adm'r for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Aug. 5, 1994).
20. Part II of this article is an attempt to remedy unfamiliarity with the environmental
justice movement as well as to provide the context for the following discussion of citizen
suits as a remedy for environmental inequity. Those readers who have studied or worked
with environmental justice issues might wish to proceed directly to parts III and IV.
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provisions.21 Existing citizen suit provisions contain limitations that
create incentives for private citizens to prosecute certain types of actions and disincentives to prosecute other actions. Part III addresses
the possibility that these incentives and disincentives result in an unequal playing field for enforcement by low income communities and
communities of color, which in turn exacerbates the disparity in environmental protection of these communities. Common types of environmental citizen suits are examined to determine whether they have
the potential to address environmental problems prevalent in low income and minority communities, and, if so, whether community-based
groups might be at a disadvantage in prosecuting such lawsuits because of underfunding.
In conclusion, part IV suggests amendments to environmental
laws that might more directly address disparity in environmental protection. It also suggests alternative interpretations of federal citizen
suit provisions that might facilitate the use of private enforcement to
promote environmental justice.zz
21. See infra note 137.
22. Ultimately, environmental justice will be attained when communities of color and
low income communities are on an equal footing economically and politically with the rest
of society. Meanwhile, enhancing private enforcement under citizen suit provisions is one
of several ways to use the legal system to promote environmental justice. Recently, legal
commentators have focused on siting procedures and civil rights claims. Federal constitutional and civil rights challenges to siting toxic facilities have been unsuccessful because of
the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent. Commentators suggest legal reformation in
the civil rights area, challenges to discriminatory siting through alternative state claims, and
reformation of facility siting procedures for toxic waste facilities. See generally Rachel D.
Godsil, Comment, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394 (1991) (examining reform of siting procedures); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson,
Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TuL. ENVTL.
L.J. 153, 205-06 (1991) (suggesting reform of siting procedures); Naikang Tsao, Comment,
Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide To Combatting the Discriminatory
Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366, 379-405 (1992) (suggesting challenges
under state constitutional, statutory, and common law doctrines); Peter L. Reich, Greening
the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REv. 271, 300-12
(1992) (examining the potential of state law doctrines); Robert W. Collin, Environmental
Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVI'L. L.J. 495
(1992) (discussing inadequacies of litigation and suggesting community-level environmental planning); Walter Willard, Environmental Racism: The Merging of Civil Rights and Environmental Activism, 19 S.U. L. REv. 77 (1992); Edward P. Boyle, Comment, It's Not Easy
Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument
for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 V AND. L. REv. 937 (1993) (advocating intermediate scrutiny for state actions with significant disparate impact); Lazarus, supra note
9 (examining reform of civil rights laws, possible alternative civil rights claims, and distributional effects in environmental laws); Carolyn M. Mitchell, Environmental Racism: Race
As a Primary Factor in the Selection of Hazardous Waste Sites, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 176
(1993) (describing specific instances of environmental hazards in minority communities
and discussing civil rights and constitutional claims); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To
Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78
CoRNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) (exploring different conceptions of fairness in the context of
siting locally undesirable land uses and examining the limitations of existing proposals for
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I

THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

To many, the term "environmentalism" evokes images of a movement engineered and mobilized by a constituency of White, highly educated, middle and upper class citizens who strive to preserve pristine
natural areas and save endangered species.23 To others, the term
evokes an image of national and international nongovernmental organizations with scientific expertise and political influence that are
largely responsible for seeding the crop of federal environmental laws
that have flowered in recent years. 24 These images are incomplete.
Parallel to mainstream environmentalism is a different environmental
movement, a movement whose constituents reside primarily in low income communities and communities of color.25 The self-termed
reform of siting procedures); Leslie A. Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought That Counts:
The Intent Requirement in Environmental Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 447 {1993)
(suggesting an "effect" rather than an "intent" approach, statutory mandates, and community participation); James H. Colopy, Comment, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Envi·
ronmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of I964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125
{1994); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994).
One commentator thoughtfully reexamined the lawyer's role in representing poor
communities. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment As the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 EcoLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) [hereinafter Empowerment As the Key]; Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A
View from the Field, 90 MrcH. L. REv. 1991 (1992) (responding to comment by Rachel D.
Godsil).
There have been several symposia on environmental justice issues. See Symposium,
Race, Clilss, and Environmental Regulation, 63 U. Cow. L. REv. 839 (1992); Third Annual
Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425
(1994).
.
See also Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 69
(1991) (describing the environmental justice movement); Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and
Addressing Problems Posed by Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 335 (1993)
(suggesting additional data, legislative and administrative remedies, education, and activism); Xavier C. Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Environmental
Racism, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 357 (1993); Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REv. 267 (1994).
23. John H. Adams, Executive Director of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
notes: "The history is well documented: the mainstream environmental movement grew
out of a white, middle-class effort to preserve the world's natural wonders. It is still true
that the staffs of the major national organizations are disproportionately white and middle
class, and it is not defensible." Adams, supra note 4, at 26; see Dorceta Taylor, Can the
Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Support of Minorities?, in RACE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 28-54.
24. Empowerment As the Key, supra note 22, at 635-36 {discussing the scientific and
legal focus of this "second wave" of the environmental movement, which helped to create
complex administrative proceedings that elevate the "expert" while excluding people without legal or scientific training).
25. See generally VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7; ROBERT D. BULLARD, PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS DIRECTORY 1992 (1992) (profiling
205 groups in 35 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Canada).
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movement for environmental and economic justice, often called the
environmental justice movement,26 has a historical development different from the mainstream environmental movement. Because many
of the grassroots campaigns originated in communities that were both
poor and predominantly minority27 and because, statistically, race is
more significantly associated with the prevalence of environmental
hazards,za disparate environmental protection in this context is often
described as environmental racism. 29 All low income communities
(regardless of race)3° and all communities of color (regardless of income) should be free from environmental inequities; however, it is in
the context of numerous race-charged conflicts that the social justice
model of environmentalism developed.

26. I use the phrases "environmentat.justice movement" and "environmental justice
organization" for ease of reference, but the phrases are misnomers to some degree. Community-based organizations identified with the environmental justice movement are multiissue, multicultural organizations that address a wide range of social justice issues and use
the term "environment" only in its broadest terms. Interview with Jeanne Gauna, SouthWest Organizing Project, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Aug. 19, 1994); see Richard Hofrichter,
Introduction to ToXIc STRUGGLES, supra note 7, at 4-6; see also infra note 40.
27. African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans are on average poorer and less educated, and have higher rates of unemployment than whites: about 32% of African-Americans and 27% of Hispanic-Americans have incomes below the poverty line, compared with
about 10% of White Americans. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 6.
28. Most studies reveal that race is a bigger indicator of the prevalence of environmental hazards than income. See Toxic Wastes and Race, supra note I, at 13, 23 (concluding that the possibility of racial patterns occurring by chance is virtually impossible); see
also Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura J. Fitton, Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited: An Update of the 1987 Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities
with Hazardous Waste Sites 2 (1994) (concluding that the disproportionate environmental
impacts that were first identified and documented in the 1987 United Church of Christ
study have grown more severe). But see Douglas L. Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste
Facilities: 'Environmental Equity' Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EvALUATION REv. 123
(1994); Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 11 FORDHAM
L.J. 689, 695-700 (1994). For a critique of the Anderton study, see Robert D. Bullard, A
New 'Chicken-or-Egg' Debate: Which Came First-The Neighborhood, or the Toxic
Dump?, 19 THE WoRKBOOK 60 (1994).
29. Although racial disparity is the focus of environmental justice activism, organizations in communities of color voice strong sentiments of racial and cultural inclusion and
view economic empowerment as key to combatting environmental inequity. See, e.g.,
SouthWest Organizing Project, VocES UNIDAS, First Quarter 1991, at 16, 16 (stating that
the mission of empowerment of the disenfranchised in the Southwest is to realize racial
and gender equality, and social and economic justice). On October 25, 1991, the First
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held a plenary session on
"Building a Multiracial and Multicultural Environmental Justice Movement." CoMMIS·
SION FOR RACIAL JuSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF CoLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT (Charles Lee ed., 1991)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT).
30. For a discussion of grassroots activism from a socioeconomic perspective, followed
by a discussion of a new model of practicing environmental poverty law, see Empowerment
As the Key, supra note 22.
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The Historical Context

Despite decades of local activism,3 1 environmental justice has
only been conspicuous on the national agenda since 1982. In that year
the siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill in predominately African-American Warren County, North Carolina sparked
nonviolent demonstrations resulting in over 500 arrests.32 Against a
well-publicized charge that the community was targeted for siting because the residents were predominantly African-American, the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook an investigation in the southern region (EPA Region IV) and found that three
of the four major offsite hazardous waste facilities were in fact located
in predominantly African-American communities, even though African-Americans comprised only about one-fifth of the region's population.33 The hazardous waste facility was ultimately sited in Warren
County anyway, but the protest provided an impetus for subsequent
empirical study of racially disparate exposure to environmental
hazards.
In 1987, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice published its national study, which documented a significant relationship between the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities
and race, and documented the prevalence of uncontrolled toxic waste
sites in and near communities of color. 34 The highly publicized report
caught the attention of academicians who began to study the relation31. VoiCES FROM nm GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 9. Dr. Bullard has observed
that:
The struggle for environmental justice was not invented in the 1990s. People of
color, individually and collectively, have waged a frontal assault against environmental injustices that predate the first Earth Day in 1970. Many of these struggles, however, were not framed as "environmental" problems-rather they were
seen as addressing "social" problems. For example, the U.S. National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) discovered that srstematic neglect of garbage collection and sanitation services in African-Amencan neighborhoods contributed to the urban disturbances in the 1960s. Inadequate services, unpaved
streets, Jack of sewers and indoor plumbing were environmental problems in the
1960s and are environmental problems in the 1990s.
/d. at 9; see also Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 18, at 526-28.
32. TOXIC WASTES AND RACE, supra note 1, at xi.
33. U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDous
WA~ LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1 (1983) (hereinafter SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LAND·
FILLS]; see also Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty and the Environment: The
Disadvantaged Face Greater Risks, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 6, 6; Robert D. Bullard, The
Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. REsouRCES & ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 23, 23.
34. Toxic WASTES AND RAcE, supra note 1. A "commercial hazardous waste facility" is a public or private facility that accepts hazardous waste from a third party for a fee
or other remuneration, and undertakes to treat, store, or dispose of the hazardous waste.
/d. at xii. "Uncontrolled toxic waste sites" are closed and abandoned sites on EPA's list of
sites posing a present and potential threat to human health and the environment. /d. In
1985, the EPA Risk Commission for Racial Justice Report summarized the following major
findings:
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ship between race and the environment and participate in the environmental justice movement.3s
Demographic Characteristics of Communities with Commercial Hazardous Waste
Facilities.
*Race proved to be the most significant among variables tested in association
with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities. This represented a
consistent national pattern.
•Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic residents. In communities with two or more facilities or one of the nation's five largest landfills, the
average minority percentage of the population was more than three times that
of communities without facilities (38% vs. 12%).
*In communities with one commercial hazardous waste facility, the average
minority percentage of the population was twice the average minority percentage of the population in communities without such facilities (24% vs. 12%).
*Although socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in the
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more
significant. This remained true after the study controlled for urbanization and
regional differences. Incomes and home values were substantially lower when
communities with commercial facilities were compared to communities in the
surrounding counties without facilities.
*Three out of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the
United States were located in predominantly Black or Hispanic communities.
These three landfills accounted for 40% of the total estimated commercial
landfill capacity in the nation.
Demographic Characteristics of Communities with Uncontrolled Toxic Waste
Sites.
*Three out of every five Black and Hispanic-Americans lived in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
*More than 15 million Blacks lived in communities with one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
*More than 8 million Hispanics lived in communities with one or more uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
*Blacks were heavily over-represented in the populations of metropolitan areas with the largest number of uncontrolled toxic waste sites. These areas
include: Memphis, TN (173 sites), St. Louis, MO (160 sites), Houston, TX (152
sites), Cleveland, OH (106 sites), Chicago, IL (103 sites), Atlanta, GA (94
sites).
*Los Angeles, California had more Hispanics living in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites than any other metropolitan area in the United
States.
• Approximately half of all Asian/Pacific Islanders and American Indians lived
in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
*Overall, the presence of uncontrolled toxic waste sites was highly pervasive.
More than half of the total population in the United States resided in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
ld. at xiii-xiv (footnotes omitted).
Dr. Bullard notes:
The facility siting controversy cannot be reduced solely to a class phenomenon
because there is no shortage of poor white communities in the region. One only
has to point to southern Appalachia to see widespread white poverty in America.
Nevertheless, poor whites along with their more affluent counterparts have more
options and leveraging mechanisms (formal and informal) at their disposal than
blacks of equal status.
DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5, at 32-33.
35. For example, the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources in January
1990 sponsored the "Michigan Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental
Hazards," which conducted a review of environmental risk from a socioeconomic perspective. Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, The Michigan Conference, A Thrning Point, EPA J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 9 [hereinafter The Michigan Conference]. "Nine of the twelve scholar-
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Meanwhile, community-based organizations-in addition to local
activism-established regional and national networks36 to prevent the
shifting of environmentally harmful activities from one poor and/or
minority community to another.37 In addition to building networks,
environmental justice activists began to challenge the practices of
EPA38 and mainstream environmental organizations.39 These chalactivists who presented papers at the Michigan Conference were people of color." RAcE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 3. Participants in the Michigan Conference, referring to themselves as the "Michigan Coalition," remained active in the environmental justice movement and commented on the 1992 EPA Report. See SuPPORTING
DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 80-87.
A notable scholar of environmental racism is Dr. Robert D. Bullard, a Professor of
Sociology at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Bullard began investigating the
relationship between race and the siting of noxious facilities as early as 1979, and has published, along with numerous articles, several influential books, including Dumping in Dixie
and Voices from the Grassroots. See DuMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5; VOICES FROM TilE
GRASSROOTS, supra note 7.
36. See generally Environmental Leadership Summit, supra note 29; Marcia Coyle,
When Movements Coalesce, in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S22 [hereinafter When
Movements Coalesce]. Networks of community-based environmental and economic justice
organizations include the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice,
the Southern Organizing Conference, and the Indigenous Environmental Network.
37. "A Call to Action," adopted at the 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, expressed a strong sentiment for a united effort to resist forms
of environmental racism. ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHrP SuMMIT, supra note 29, at xviixviii. The steadfast insistence on social justice principles marks a fundamental difference
from environmental activism that is characterized solely by the not-in-my-back-yard
(NIMBY) attitude. Dorceta E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 54 [hereinafter Environmentalism and
Politics].
38. For example, the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice
sent a letter to then EPA Administrator William K. Reilly giving specific examples of "the
poisoning of our communities" and listing "examples of the lack of accountability on the
part of EPA towards communities of color." Letter from the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, to William K. Reilly, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (July 31, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter SNEEJ Letter to EPA].
The groups represented requested a meeting within 60 days, a description of the process of
addressing problems in communities of color, actions being taken to address specific cases
of environmental degradation, a list of specific cases where EPA chose not to take action
and a list of cases in which EPA used its own funds to clean up industrial, military, or
agricultural contamination. /d. at 7. The groups also requested the implementation of
policies that "will guarantee the full, ongoing and meaningful participation of those directly affected by environmental degradation in any and all workgroups designed to address discriminatory EPA policies in the field and that these participants be chosen by
those directly affected, their organizations and communities." /d. at 8.
39. For example, the SouthWest Organizing Project sent a letter to the "Group of
Ten" national environmental organizations, expressing concern about the role of the organizations in communities of color and citing examples of lack of accountability by the
Group of Ten. Letter from SouthWest Organizing Project, to National Wildlife Federation,
Sierra Club, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Policy Institute/Friends of
the Earth, Izaak Walton League, The Wilderness Society, National Parks and Conservation
Association, and Natural Resources Defense Council1-3 (Mar. 16, 1990) (on file with author); see also The Letter That Shook a Movement, SIERRA MAG., May-June 1993, at 54.
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lenges well illuminated their different perspectives on
environmentalism.40
Environmental justice activists, many of whom were veterans of
the civil rights movement, saw environmental problems as only one
part of the larger social issues of racism and cultural and economic
injustice, while the conventional perspective of environmentalism was
more narrowly focused on the preservation of pristine ecosystems or
on the science and technology of environmental pollution regulation.41 Environmental justice activists charged that national mainstream organizations, at best, contributed to environmental inequities
40. There are many significant differences between mainstream environmental movements and environmental justice activists. For example, the environmental justice movement grew with strong support of religious institutions. Largely due to the influence of
Native American participation, the movement holds spirituality as a key element. A Place
at the Table, A Sierra Roundtable on Race, Justice and the Environment, SIERRA MAG.,
May-June 1993, at 50, 55 [hereinafter A Place at the Table]. While mainstream environmental organizations developed complex relationships with administrative bureaucracies
and focused on national, bureaucratic resolutions, grassroots organizations tended to address local urban and industrial issues. Robert Gottlieb & Helen Ingram, The New Environmentalists, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1988, at 14, 14-15. In addition to toxic substances,
air pollution, and residential groundwater contamination, grassroots organizations view environmental issues as including issues of housing, transportation, and economic development. /d. Viewing conventional environmentalism's focus on regulation and cleanup as
rationalizing urban industrial issues, grassroots organizations promote the concept that the
need of the community and workplace take precedence and that risk decisions-being
political as well as technological-should be subjected to public scrutiny, debate, and participation. /d.
The existing nationally oriented environmental groups, though influenced to
some extent by the new grass-roots organizations, still adhere to an organizational
network that depends primarily on lobbying, litigation, and technical expertise.
Furthermore, during the Reagan years these conventional environmental organizations have become more dependent on funding from foundations and other
private and governmental sources than on their membership bases. And many
have come to embrace an operational style that stresses management skills rather
than organizing efforts, dictating opinion rather than soliciting it. . . . What is most
striking about the grass-roots efforts, however, is their democratic thrust . . . .
Instead of embracing expertise, they have developed self-taught experts. Instead
of concentrating on lobbying and legislation, they have resorted to popular action
and citizens' lawsuits. They have become organizations of active members rather
than rosters of dues-payers on mailing lists.
/d. at 15.
41. DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5, at 11-12. Dr. Bullard notes that mainstream
environmental organizations emphasize preservation and outdoor recreation and are
heavily involved with the technical aspects of environmental regulation and national environmental policy. /d. These organizations have not had a great deal of success in attracting working class persons and Black community residents, who are generally more
attracted to issues couched in a civil rights or equity framework. /d. Moreover, poor and
minority residents have tended to see mainstream environmentalism "as a disguise for oppression and as another 'elitist' movement." /d. at 9.
Blacks did not launch a frontal assault on environmental problems affecting their
communities until these issues were couched in a civil rights context beginning in
the early 1980s. They began to treat their struggle for environmental equity as a
struggle against institutionalized racism and an extension of the quest for social
justice.
/d. at 29.
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by neglect, and at worst, disrupted local initiatives in poor and minority communities by failing to consider the social, economic, and cultural complexities involved.42
In July 1990, then EPA Administrator William K. Reilly formed
the EPA Environmental Equity Workgroup (EPA Workgroup), composed of EPA staff persons,43 to assess evidence that racial minority
and low income communities bear a higher environmental risk burden
than the general population.44 After two years of study, the EPA
42. On March 16, 1990, the SouthWest Organizing Project, a grassroots environmental organization, sent a letter to the "Group of Ten" national environmental organizations,
charging:
In the name of eliminating environmental hazards at any cost, across the country
industrial and other economic activities which employ us are being shut down,
curtailed, or prevented while our survival needs and cultures are ignored. We
suffer the end results of these actions, but are never full participants in the decision-making which leads to them.
See The Letter That Shook a Movement, supra note 39, at 54. The letter cited specific
instances where environmental organizations ignored survival and cultural needs of people
of color, such as Sierra Club's and The Wilderness Society's support of legislation that
annexed 13,000 acres considered to be the ancestral holdings of the Pueblo of Acoma to
form El Malpais National Monument of New Mexico and the Nature Conservancy's and
the National Audubon Society's opposition to sheep grazing on Humphries and Sargent
Wildlife areas by local economic development projects in northern New Mexico. ld.
Richard Moore, Co-Chair of the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic
Justice (SNEEJ), remarked: "We've had to close down plants.... (I)t's killed people inside,
and has also poisoned our groundwater and our air and our children outside. But we went
through a process first, attempting to bring workers into the decision." A Place at the
Table, supra note 40, at 58.
Carl Anthony, President of Earth Island Institute, recently noted:
A good example of the attitudes of the more established groups toward communities of color is Blueprint for the Environment, which was submitted to George
Bush when he took office. It contained 750 detailed recommendations.... The
Groups could have made recommendations about lead poisoning, energy conservation in public housing, siting of affordable housing near transportation corridors, and occupational health-and-safety issues in the workplace. But they didn't.
ld. at 53.
Winona LaDuke, Director of the White Earth Recovery Project, remarked:
In our (Native American] case, unfortunately, the trouble is that environmental
groups have, historically, come from a Eurocentric perspective. That is not an
inclusive perspective, and it's not something we can relate to. Many times, in fact,
environmental groups make decisions that affect other communities without the
input of those communities. One of them even purchased land on our reservation
without ever talking to us about it, and restricted our use of an area that had
medicinal plants.
ld. at 57.
Scott Douglas, Director of the Greater Birmingham Ministries, remarked:
As I went to those communities (of color], I noticed that they didn't separate the
hazardous-waste incinerator from the fact that lead poisoning is not being dealt
with in their schools, from the fact that their schools have been underfunded, that
they have no day care, no jobs, no access to jobs.... Oppressed people do not
have compartmentalized problems.
Id. at 58.
43. WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at ii-iii.
44. The EPA Workgroup's mission was to review and evaluate (with respect to income and race) evidence of disproportionate risk burden, current EPA programs, risk assess~ent guidelines, risk communication guidelines, and institutional relationships. Jd. at
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Workgroup reported insufficient data on environmental health effects
by race and income, but concluded that racial minority and low income populations experience higher than average exposures to certain
air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities (and by implication, hazardous waste), contaminated fish, and agricultural pesticides.45 The
7-8. Although the 1992 EPA Report focuses on income as well as race, the charge of racial
disparity and the attendant political pressure was the prime motivating force. An internal
EPA memorandum asserts that: " [L]ong-simmering resentment in the people of color and
Native American communities about environmental fairness could soon be one of the most
politically explosive environmental issues yet to emerge." The Real Story Behind EPA's
"Environmental Equity" Report, RACE, POVERTY & ENv'T (California Rural Legal Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. Urban Habitat Program, S.F., Cal.), Fall 1991-Winter
1992, at 5, 18 [hereinafter The Real Story).
45. The EPA Workgroup noted evidence of disproportionate exposure in five areas:
exposures to hazardous materials due to residence located near waste sites, lead exposures,
pesticide exposures, air pollution exposures, and dietary exposures to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's), dioxins, and furans through fish consumption. SuPPORTING DocuMENT,
supra note 5, at 7-14.
Residences Near Waste Sites: Ethnic minorities are more likely to live near a commercial or uncontrolled hazardous waste site. !d. at 7-8 (citing SITING oF HAZARDous WASTE
LANDFILLS, supra note 33, at 1). The proportion of minorities in communities with the
largest commercial landfills or the highest number of commercial waste facilities is three
times greater than in communities without such facilities. ld. (citing Toxic WASTES AND
RAcE, supra note 1, at 15-21). Race is more strongly associated with residence near a
waste site than socioeconomic status. ld. at 8. Three out of every five African-Americans
and Hispanic-Americans live in a community with an uncontrolled hazardous waste site.
!d.
Lead Exposures: A significantly higher percentage of Black children compared to
White children have unacceptably high blood lead levels. ld. at 9-10. Notably, these are
studies of actual exposure measured by blood levels, not indicators of potential exposure
determined by measuring ambient concentrations.
Pesticide Exposures: Racial minorities are at increased risk of pesticide exposure because farmwork not done by farm families is done primarily by ethnic minorities.
"[A)gricultural workers are exposed to many toxic substances in the workplace. Such exposures can cause cancer and a wide range of noncancer health effects." ld. at 10. Of
approximately two million workers, 80% to 90% are Latino, followed in order by AfricanAmericans, Black Caribbeans, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Laotians, Koreans,
and Jamaicans. ld. As many as 313,000 farm workers experience pesticide-related illnesses
each year. ld.
Air Pollution: "[H)igher percentages of Blacks and Hispanics live in EPA-designated
non-attainment areas, relative to Whites, for particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone,
sulfur dioxide and lead." /d. at 11. Indicators of unhealthful outdoor air quality positively
correlate with low income areas. /d. African-Americans were shown to have higher levels
of carbon monoxide than Whites in a national study. ld.
Fish Consumption: Nearly 20 local and national surveys and reports note fish consumption differences based on race and ethnicity, but find different rates for the populations studied. /d. at 12. Native Americans consumed 36% more fish and Blacks 13% more
fish than Caucasians. ld. (citing Patrick West et al., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a Statewide Survey of Michigan, in RACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 100) [hereinafter West Survey). Asians/Samoans eat the most
fish, followed in order by Caucasians, Hispanics, and African-Americans. SuPPORTING
DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 12. "The National Purchase Diary (NPD) Survey, a national
survey of 25,000 individuals, found Asians to have the highest fish consumption rate." /d.
The EPA Workgroup noted that the studies, focused on licensed fishers, "may not be accounting for lower-income anglers who do not purchase licenses but continue to catch and
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higher than average exposures to air pollutants and hazardous substances were due largely to residential patterns (i.e., living in areas
with unhealthy outdoor air quality and near hazardous waste facilities). Occupational exposures accounted for higher than average pesticide exposure. Above average fish consumption generally, the kinds
of fish consumed, and the manner of preparation accounted for higher
than average exposure to contaminated fish. The 1992 EPA Report
was cautious in tone. The EPA Workgroup stressed that exposure
does not always result in immediate or acute health effects and that an
individual's activity pattern is the most important determinant of exposure.46 Thus, exposure indicated by environmental measurements
in air, water, soil, or food merely represents potential rather than actual exposure. 47 The exception to the potential, but not necessarily
actual, exposure distinction was lead. The existing studies of unacceptably high blood lead levels documented actual rather than potential exposure and, consequently, directly established disparate adverse
health effects.48 The EPA Workgroup then concluded that high exposures and the possibility of chronic effects presented cause for concern, and suggested that EPA procedures might be improved to take
into account equity considerations.49 The EPA Workgroup also emphasized the Agency's earlier responses to environmental justice issues at regional levels.so
consume fish." /d. Other studies suggest that "ethnic minorities are more likely to eat fish
with the skin, may be less likely to trim the fat, and are more likely to eat the whole fish."
/d. Bottom-dwelling fish are consumed more by non-White, low income populations, and
clams and hepatopancreas' of crabs are disproportionately consumed by Asians. !d. at 1213.
46. WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 3, 7.
47. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 7. The EPA Workgroup noted that the
level of pollution is a measure of potential exposure, and, "although the potential for exposure may be the same, not all potentially exposed persons will experience the same actual
exposure ... . [A) person's activity pattern is the single most important determinant of
environmental exposures for most pollutants." ld.
48. !d. at 9-10.
49. Among the Workgroup's recommendations are that EPA should: (1) increase the
priority that it gives to issues of environmental equity; (2) establish and maintain information that provides an objective basis for assessment of risks by income and race; (3) incorporate considerations of environmental equity into the risk assessment process; (4) target
opportunities to reduce concentrations of risk to specific population groups; (5) where appropriate, assess and consider the distribution of projected risk reduction in major
rulemakings and Agency initiatives; (6) selectively review and revise permit, grant, monitoring, and enforcement procedures to address high concentrations of risk in racial minority and low income areas and emphasize environmental equity concerns to state and local
governments; (7) improve communication with racial minority and low income communities and increase efforts to involve them in environmental policymaking; and (8) establish
mechanisms to incorporate environmental equity concerns in long-term planning operations. See Workgroup Report, supra note 5, at 25-31.
50. Many of the equity projects listed in the 1992 EPA Report were not specifically
designed to target racial or socioeconomic disparity, but had the potential to indirectly
affect poor and minority communities. Equity projects included: (1) a project in Boston,
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The 1992 EPA Report was reviewed by environmental justice activists. They were particularly critical of the EPA Workgroup's decision to narrow the environmental justice issue to exclude
consideration of relevant social dynamics as causes of environmental
inequities, such as housing discrimination, land use planning, and redlining.51 In addition, the EPA Workgroup made no attempt to provide
an analysis of how exclusion, power imbalances, and other institutionalized forms of racial and class discrimination affect environmental
policies and decisionmaking. For example, one organization questioned the Workgroup's failure to consider how delegation of programs to states, agreements with regulated industries, and market
Massachusetts (Region I), which consisted of nine meetings between community leaders,
Black college student government presidents, local urban media outlets, and EPA officials
and was intended to culminate in a conference in 1993; (2) a study in New York (Region II)
to assess whether more affluent communities were receiving more favorable cleanup
through the Superfund program; (3) a multimedia environmental risk profile to be developed in Region III to see if risks were distributed disproportionately by socioeconomic
class; (4) a program in Region III for communication of radon and asbestos health risks to
communities in the Philadelphia area; (5) a program to increase multicultural participation
in the restoration of the Chesapeake Bay in Region Ill; (6) a risk-based, multimedia effort
in southeast Chicago (Region V) to reduce toxics in inner-city locations; (7) a comparative
risk analysis project in Region VI to analyze factors such as age, pregnancy, genetics, personal income, preexisting disease, and lifestyle as susceptibility measures; (8) a major 1992
enforcement effort in the Gulf Coast ecoregion (Region VI); (9) a study to monitor and
analyze toxic chemicals along the Rio Grande from El Paso to the Gulf of Mexico; (10) a
strategy to develop the capability within tribes to manage their own tribal environments in
Kansas City (Region VII); (11) a pilot teacher-training program focused on educating K-6
teachers at a July 1991, two-week summer institute in Region VII; (12) an investigation of
polluting facilities and enforcement actions in the Denver-Boulder metropolitan area (Region VIII); (13) an outreach program piloted in a low income community in Region VIII;
(14) a public water supply enforcement effort in San Francisco (Region IX); (15) an environmental risk-ranking project in Hawaii; (16) the development of a pesticide applicator
training course in Spanish, held at six locations in Washington State; (17) a Seattle study
(Region X) to develop a methodology to estimate populations that may be at greater risk
from fish consumption; (18) a study to see whether a state revolving fund loan program
was providing equitable funding to economically disadvantaged small communities; (19) a
project to develop and test new financing arrangements and to encourage private participation in environmental services; (20) a strategy to reduce lead, including publishing a final
rule reducing lead in drinking water and planning to propose lowering the national ambient air quality standard for lead; (21) training sessions for Mexican inspectors of maquiladora industries; and (22) the development of a project to evaluate the relationship
between pollutant emissions and exposure for racial minorities and low income persons to
be done by state, county, and targeted geographic areas. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra
note 5, at 54-67.
51. Responding to the 1992 EPA Report, the Michigan Coalition noted a failure to
mention housing discrimination, poverty, or imbalances in political access and power. /d.
at 73. Dr. Bullard observed that the EPA Workgroup and the resulting 1992 EPA Report:
(1) failed to grasp the interrelationship between race, class, and environmental decisionmaking; (2) omitted literature on environmental politics challenging the notion of "valuefree" science and application of technology; (3) identified class factors as the reason for
elevated risks instead of racial barriers, inequitable distribution of wealth, housing and real
estate practices, land use planning, redlining, and differential enforcement of environmental laws; and (4) failed to address the issue of institutional racial discrimination. /d. at 78.
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incentives impact low income and minority communities.sz The 1992
EPA Report was also criticized for overemphasizing the lack of data
and for the absence of specific recommendations to address disparity
in environmental protection. 53 Environmental justice activists were
clearly frustrated by EPA's failure to take specific and aggressive action.54 Activists also questioned the motives of high level EPA officials and their commitment to environmental justice.ss
52. SNEEJ noted: "There is no analysis of causes of environmental inequities. EPA
policies, including delegation of programs to state/local governments, voluntary agreements with industry, and market incentives, disproportionately impact racial minority and
low-income communities." /d. at 75.
53. See id. at 72-121. For example, the Michigan Coalition noted that the 1992 EPA
Report overstated the lack of data on environmental risks, and that there was more information on the impacts of environmental hazards to racial minority and low income communities than the Workgroup had considered. /d. at 73. SNEEJ noted that, while the 1992
EPA Report identified lack of data as a major finding, EPA was not planning any major
effort to remedy the data gap. /d. at 75-77. Dr. Robert Bullard noted that the EPA Report
contained "a selective, biased and superficial review of the literature on the nature and
severity of environmental problems." /d. at 78.
54. Richard Moore, Co-Chair of SNEEJ, commented: "We want protection, not another study ... . We've studied this issue to death. When you see poor communities that
have six times more miscarriages than they should have or clusters of babies born without
brains, you don't need another study to tell you that something is wrong." Environment,
Community Leaders Angered by EPA Report on Pollution Impact on Poor, Minorities,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 143, at D6 (July 24, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NWLTRS File. He also questioned whether the formation of an EPA "environmental equity cluster" (as the EPA Workgroup suggested) would be a powerless buffer
between grassroots environmental organizations and the more powerful branches of EPA.
/d. Also noted was the Workgroup's failure to address inequitable siting concerns and
failure to explain inaction in pesticide regulation. SUPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5,
at 72, 75-76; see also supra note 45 (findings on pesticide exposure).
55. Response to the 1992 EPA Report also evidences a basic mistrust of high level
EPA officials, who allegedly view equity solely as a public relations issue. SuPPORTING
DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 72. The criticism is not without basis. A confidential internal
EPA memorandum (from the Associate Administrator for Communications to the Administrator's Chief of Staff) warned that environmental fairness could become " 'one of the
most politically explosive environmental issues yet to emerge.' " The Real Story, supra
note 44, at 5 (quoting the memorandum). The memorandum further warned that:
"'(EPA's] goal is to make the agency's substantial investment in environmental equity and
cultural diversity an unmistakable matter of record with mainstream groups before activists
enlist them in a campaign that could add the agency ... as a potential target.' " /d. at 18
(quoting the memorandum). According to the memorandum, EPA should "win recognition" before "'the people of color fairness issue reach[es] the "ftashpoint"-that state in
an emotionally charged public controversy when activist groups finally succeed in persuading the more influential mainstream groups (civil rights organizations, unions, churches) to
take ill-advised actions.'" /d. (quoting the memorandum). The adversarial tenor of the
memorandum indicates more of a concern for political maneuvering than a respect for the
concerns of environmental justice activists. Some members of the EPA Workgroup specifically dissented from the 1992 EPA Report on the basis that the Report "does not include
any input from outside organizations which have been active in identifying the issue of
environmental equity." EPA Report: A Dissent, RACE, PoVERTY & ENV'T (California Rural Legal Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. Urban Habitat Program, S.F., Cal.), Fall
1991-Winter 1992, at 19; see also SNEEJ Letter to EPA, supra note 38 (requesting participation in EPA Workgroup proceedings).
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On September 21, 1992, the National Law Journal presented the
results of an eight-month investigation of EPA's enforcement patterns.56 Among the most alarming findings were that penalties for violations of federal environmental laws were substantially higher ( 46%
to 500% higher) in predominantly White communities;s 7 the
Superfund cleanup of contaminated sites in or near non-White communities generally took longer than efforts in predominantly White
areas; and the cleanup remedies chosen in non-White areas were less
thorough than cleanup initiatives in predominantly White areas.ss
EPA's oblique response to the investigation was an assertion that
environmental laws are enforced in a neutral manner according to
neutral criteria.59 EPA's race-oblivious approach to environmental
protection appeared to be justified on a familiar logic: (a) more scientific studies must be completed before it is determined if, and to what
extent, disparate exposure to environmental hazards, disparate adverse health effects, and disparate environmental protection actually
exist; and (b) if there is disparity in environmental protection, it is the
result of the legacy of inherited poverty and discrimination.60 Accord56. Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S5.
57. In the National Law Joumafs investigation, enforcement data and Superfund data
were divided into four equal groups or "quartiles"; the results compare the quartile with
the highest White population to the quartile with the lowest White population. Methodology: Computing the Patterns, in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S2, S4. For ease of
reference to this particular study, I use the term "predominantly White communities" to
signify the quartile with the highest White population and the terms "non-White areas" or
"non-White communities" to signify the quartile with the lowest White populations.
58. Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S2. Key findings, based on computer-assisted
analysis of census data, revealed that:
*Penalties under hazardous waste laws at sites having the greatest white population were about 500 percent higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority population. Hazardous waste, meanwhile, is the type of pollution experts say
is most concentrated in minority communities.
*For all the federal environmental Jaws aimed at protecting citizens from air,
water, and waste pollution, penalties in white communities were 46 percent
higher than in minority communities.
*Under the giant Superfund cleanup program, abandoned hazardous waste sites
in minority areas take 20 percent longer to be placed on the national priority
action list than those in white areas.
*In more than half of the 10 autonomous regions that administer EPA programs
around the country, action on cleanup at Superfund sites begins from 12 percent
to 42 percent later at minority sites than at white sites.
*At the minority sites, the EPA chooses "containment," the capping or walling off
of a hazardous dump site, 7 percent more frequently than the cleanup method
preferred under the law, permanent "treatment," to eliminate the waste or rid it
of its toxins. At white sites, the EPA orders treatment 22 percent more often than
containment.
/d. at S4, S7.
59. EPA lawyers declined to respond directly to the National Law Journal's analysis,
but said decisions are based on the science of particular sites, not on race. /d. at S8.
60. In an article published before the National Law Journal published a report on its
investigation, then EPA Administrator William K. Reilly stated that the failure to achieve
equity in environmental matters is a symptom of larger patterns of industrial growth and
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ing to this logic, EPA is neither culpable nor legally required to undertake specific or targeted action to alleviate the effects of past
injustices. 61
Partly in response to the National Law Journal investigation and
report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights launched a
broad investigation of federal agencies' compliance with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance. In particular, the Commission on
Civil Rights sought to examine EPA's environmental justice policy.62
Perhaps in response to the investigation, some EPA officials under a
new administration appeared to take a more introspective look at how
Agency procedures might affect environmental justice issues. 63
neglect, and the legacy of inherited poverty and discrimination. Reilly, supra note 3, at 22.
Mr. Reilly also protested that talk of environmental racism at EPA infuriated him and that
impartiality should guide the application of laws designed to protect the health of human
beings and the productivity of ecological systems. ld. According to Reilly, EPA's ap·
proach to environmental equity is to strengthen relationships with minority academic institutions, hire more racial minorities, and address the distribution and management of
environmental risk. ld. at 19.
61. Mr. Reilly took the position that a governmental agency is limited in its capacity
to affect larger cultural and social trends, but he acknowledged that EPA could make efforts to redress obvious wrongs. ld. Although he felt that informed decisions about environmental equity require a better database, Mr. Reilly suggested that EPA could integrate
equity considerations in risk assessment, target high risk populations, incorporate equity
into long-term planning, and improve relationships with minority and low income communities. /d. at 22. He stated that regional offices were investigating problems of environmental equity and undertaking steps to remedy them, but he alleged that minorities are
usually the chief beneficiaries of more general efforts to protect the environment. !d. Mr.
Reilly's comments, as well as the 1992 EPA Report, exhibit a notable lack of introspection
concerning EPA's internal processes or the social context in which environmental laws are
enforced. SUPPORTING DocUMENT, supra note 5, at 2-3 (EPA Workgroup noting that the
existence of injustices and socioeconomic factors was beyond the scope of the 1992 EPA
Report and that EPA can act on inequities based on scientific data).
EPA did not appear to question whether there could exist institutional racism or even
unconscious individual racism within the Agency. See Reilly, supra note 3. Similar institutional attitudes have been examined in other governmental contexts. See generally JAMES
A. KUSHNER, APARTiffiiD IN AMERICA: AN HiSTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980) (supporting the theory
that judicial treatment of racial segregation is based on the assumption that segregation is a
result of unknown and unknowable causes, which leads to a failure to identify the nature
and extent of government culpability and abdication of moral or legal responsibility).
62. Marcia Coyle et at., Civil Rights Commission To Look at Agencies, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 5, 5. The Commission also asked EPA to review Mississippi's hazardous
waste facility permitting program to determine whether it exposes poor and predominantly
Black communities to disproportionately high environmental risks. Id. at 5, 9.
63. Scott Fulton, then EPA's acting head of enforcement, during a March 25, 1993,
forum of civil rights and environmental justice activists, commented that: "[O)ver the past
several months in particular, (EPA has] been doing a lot of soul-searching, to make sure
we're doing the right thing in this area. We need to look at how we target the enforcement
machine and see how we can focus it better on the communities that are suffering disproportionate risk." Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement To Be Probed by Rights Commission, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 3, 34. He also noted that: "[I)t's certainly true that
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Although many EPA officials under President Clinton's Administration have abandoned the race-oblivious approach to environmental
protection, the primary administrative responses64 remain investigation and study, rather than specific remedies targeted toward alleviating specific environmental inequities.65
On a legislative level, environmental justice measures have been
proposed as well, but the measures largely provide for further study in
one form or another. For example, in response to the United Church
of Christ study and the National Law Journal investigation, Congress
amended legislation establishing an Office of Environmental Justice
to gather and analyze data and to develop a plan to achieve environmental equity.66 There were additional legislative proposals attemptwithout documentation [of assessed penalties], we're left unable to police ourselves in the
way we would like to assure that things like bias don't creep into our penalty assessments.
We're working on that." Jd.
64. The Clinton Administration recently agreed to: (1) investigate civil rights claims
of two communities charging racially motivated facility sitings; (2) review regulations
designed to prevent exposure to contaminants from fish consumption; (3) open the process
for community participation in the identification and cleanup of contaminated sites; (4)
institute a lead abatement program in Washington, D.C.; and (5) draft proposed regulations pressing state agencies to consider, in permit proceedings, the environmental impact
of high concentrations of industries in the area. Melissa Healy, Administration Joins Fight
for 'Environmental Justice', L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1993, at Al. On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed an Executive order requiring federal agencies to make fair treatment
of minority communities a factor in decisions ranging from the regulation of pesticides to
the prosecution of polluters. Melissa Healy, 'Environmental Justice' for U.S. Minorities Is
Ordered, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at A15. But at a meeting of environmental justice
activists, the Administration was called upon to take specific action, such as the promulgation of a ban on lead and benzene. Jd.
65. For example, at a meeting of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC)-comprised of members of environmental justice groups, academics, and industry-representatives of the EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
discussed potential projects to enhance enforcement in poor and minority communities.
Proceedings of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Meeting (Aug. 3-5,
1994) (meeting summary on file with author).
Another concern raised at the NEJAC enforcement subcommittee meeting by environmental justice advocate Pat Bryant of the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization, is that,
despite efforts at the federal level, it is difficult to get concrete beneficial results at the
regional and local enforcement level. Acknowledging the difficulty, Scott Fulton, EPA
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, noted that
the states conduct approximately 95% of regulatory inspections and bring about 10,000
enforcement compliance actions, compared to the approximately 4000 enforcement actions
(including criminal enforcement) brought annually by EPA. He explained the difficulty in
the federal-state relationships involved: where EPA challenges the states for nonenforcement, courts tend to look at EPA as being "too picky" and the states respond by declining
to administer some programs. His comments underscore the need for enhanced private
enforcement at the local level in poor and minority communities. /d.
66. 139 CoNo. REc. S5166-67 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (recording a Senate discussion
of both the 1987 United Church of Christ study and the 1992 National Law Journal investigation to support an amendment establishing an office of environmental justice that would
be responsible for collection of data on environmental justice issues).
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ing to identify high impact areas and adverse health effects as a
prelude to further legislative or administrative action. 67
In addition to recent agency and legislative responses, some of
the national mainstream environmental organizations,68 such as Sierra
Club,69 have responded to environmental justice issues by attempting
candid communication with community activists, such as Richard
Moore of the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic
Justice (SNEEJ) and Winona LaDuke of White Earth Recovery Project.70 These national organizations have also undertaken collabora67. On June 24, 1993, the proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1993 was submitted
to Congress for consideration. 139 CoNG. REc. S8107-10 {daily ed. June 24, 1993). Under
the proposed legislation, the EPA Administrator is to inventory toxic chemicals released
and, within one year of enactment, determine the 100 geographical areas of the United
States with the highest total load of toxic chemicals. !d. at S8108. Within two years of
enactment, EPA, in consultation with other agencies, is to conduct compliance inspections
of facilities in the areas and publish a report identifying the nature and extent of the health
impacts of such facilities on the communities involved. /d. If significant adverse health
effects on humans are found, the President would have one year to propose administrative
and legislative changes to Congress in order to remedy and prevent adverse impacts. /d.
Additionally, if significant adverse health effects are found, the Administrator is to promulgate regulations for federal permits for construction or modifications of toxic chemical
facilities requiring net reductions of chemicals causing adverse health effects (i.e., an offset
program for new sources). /d. An earlier version submitted by former Senator Gore was
more aggressive in providing for a moratorium on new permits in high impact areas. 138
CoNG. REc. S7489 {daily ed. June 3, 1992).
The proposed legislation would undoubtedly be beneficial in that EPA would undertake to inventory multiple and diverse contaminants and study resulting adverse health
effects. But the bill in its currently proposed form has obvious problem areas. The phrase
"significant adverse impacts" from exposure to toxic chemicals on human health, which
triggers a duty to propose legislation and promulgate offset requirements, is not statutorily
defined. There is no statutory deadline to promulgate offset regulations. The bill is silent
as to its effect on inconsistent provisions in other federal environmental laws. For example,
the Clean Air Act authorizes a waiver of offset requirements for certain facilities emitting
criteria pollutants {which should be considered toxic pollutants under the proposed Environmental Justice Act) if located in nonattainment areas designated as zones targeted for
economic development. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. Lastly, the proposed
legislation does not contain a citizen suit provision authorizing an action-forcing suit
should the Administrator fail to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the bill.
The proposed legislation was not enacted during the 103d congressional session. More
specifically targeted amendments were proposed {but not enacted during the 103d congressional session) under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), which includes RCRA, to
require federal rejection of proposals to site hazardous or solid waste facilities in environmentally disadvantaged communities and to require community information statements.
See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
68. In using the term "mainstream environmental organizations," I exclude some initiatives by local chapters. Professor Jarman correctly points out that, in the past, some
local chapters undertook environmental initiatives in low income and minority communities, but were often understaffed, underfunded, and unsupported at the national level. Telephone Interview with Casey M. Jarman, Associate Professor, University of Hawaii,
William S. Richardson School of Law (July 20, 1994) (on file with author).
69. See generally A Place at the Table, supra note 40.
70. !d. at 53-58.
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tive efforts with environmental justice groups71 and have diversified
staff boards and staff members.72 However, initiatives in poor and minority communities brought by national environmental organizations
have been counterproductive to the environmental justice movement
when representation is undertaken without meaningful direction from
the community.73 Additionally, national environmental organizations
compete with community organizations for limited funding that is
available for environmental justice activities.74
In sum, despite national publicity surrounding environmental justice issues and some agency and environmental interest group response, many local communities are in substantially the same position
as they were before the 1982 Warren County demonstrations.

B.

From the Data Gap to the Quantification Trap

In the 1970's and 1980's, environmental justice advocates-those
who were engaged in addressing environmental problems on the local
level with limited budgets-did not participate in the formulation of
national environmental policy, the legislation of federal environmental laws, or the implementation of regulatory enforcement. 75 The in71. Environmentalism and Politics, supra note 37, at 58-59. However, not all mainstream environmental groups have been willing to collaborate.
Some white environmentalists dismiss this new sector of the environmental movement as radical social justice extremists and stubbornly ignore the potential insights to be gained by exploring their experience. For them, it is still business as
usual. Others have sought to make just enough changes within their organizations to avoid charges of racism and negative press coverage. Still others have
responded to this new sector of the movement by beginning to imagine more
powerful and inclusive ways of furthering the environmental cause.
/d. at 58; see Steven Keeva, A Breath of Justice, 80 A.B.A. J. 88,.90 (1994) (noting that
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund opened an office in Louisiana's "Cancer Corridor" area);
see also Richard Moore & Louis Head, Acknowledging the Past, Confronting the Present, in
Toxic STRUGGLES, supra note 7, at 122-23 (discussing successful alliances with National
Toxics Campaign and Campaign for Responsible Technology).
72. See generally Adams, supra note 4.
73. Environmental justice advocate Dana Alston of the Public Welfare Foundation
discussed the difficulty with alliances between community groups and large environmental
organizations. She noted that there have been instances where litigation-oriented national
environmental groups prosecuted lawsuits concerning activities in poor and minority
neighborhoods without meaningful participation from the community residents. Community residents and community organizations were not consulted to determine if the Htigation would be beneficial to the community, given the political and economic complexities
involved. Interview with Dana Alston, Public Welfare Foundation, in Albuquerque, N.M.
(Aug. 4, 1994).
74. /d. Ms. Alston noted that some large national environmental organizations use
their "environmental justice" activities to bolster their fundraising campaigns. See Richard
Moore & Louis Head, Acknowledging the Past, Confronting the Present, in Toxic STRUGGLES, supra note 7, at 124-25.
75. Major environmental laws were first enacted or underwent substantial revision
from the late 1960's to the early 1980's. See FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw§ 1.01
(3d ed. 1985) (hereinafter GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw]. For example, although the
Clean Air Act was the product of 10 separate congressional acts beginning with the Air
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fluential players in the national environmental community have been
the regulated entities, governmental agencies administering environmentallaws,76 and national environmental organizations, particularly
those with litigation missions.77 It has become apparent that the interests of low income and minority persons were not specifically addressed during the drafting of critical environmental laws.78
Pollution Control Act of 1955, it was substantially amended by the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970 and 1977. See Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685 (1977); see also 3 MARK SQUILLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR POLLUTION 47 (2d
ed. 1992). The Clean Water Act was amended in 1972 and again in 1977. Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). RCRA was first enacted in 1976.
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was first enacted in 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980). Yet, grassroots organizations did not begin to coalesce nationally
until the 1980's. DuMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5, at 29. But see When Movements Coalesce, supra note 36, at S22 (stating that grassroots movements truly coalesced in 1991
during the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit); but cf Gottlieb & Ingram, supra note 40, at 15 (finding that nationally oriented environmental groups
focus on lobbying and legislation while grassroots organizations generally resort to popular
action and citizen's lawsuits).
76. EPA administers the majority of the pollution control environmental laws; however, the Army Corps of Engineers administers§ 404 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving the Secretary of the Army authority to issue
permits to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters). Other agencies administer environmental laws that pertain to resource management rather than pollution
control, such as the Department of Fish and Wildlife, which administers the Endangered
Species Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1644 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
77. National environmental organizations that have litigation missions and typically
seek review of environmental standards in the courts of appeals include Sierra Club, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council. GRAD, ENviRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 75, § 1.04.
78. For example, the Clean Air Act was amended in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
777 (1977). By 1977, there were at least three urban area studies that had analyzed the
distribution of air pollutants by race; two of the studies indicated the distribution was inequitable by race. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism, Reviewing the
Evidence, in RACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 166 (hereinafter Reviewing the Evidence] (table summarizing various environmental studies and noting the
following studies: (1) A. Myrick Freeman III, The Distribution of Environmental Quality,
in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
243,264 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972) [hereinafter 1972 Freeman Study]
(study of Kansas City, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.); and (2) W. J. Kruvant, People,
Energy and Pollution, in THE AMERICAN ENERGY CoNSUMER (K.K. Newman & D. Day
eds., 1975) (hereinafter 1975 Kruvant Study]).
By 1977, there were at least six urban area studies that had analyzed the distribution
of air pollution by income, and all had found distribution inequitable by income. Reviewing the Evidence, supra, at 166 (table summarizing various environmental studies and noting the following studies: (1) CouNCIL oN ENVTL. QuALITY, THE SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE CouNCIL oN ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY (1971) [hereinafter 1971 CEQ
STUDY]; (2) 1972 Freeman Study,supra; (3) D. HARRISON JR., WHo PAYS FOR CLEAN AIR:
THE CoST AND BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILE EMISSION STANDARDS (1975)
[hereinafter 1975 HARRISON STUDY]; (4) 1975 Kruvant Study, supra; (5) J. M. ZuPAN, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF AIR QUALITY IN THE NEW YoRK REGION (1973) (hereinafter 1973
ZUPAN STUDY]; and (6) W . R. Burch, The Peregrine Falcon and the Urban Poor: Some
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One result of the isolation of environmental justice advocates
from the national legislative process was that environmental regulatory agencies seldom, if ever, considered race or income to be an important factor in the first critical years of data compilation and
analysis. Environmental regulatory agencies, like EPA, did not routinely collect and analyze environmental and health data by income

Sociological Interrelatwns, in HuMAN EcOLOGY, AN ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH (P.
Richerson & J. McEvoy eds., 1976) (hereinafter 1976 Burch Study]).
Three studies compared race and income: two found income to be a more important
determinant in inequitable distribution, and one found race to be a more important determinant. Reviewing the Evidence, supra, at 166 (table summarizing various environmental
studies and noting that the 1975 Kruvant study and the 1976 Burch study found income to
be a more important determinant, and the 1972 Freeman study found race to be more
important). The 1975 Harrison study also examined the national distribution of air pollution by income (not limited to urban areas) and found that distribution by income was not
inequitable. 1975 HARRISON STUDY, supra. The 1976 Burch study analyzed but did not
find inequitable distribution by race. 1976 Burch Study, supra. A computer search did not
reveal that any of these studies were discussed during the debates on the 1977 amendments
to the Clean Air Act.
By the time of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, there were at least four
more studies indicating racially inequitable distribution of air pollution. Reviewing the Evidence, supra, at 166 (table summarizing the following environmental studies: (1) B. J.
BERRY ET AL., THE SOCIAL BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION: A COMPARATIVE
METROPOLITAN DATA SouRCE (1977) [hereinafter 1977 BERRY STUDY] (urban area
study); (2) P. Asch & J.J. Seneca, Some Evidence on the Distribution of Air Quality, in
LAND EcoNOMICS 54(3), 278-97 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Asch Study] (urban area study);
(3) L. Gianessi et al., The Distributional Effects of Uniform Air Pollution Policy in the U.S.,
Q.J. EcoN., May 1979, at 281 [hereinafter 1979 Gianessi Study] (national study); and (4)
Michel Gelobter, The Distribution of Outdoor Air Pollution by Income and Race: 19701984 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Gelobter Study] (unpublished M. thesis, University of California at Berkeley)). There were two more studies finding inequitable distribution of air
pollution by income in U.S. urban areas. Reviewing the Evidence, supra, at 166 (table summarizing studies including the 1979 Gianessi Study and the 1987 Gelobter Study). On a
national basis, the 1979 Gianessi study did not find inequitable distribution of air pollution
by income. /d. The 1987 Asch study found income to be a more important determinant,
while the national 1979 Gianessi study and the 1987 Gelobter study found race to be a
more important determinant. /d. There are no provisions in the voluminous amendments
that directly address racial or socioeconomic disparity in exposure to air contaminants. In
fact, the EPA Workgroup identified provisions of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990
that have the potential to affect poor and minority communities more adversely. SuPPORTrNG DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 23-24; see also infra part II.B.1.
RCRA, first enacted in 1976, was substantially amended in 1980 and again by the
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. RCRA of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90
Stat. 2796 (1976); SWDA Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980);
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
CERCLA, first enacted in 1980, was substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(1980); SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1615, 1652, 1692, 1703, 1704, 1774
(1986). At the time of the 1986 amendments, there was at least one regional study by the
U.S. government indicating inequitable location of hazardous waste facilities by race and
income. Reviewing the Evidence, supra, at 166 (table summarizing studies including SITING
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS, supra note 33).
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and race. 79 Environmental regulators did not specifically consider
race or income in risk assessment and risk management procedures.so
Data was not routinely collected on health risks posed by multiple
industrial facilities, cumulative effects, synergistic effects, or multiple
pathways of exposure, all of which tend to affect people of color disproportionately.81 To date, no one has published a comprehensive national study of exposures and risks to environmental contaminants by
race and income. 82 Presently, there exist national studies on blood
79. WoRKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 17-18. As early as 1971, William Ruckelshaus, then Administrator of the newly formed EPA, testified in a hearing before the Civil
Rights Commission that EPA was a technical and scientific agency not equipped to judge
disparate impacts on minority communities due to pollution. Marianne Lavelle, Residents
Want 'Justice,' The EPA Offers 'Equity', in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S26.
80. SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 30-37.
The four components of EPA's risk assessment process as defined in risk and
exposure assessment guidelines do not exclude the consideration of age, gender,
raciaVethnic groups. Age and gender and some raciaVethnic elements are traditional health topics and so are explicitly discussed in risk assessments conducted
by the Agency as appropriate. Age and gender are familiar topics in exposure
guidance; information concerning exposure traits of raciaVethnic groups are [sic]
more limited. While the guidelines discuss some of these issues, the availability of
data for use in risk assessment is problematic.... [O]ne way in which risk assessments can be improved in terms of environmental equity is to determine the proportionality and distribution of environmental exposures and risk .... [T]he U.S.
Census could be applied to that particular geographical area to identify the age,
gender, levels of income, race and ethnicity of the potentially exposed population
according to the estimated cumulative frequency distribution of environmental
exposures. This could permit quantitative analysis of the proportionality of exposures and risk according to demographic classifications of race, ethnicity, gender,
age and income.... [I]n addition, the exposure analysis can be improved through
the further research and incorporation of human activity patterns that may be
influenced by custom, social class, and ethnic and racial culture.
Id. at 31-32.
Exposure assessment does not incorporate ethno-cultural and economic considerations. Id. at 34. "[Yet c]ultural specific behaviors, activity patterns, and food preferences
vary significantly by ethnic and racial groups, and these patterns may define pathways of
exposure to an environmental pollutant." Jd. Furthermore, "[t]he available studies on
human activity patterns (percent time spent in various activities while at work, horne, and
recreation) are skewed toward middle income individuals, but are generally not delineated
by race/ethnicity." ld. at 35 (citation omitted).
81. WoRKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 17-18. Inner cities and industrial environments sustain exposure to pollutants from diverse and numerous sources. ld. at 18. The
percentages of minorities living in urban areas are much higher than Whites (91.2% Latino, 86.1 o/o African-American, and 86.5% other minorities, compared to 70.3% Caucasian). SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 7.
82. The EPA Workgroup explains: "No national baseline currently exists of population exposures and risk to environmental contaminants that is evaluated by age, gender,
ethnicity, and race for all environmental media. Therefore it is not possible to statistically
evaluate the proportionate risk burden by age, gender, ethnicity and race on a national
scale." SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 33. However, three national studies that
analyzed exposures to selected environmental hazards by race and income found race to be
more importantly related to exposure to environmental hazards. Reviewing the Evidence,
supra note 78, at 166 (table summarizing studies including the following: (1) 1979 Gianessi
Study, supra note 78 (air pollution); (2) Tox1c WAsTEs AND RACE, supra note 1 (hazardous wastes); and (3) Michel Gelobter, Toward a Model of Environmental Discrimination, in
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levels of lead, exposure to air pollution, and location of communities
near hazardous waste facilities.s3 But comprehensive nationwide
studies on other major environmental hazards, such as water pollution, pesticide exposure, and asbestos exposure are still needed.84
EPA's traditionally race-oblivious perspective on environmental
problems has unfortunate circularity. Historical inattention to race
and social context in environmental regulation has resulted in a data
gap: a lack of comprehensive statistical information on environmental
exposures to major pollutants and adverse health effects by race and
income. This lack of data (caused in part by the Agency's own failure
to consider social context) then has become the focus of the response
and the primary reason for EPA not to address environmental inequities aggressively.ss
Even when some EPA officials have shifted from a race (and socioeconomic) neutral approach to environmental protection to a more
direct consideration of environmental justice issues, the Agency as an
institution falls short of the mark. Agency response is oriented toward
the science and technology of pollution control. EPA responds to the
issue of disparate environmental protection as a technical issue to be
addressed within the narrow framework of data collection and risk
assessment.86 Instead of considering the social context in which enviRAc E AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 64-81 (air pollution)). EPA regional offices are undertaking investigations and studies of disparate environmental exposures on regional levels. See WoRKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-40.
83. See Reviewing the Evidence, supra note 78; see also supra note 45 (EPA Workgroup findings).
84. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty & the Distribution of Environmental
Hazards: Reviewing the Evidence, RACE, PoVERTY & ENV'T (California Rural Legal
Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. Urban Habitat Program, S.F., Cal.), Faii1991-Winter 1992, at 3, 24.
85. Lack of data was the first finding of the EPA Workgroup, which recommended
the establishment and maintenance of information to provide an objective basis for assessment of risks by income and race. See Workgroup Report, supra note 5, at 3-4. There was
a lack of specificity to the recommendations in general. See id. See generally Howard
Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air A ct, 21 ENvn...
L. 1647, 1662 (1991) (discussing the eight "laws" of administrative behavior and asserting
that, "administrators frequently chose to 'study' uncertain issues as a way to avoid resolving them").
86. The difference in perspective is illuminated in the debate over the choice of terms
used to define and address the problem of disparate environmental protection. The EPA
Workgroup explained:
EPA chose the term environmental equity because it most readily lends itself to
scientific risk analysis. The distribution of environmental risks is often measurable and quantifiable. The Agency can act on inequities based on scientific data.
Evaluating the existence of injustices and racism is more difficult because they
take into account socioeconomic factors in addition to the distribution of environmental benefits that are beyond the scope of this report [the 1992 EPA Report].
Furthermore, environmental equity, in contrast to environmental racism, includes
the disproportionate risk burden placed on any population group, as defined by
gender, age, income, as well as race.
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ronmentallaws are created and enforced-and responding directly to
adverse social forces-major environmental justice concerns remain
unaddressed pending a study and quantification. As a result, environmental justice might ultimately be lost in the institutional machinery
of risk analysis.s1
C.

A Difference in Perspective: Environmental Justice v.
·
Environmental Equity

The environmental justice movement adheres to a social justice
perspective on environmentalism, while EPA and many national environmental organizations adhere to a science and technology-oriented
perspective on environmentalism. A scientific framework of risk analysis,88 with a focus on the proportionality and distribution of environmental exposures and risk,89 is ill suited to address social justice issues.
It is not difficult to imagine that once environmental problems in low
income communities and communities of color are sufficiently studied, quantified, compared, and ranked, disparity in risk is likely to be
addressed by the experts as a risk redistribution enterprise. 90 The
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT, supra note 5, at 2-3.
87. For a critique of the overemphasis on scientific risk assessments and the need to
consider normative questions, including equity among risk-bearers, see Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1992). Professor Hornstein demonstrates how, in evaluating risks
according to expected losses across populations, distributional aspects are deemphasized.
For example, if the widespread use of chlorine in public drinking water systems
causes each year an estimated 400 excess cancers nationwide, an evaluation based
on population effects would rank it as a worse cancer risk than that posed by
active hazardous waste sites .. . if air and water pollution from such sites cause no
more than 100 excess cancers annually . ... For the "hard" comparative risk
analyst, the evaluation of these risks is simple arithmetic: 400 cancers are worse
than 100 . ... The full evaluation of these two risks is not so simple.
!d. at 593. For example, suppose the hazardous waste sites were exclusively near low income communities of color. One might imagine that these residents would "misperceive"
the risks of hazardous waste as much greater than the risks associated with the use of
chlorinated drinking water. In addition, assume that centers of industrial activity emitting
large amounts of air and water pollutants were similarly located exclusively in low income
minority communities, and that the risks were similarly ranked lower than the chlorine
risk. If risks were compared and ranked separately, chlorinated water would be ranked
first. In this hypothetical society, if comparative ranking was the only analytical tool employed and resources were given to higher ranked risks, the diffuse risks associated with
chlorinated drinking water would be addressed first and most aggressively. In such a situation, one wonders who is misperceiving risks.
88. /d. at 569-70 (stating that the discipline of formal risk analysis has developed a
sufficiently rigorous internal structure to qualify as a "science" on its own right).
89. Su PPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 30-37.
90. As long as EPA rejects a social justice orientation and exclusively relies on a "scientific" comparison of one quantified risk to another, the focus is on distribution. "Environmental equity refers to the distribution of environmental risks across population groups
and to policy responses to these distributions." WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
The response to an inequitable distribution may likely involve an effort at redistribution
(e.g., siting a noxious facility in another area but not outright denial of a permit), rather
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risk assessment model-and its ultimate goal of risk distribution determined and executed by EPA experts-does not give communities
an equal voice in determining which risks can be prevented and which
risks are acceptable (or unacceptable) within the community that ultimately bears the environmental burden.91
Alternatively-from an environmental justice perspective-when
viewed in its social context, empirical evidence that low income and
minority communities are disproportionately subjected to environmental hazards, 92 that people of color disproportionately suffer adverse health effects from toxic substances,93 and that enforcement of
environmental laws in communities of color is not as rigorous as in
predominantly White communities94 is evidence of racism and exclusion. Thus, environmental injustice cannot be adequately addressed
solely within the confines of scientific study, technical risk assessment,95 and risk redistribution.
than risk elimination or risk reduction. Risk reduction or risk elimination would necessarily entail tighter controls on regulated industries, a strategy that would meet with severeand probably effective-opposition from those industries. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1684-88 (1975)
(explaining reasons why agencies favor organized interests, especially the interests of the
regulated); Latin, supra note 85, at 1659 (discussing the dynamics of agency behavior in the
implementation of environmental legislation and concluding that, "[s]ocial dislocation and
competitive disadvantages from environmental regulation will invariably provoke intense
opposition that from an agency's perspective may lead to many undesirable consequences"). Administrators will therefore avoid these kinds of politically controversial
choices if Congress fails to provide unambiguous and unqualified directions. If professor
Latin's theories of agency behavior are correct, any efforts at redistribution of environmental risk are as likely to fail as his predicted failure of the implementation of the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act.
91. Pollution prevention rather than risk redistribution is a central theme in the environmental justice movement, along with principles of public participation and self-determination. ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, supra note 29, at 31. For a critique Of
EPA's quantitative risk assessment model for ranking environmental hazards from an environmental justice perspective, see ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CoMM. OF THE CAL. COM·
PARATIVE RISK PROJECT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CoMPARATIVE RISK (1994). The
Environmental Justice Committee argues that the present model of comparative risk as
risk ranking fails to incorporate the concerns and experiences of impacted communities,
tends to compare and choose between risks rather than consider toxic reduction strategies,
does not distinguish between existing and future (preventable) risks and that quantitative
risk assessment does not account for multiple hazards, differences in individual susceptibilities to toxics, and potentially synergistic health effects. /d. at 10-16. Using population risk
measures rather than individual risk measures downplays impacts affecting smaller groups
of people who are affected disproportionately. /d. at 17-19.
92. See supra notes 34, 45 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (concerning findings of adverse health
effects from exposure to lead).
94. See supra note 58 (summarizing National Law Journal findings).
95. In the 1992 EPA Report, the EPA Workgroup appeared intentionally to exclude
an evaluation of the existence of injustices and racism in its use of the term "environmental
equity." SUPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 1. The recommendations of the EPA
Workgroup appear further to confine the consideration of environmental equity to the risk
assessment process. See WORKGROUP REPORT, supra note 5; see also supra note 80
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Environmental justice activists steadily and forcefully insist that
disparate environmental protection should be addressed through a
participatory, democratic process that considers and responds to the
larger social context.96 Risk elimination rather than risk redistribution is a key component of the environmental justice perspective.97 In
short, argue environmental justice activists, "environmental equity"
misses the point.
D.

Considering the Social Context

Regardless of the relative merits of the contradictory positions,
there is common ground. More study is undoubtedly necessary, but
irrefutable evidence of disparate adverse health effects need not be a
prerequisite to Agency response. EPA often regulates-sometimes
aggressively-in the face of scientific uncertainty about the existence
of adverse health effects.98 Confronted with credible evidence sug(describing the risk assessment process); see also supra note 49. Risk assessment is more
limiting than risk management. Risk assessment generally means the characterization of
potential adverse health effects of human exposures to environmental hazards, while risk
management describes the process of evaluating and selecting among alternative regulatory actions. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcriON: LAW AND
POLICY 502 (2d ed. 1990) (hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION) (citing COMMISSION
ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR
ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PuBLIC HEALTH, RISK AssESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCEss 18-347 (1983)). It appears from the 1992 EPA Report
that EPA is attempting to confine its role in the issue of environmental racism to determining whether any particular segment of society suffers actual disparate health effects due to
exposure to environmental pollutants (i.e., risk assessment) rather than targeted agency
action (i.e., risk management).
96. For the environmental justice advocates' responses to the 1992 EPA Report, see
supra note 51.
97. Explaining the environmental justice movement, Dr. Chavis emphasizes:
[T]he environmental justice movement is not an anti-white movement. (Contributors to Voices from the Grassroots] document the stories of grassroots leaders
who are struggling against unjust, unfair, unethical, and sometimes illegal practices of industry and government. Environmental justice advocates are not saying, "Take the poisons out of our community and put them in a white
community." They are saying that no community should have to live with these
poisons.
Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to VoiCES FROM THE GRAsSROOTS, supra note 7,
at 5.
98. Although the role of cost in relation to scientific uncertainty has resulted in substantial litigation, it remains clear that EPA has authority under many statutes to regulate
substances for which there is no clear causal link between the substance and adverse effects
on health, like cancer or birth defects. For example, the Clean Air Act allows EPA to
regulate emissions that "may reasonably be anticipated" to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (1988); see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130,
1153-57 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (rejecting the position that
primary air quality standards were too stringent because they protected against subclinical
effects that were not proven to be clearly harmful). Prior to the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act, EPA was authorized to establish ambient standards for hazardous air pollutants at a level that provided an "ample margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V
1993); cf Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir.
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gesting that select classes of communities (poor and minority) suffer
disparate exposure to major pollutants, EPA would be acting within
its mandate in taking targeted and aggressive action to protect these
communities.
Agency response, however, should include consideration of the
larger social context. 99 The reasons that communities of color and low
income communities receive too little environmental protection are
varied and complex. To respond adequately to environmental disparities, EPA must make a good faith attempt to understand the social
dynamics in which environmental laws are enforced. There is helpful
information available, albeit not written within the comfortable confines of scientific and technological jargon. 100 Even if sociological
studies are not available that precisely address adverse social forces in
the conrext of environmental regulation, EPA must still consider the
forces of racism and class privilege. This approach is neither a new
nor radical idea. For example, EPA's common sense determination
that violators of environmental laws are motivated by profit informs
1987) (en bane decision upholding EPA's discretion to regulate vinyl chloride emissions in
the face of scientific uncertainty but allowing consideration of technological feasibility of
alternatives within a range of "safe," albeit not "risk free"). A more recent example of
EPA's aggressive regulation is the prohibition on the manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos in most products, promulgated under the authority of § 6
of the Toxic Substances Control Act. The final rule was vacated by the Fifth Circuit on the
rationale that EPA did not adequately consider costs, benefits, and alternatives. Corrosion
Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
99. A cross-disciplinary approach to environmental regulation is not new. EPA routinely uses economic analysis in fashioning regulations when considerations of technological and economic feasibility are specifically allowed under the statutes. A good illustration
of the use of economic cost-benefit analysis is found in a recent case involving EPA's promulgation of a rule for the regulation of asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
A ban on asbestos in products was predicated upon a cost-benefit analysis indicating that a
ban on asbestos pipe would save three lives over 13 years at a cost of $128-227 million per
life, a ban on asbestos shingles would save .32 statistical lives at a cost of $21-34 million, a
ban on asbestos coating would save 3.33 Jives at a cost of $46-181 million, and a ban on
asbestos paper products would save .60 lives at a cost of $4-5 million. See Corrosion Proof
Fittings, Inc. , 947 F.2d at 1222.
100. The sociological basis of the problem is not difficult to see and not unknown to
EPA officials.
OSWER [Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response) managers recognize
that the siting and permitting of hazardous and solid waste management facilities
raise socioeconomic factors that are distinct from technical concerns (geo-hydrology, depth to groundwater, etc.). They also believe that one result of the "not in
my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome is that such facilities will tend to be located in
communities with the least ability to mount a protest. They pointed out that this
problem is compounded when wastes from Superfund sites are brought to commercial hazardous waste management facilities as a result of community opposition to incineration of the hazardous waste at the Superfund site.
SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 18. For bibliographies of cross disciplinary writings, surveys, and studies, see VOicES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, and RACE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7.
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EPA's penalty policy.tot In assessing risk10 2 as well as managing risk,
EPA encounters data gaps and rests its ultimate decisions on considerations other than hard scientific data. 1o3
Often there is little reason for EPA not to consider the dynamics
of racism, along with economic and political disadvantage in the
course of environmental regulation. 104 In the case of disparate environmental hazards, an inquiry into the cause of the problem must include consideration of the social context.
Social dynamics can explain why minority and low income communities are exposed to more environmental hazards and, once exposed, why these communities appear to receive less protection from
enforcement agencies than do other communities. Although the social dimension of the problem is complicated, a few explanations have
become apparent to those studying environmental inequities.
1. Keeping the Noxious Facility Away: NIMBY-ism and Siting
One cause of environmental inequities is the not-in-my-backyard, or NIMBY attitude. In classic NIMBY-ism, the community's
goal is to keep noxious facilities out of the area without thought to
101. Penalty policy requires that, ideally, penalties under environmental laws should be
in an amount sufficient to make the violator disgorge the economic benefit of noncompliance. See infra note 115. To my knowledge, the assumption that making a profit is a prime
motivating factor in the violation of environmental laws was not empirically verified
before the penalty guidelines were established. Rather, profit motivation appears to be
assumed based upon common experience.
This is not to say that stated penalty policy prevails. According to a recent study,
penalties showed little relationship to the economic benefits of the violations. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: PENALTIES MAY
NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS (1991).
102. In assessing risk, the Agency often encounters gaps in available data and, in order
to proceed, must choose from a range of inferences; the choice of inference (e.g., a conservative inference) is ultimately a policy choice, not a scientific decision. See Hornstein,
supra note 87, at 572 n.41.
103. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 95, at 493-519. Risk management also
entails consideration of political, social, economic, and engineering information (along
with risk-related information), and selection of regulatory options necessarily requires the
use of value judgments on issues such as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of
costs of control. /d. at 502 (quoting CoMMISSION oN LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL CoMM. ON INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PuB. HEALTH,
RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 18-347
(1983)).
104. The authority for the Agency to consider these matters might be found in Executive Order No. 12,898, signed by President Clinton on February 11, 1994, under which:
"[E]ach Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities on minority populations and low income populations in the United States and its territories and possessions,
the District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of the
Mariana Islands." Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
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where the facilities will be ultimately sited.tos Wealthier and more politically powerful neighborhoods often keep noxious facilities out of
their communities by restrictive zoning or targeted political pressure.106 At best, an unintended but unfortunate effect of NIMBY-ism
is that unwanted land uses "take the path of least resistance" and are
shifted to communities that do not have the political resources to prevent the siting of facilities in the area.to7
A more skeptical view (though one not without basis) is that low
income and minority communities are intentionally targeted for siting
polluting facilities because they lack the political power to prevent the
siting.tos Once a polluting facility is located in or near a minority or
105. See Orlando E . Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.
REV. 198, 198-200 (1990).
106. Du MPING IN DIXIE, supra note 5, at 81-84. Developers understand that wellfunded community resistance can result in costly delays in siting; thus, communities that
cannot afford to litigate will be more vulnerable to site selection. Collin, supra note 22, at
512. But see Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY?, 11 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 495,
514-16 (1994) (noting no nationwide pattern of siting new hazardous waste or radioactive
materials facilities in minority communities since the passage of RCRA because there has
been only one facility successfully sited).
107. Du MPING IN DrxrE, supra note 5, at 37-38 ("The cumulative effect of not-in-mybackyard (NIMBY) victories by environmentalists appears to have driven the unwanted
facilities toward the more vulnerable groups. Black neighborhoods are especially vulnerable to the penetration of unwanted land uses."); Robert D. Bullard, In Our Backyards,
EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 11, 11-12. An example of racially inequitable results is the
siting of large commercial hazardous waste facilities. Chemical Waste Management owns
the Nation's largest commercial hazardous waste site, located in Emelle, Alabama, an economically impoverished rural area where over 90% of the residents are African-American.
Robert D. Bullard & Beverly H . Wright, The Quest for Environmental Equity: Mobilizing
the African-American Community for Social Change, 3 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 301,307
(1990). Chemical Waste Management also owns another hazardous waste facility in Kettleman City, California, which is predominantly Latino (more than 95% of the residents).
VoiCES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 29. Chemical Waste Management also
owns three toxic waste incinerators, one located on the south-side of Chicago, where the
population is 55% African-American and 24% Latino; one in downstate Illinois, near
neighborhoods that are 95% or more African-American; and one in Port Arthur, Texas,
which is 80% African-American and Latino. Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman
City: Lessons for the Movement, 5 Mo. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 67, 70-71 (1993-94).
108. As one might expect, no one will admit to targeting a community because of its
racial characteristics. However, some have been more candid about targeting low income
communities. A 1984 report prepared for the California Waste Management Board by J.
Stephen Powell of Cerrell Associates observed that all socioeconomic groupings tend to
resent the nearby siting of major facilities, but the middle- and upper-socioeconomic strata
possess better resources to effectuate their opposition. Accordingly, the report advised
that middle- and higher-socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall at least within
the one-mile and five-mile radii of the proposed site. J. STEPHEN PowELL, CERRELL As.
SOCS., POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACING WASTE TO ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING:
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA WASTE MANAGEMENT BOARD 42-43 (1984) (hereinafter
CERRELL REPORT]. The report noted: "Ideally .. . officials and companies should look for
'lower socioeconomic neighborhoods.' " Dick Russell, Environmental Racism: Minority
Communities and Their Battle Against Taxies, AMic us J., Spring 1989, at 22, 26 (quoting
the CERRELL REPORT); see also SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 78 (comments
from external reviewers of the 1992 EPA Report criticizing the EPA Workgroup's failure
L.
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low income community, the residents can seldom "vote with their
feet" and relocate to safer areas. 109 A polluting facility, once sited,
often provides justification for siting similar facilities nearby, resulting
in de facto sacrifice areas.no
NIMBY-ism presents a paradox that EPA and mainstream environmentalists have yet to address in the context of environmental justice. If politically powerful communities (in this case, predominantly
White and/or affluent communities) are able through environmental
activism to push noxious facilities into communities with fewer political resources (in this case, minority and/or poor communities), then
responsible agency action would be to enforce environmental laws in a
manner that will eliminate the inequity. Ideally, this will mean that
some environmental hazards will be eliminated by tightening controls
on the regulated entities (polluting industry). But some environmental risks will not be eliminated due to economic or technological infeasibility. The risk-generating activity that the Agency decides
cannot be eliminated must be redistributed geographically, potentially
affecting White affluent communities. Consequently, to the extent
that EPA is successful in alleviating disparate environmental burdens,
it will receive intense political pressure from the regulated community
because of tighter controls, along with intense political pressure from
more politically powerful communities because of redistributed risk.
In this light, one must question whether EPA can adequately respond
to environmental inequity, given that Agency response is primarily
to acknowledge the existence of the CerreiJ Report). The same sentiments have been expressed in the international arena. In a memorandum from World Bank Vice President
and Chief Economist Lawrence Summers to colleagues, Summers wrote: "Shouldn' t the
World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs (less developed countries)?" World Bank Dumps on Third World Again, RACE, PoVERTY & ENV'T
(California Rural Legal Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. Urban Habitat Program,
S.F., Cal.), Faii1991-Winter 1992, at 12 (quoting the memorandum). Summers further proposed that the World Bank encourage the dumping of toxic waste in Africa. ld. Summers
also stated: "[T]he economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage
country is impeccable and we should face up to that." Jd. (quoting the memorandum).
When the memorandum was publicized, Summers claimed his remarks were intended as a
"sardonic counter-point, an effort to sharpen the analysis." !d. (quoting the memorandum); see also Pollution and the Poor: Why 'Clean Development' at Any Price Is a Curse on
the Third World, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 15, 1992, at 18 (quoting the memorandum as an
illustration of classic welfare economic theory and of how in both domestic and global
environmental policy, equitable distribution is generally subordinated to short-term economic efficiency).
109. VoiCES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 21; see also Collin, supra note 22,
at 507-10 {discussing land use practices that systematically exclude people on the basis of
race).
110. See Cynthia Hamilton, Coping With Industrial Exploitation, in VoiCES FROM THE
GRASSROOTS, supra note 7, at 70 {"As long as land can be acquired cheaply and easily in
communities of color, and as long as zoning and other regulations can be minimized, these
communities will continue to be prime targets, particularly for waste disposal and waste-toenergy incinerators. This will intensify as landfill space decreases.").
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limited to narrowly focused discretionary actions and environmental
justice projects. Despite the good intentions of many EPA personnel,
the contribution of NIMBY-ism to environmental inequity is
profound and is not likely to be remedied solely by discrete projects,
more study, and promises of even-handed enforcement.111
2.

Once Sited, Keeping the Facility Clean: The Problem of
Compliance

In addition to the NIMBY phenomenon, which causes polluting
activity to be located in and near minority and low income communities, the social context in which environmental laws are enforced must
be considered. Enforcement of environmental laws typically includes
distinct agency actions: inspection of permitted facilities, detection of
violations, prosecution of violators, punishment of violators, and
agency response to the release of hazardous substances. Assuming
even-handed governmental inspection of facilities, 112 inequities result
if violations are prosecuted less often or less rigorously in low income
and minority communities, or if violators operating in such communities are assessed more lenient penalties. Polluting industries will find
it advantageous to locate in low income and minority communities if
penalties are so low that it makes economic sense to disregard environmental laws and to consider the penalties simply as a cost of business. If, as the National Law Journal's study indicates, fines in
predominantly White areas are 149% to 506% higher, 113 then the
111. See generally Latin, supra note 85 (describing the dynamics of agency response
under political pressure). The same dynamics would apply at the state regulatory level as
well.
112. The author is unaware of any studies of inspection patterns within EPA.
113. In the seven years of fines analyzed by the National Law Journal, 86.5% of the
fines were negotiated and 13.5% were the result of court decisions. Marianne Lavelle,
Negotiations Are Key to Most Fines, in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S15 [hereinafter
Negotiations). Considering both negotiated and adjudicated fines, the fines in predominantly White areas were 506% higher than in minority areas. /d. Considering only negotiated fines, the fines in White areas were 149% higher. /d. "Only in Superfund
enforcement cases, lodged mainly against polluters who have been recalcitrant about
cleaning up abandoned toxic waste sites, did fines in minority areas come out higher than
in white areas, by 9 percent. Minority communities saw lower average penalties in federal
enforcement of the Clean Water Act, by 28 percent, the Clean Air Act, by 8 percent, and
the Safe Drinking Water Act, by 15 percent." Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S4.
Under RCRA, the average fine in areas with the greatest White population was $335,556,
compared to $55,318 in the areas with the greatest minority population. /d.
Although penalties against polluters in poor neighborhoods are on average 54% lower
than those in wealthy communities, the pattern varies depending on the particular law
involved such that income is not a reliable predictor. Marianne Lavelle, The Minorities
Equation, in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at S2. But minority communities consistently draw lower average fines under every type of environmental law except CERCLA.
/d. In the Clean Air Act, Superfund, and Safe Drinking Water Act cases, low income
communities see higher fines than high income communities. !d. However, in the Clean
Water Act and "multimedia" cases (i.e., charges made under different laws), the fines are
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comparatively low fines in non-White areas are likely to be more costeffective than compliance. Although statutory provisions and administrative penalty guidelines recommend that penalties should be in an
amount sufficient to remove the economic benefit of noncompliance, 114 there are other factors considered in assessing penalties
against a violator, such as the gravity of the violation, degree of culpability, violator's ability to pay, and other circumstances as justice may
require. 115 As a result, "EPA reserves for itself virtually unlimited
flexibility to reduce the computer-generated penalty. "116 The flexibility of penalty assessment at the regional level, undoubtedly beneficial
in some respects, creates the potential for racially and socioeconomically inequitable enforcement. For example, flexible criteria can be
manipulated to justify less rigorous penalties that are really based on
unstated or even unconscious attitudes that violations in rundown
so much higher in high income areas that low income communities fare worse on average.
/d.
114. See supra note 101.
115. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (requiring that the court, in determining
Clean Water Act civil penalties for violations of standards, consider the seriousness of the
violation, the economic benefit resulting from the violation, history of violations, good
faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty
on the violation, and such other matters as justice may require); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1)
(Supp. V 1993) (setting forth Clean Air Act penalty assessment criteria: the size of the
business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the violator's full compliance
history and good faith efforts to comply, the duration of the violation, payment of penalties
previously assessed for the same violation, the economic benefit of noncompliance, and the
seriousness of the violation); 40 C.P.R. § 66.21 (1994) (explaining EPA's calculation of
noncompliance penalties under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (1988) (providing
for civil penalties under RCRA of up to $25,000 per day for each violation); id.
§ 9609(a)(3) (1988) ("(For CERCLA class I violations, the] President shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation or violations, and with
respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of such violations, the degree of
culpability, economic benefit or savings (if any) resulting from the violation, and such
other matters as justice may require."). See generally Enforcement: GAO Says EPA Failing
To Collect Money Gained by Polluters Evading Requirements, 22 ENv'T REP. (BNA) No. 8,
at 483 (June 21, 1991). The General Accounting Office (GAO) found that two out of three
penalty cases in fiscal year 1990 did not include recovery of economic benefits gained by
the polluters. /d.
116. Negotiations, supra note 113, at S15. Although ability to pay is a factor affecting
the size of the penalty, the National Law Journal investigation found that some relatively
minor fines in minority areas have been lodged against large industries, for example, a
$22,000 air pollution penalty against Procter & Gamble Co. in Staten Island, New York,
and $32,000 against General Motors Corp. in Dayton, Ohio. Id.
In a review of state enforcement actions under the Clean Air Act, the GAO
found that over half of the more than 1,100 significant violators that states and
localities identified in 1988 and 1989 had paid no cash penalties at all. In one
case, a company that failed to install pollution control equipment-and thus had
emitted excess pollution-for six years was assessed a penalty of $15,000,
although EPA's Enforcement Office later found that the economic benefit of the
violation was more than $231,000, or about 15 times the penalty.
Another Reason Not To Let Polluters Open Shop in Your Community, RACE, POVERTY &
ENV'T (California Rural Legal Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. Urban Habitat Program, S.F., Cal.), Fall 1991-Winter 1992, at 9.

36

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 22:1

(low income or minority) neighborhoods are not as serious as violations in "better" neighborhoods.117
Other factors might influence enforcement of environmental laws
in a manner that results in disparity. One factor identified by the National Law Journal investigation is that the degree of citizen involvement affects the size of the penalty; the top penalties were levied
against violators when citizens joined the litigation.118 If citizens in
low income and minority communities rely solely on governmental enforcement because they have fewer resources (money, time, and expertise) than White, wealthier communities to prosecute violators
through citizen suits, then disparity results in part from private enforcement, or at least from the leverage that the ability to "take the
matter to court" provides.119
3. Once Contaminated: The Problem of Cleanup

In addition to disparity in facility siting and disparity in enforcement of regulatory requirements, the cleanup of contaminated sites is
an area where there is racial and socioeconomic disparity. According
to the National Law Journal investigation, it takes 20% longer to place
a site in a minority community on the Superfund list once a release of
117. See generally Boyle, sup ra note 22 (discussing the dynamics of institutional forms
of racism, both on a conscious invidious level and on an unconscious insidious level, which
the author terms "aversive institutional racism"); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317
(1987).
118. Negotiations, supra note 113, at Sl5. Disparity in litigation resources affects environmental enforcement. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 75, § 1.04[2). Government litigators and environmental groups utilizing citizen suit provisions find it hard to
match the economic means of regulated industries, which may make a difference where
technical issues are complex and expert witnesses expensive. Id.
119. In a recent survey of corporate counsel: "[O]nly 2 percent surveyed said they were
taking steps to assure that minority communities were not disproportionately affected by
their operations. About 4 percent said they had concerns but had not taken action on it.
More than 70 percent said they did not anticipate any serious challenge of 'environmental
racism.' " Marianne Lavelle, Community Activists Can Push Companies To Take Extra
Steps, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at Sl, S5. More than 50% said community activism had
some impact, but the corporate response noted was an effort to build a relationship with
the neighborhood rather than reduce polluting activity. ld. About 15% reported the corporation responded to community activism by additional compliance evaluation or pollution-reducing features, while 11.8% said the presence of community activists had no impact
whatsoever. Id. The survey results support the observation that corporations are responding to community concerns in general, but are more likely to undertake pollution-reducing
measures or step up compliance measures when they perceive that the community has the
resources to mount a serious legal challenge. In the same survey, two-thirds of the counsel
surveyed said their businesses have operated at least some time in the past year in violation
of state or federal environmental laws. Marianne Lavelle, Environment Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at Sl. In contrast, only one-third said they were in
compliance. Id.
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a hazardous substance is discovered. 12° Further, at the minority sites,
EPA chooses "containment," the capping or walling off of a hazardous
dump site, 7% more frequently than the cleanup method preferred
under the law, permanent "treatment," to eliminate the waste or rid it
of its toxins. At the White sites, EPA orders treatment 22% more
often than containment.121 Some environmental justice activists believe that political clout substantially influences decisions concerning
how thoroughly to clean a contaminated site.122 It is difficult to confirm the charge with anything other than anecdotal evidence. However, at least one commentator has demonstrated how EPA in the
course of Superfund cleanups may yield to pressure to keep cleanup
costs to a minimum, and in the process disregard clear statutory mandates.123 Policy considerations and value judgments may lie hidden in
the scientific conclusions that support selection of a cleanup remedy.124 When EPA is under substantial pressure to keep cleanup costs
to a minimum, the degree of citizen involvement may be critical to the
ultimate outcome, but significant citizen involvement is less likely in

120. It takes an average of 4.7 years in communities with the highest White populations, compared to 5.6 years in communities with the most minorities. Unequal Protection,
supra note 7, at S7.
121. Id.
122. Environmental activists compare the results obtained in a predominantly White,
blue collar mobile home park in Globe, Arizona, with the results obtained in Carver Terrace, an African-American middle class neighborhood in Texarkana, Texas. Marcia Coyle
& Marianne Lavelle, Same Ills, Different Solutions, in Unequal Protection, supra note 7, at
S23. After 1979, residents of the trailer park, which had been built on asbestos-contaminated soil, lobbied then Governor Bruce Babbitt, who referred the community leaders to
an attorney who served on the committee that worked on the creation of EPA under former President Nixon. !d. The attorney filed suit and worked with EPA officials to get the
community relocated, eventually recovering approximately $80,000 per resident. ld.
Throughout the 1970's, middle class African-American residents in Carver Terrace tried to
get their community placed on the Superfund list. !d. The community, built on a former
wood-preserving plant site, was contaminated with toxic chemicals. /d. The site was listed
in 1986. Id. The federal government offered residents an average of $30,000 to $40,000 for
their homes. !d.
123. Donald A. Brown, EPA's Resolution of the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and
the Law in Setting Cleanup Standards Under Superfund, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 241 (1990)
(demonstrating through a case study how EPA disregarded congressional preferences for
treatment, prohibitions on considerations of cost in initial phases of remedy selection, and
applicability of RCRA standards and federal water quality criteria).
124. For a discussion of how political, nonscientific, and ideological positions on cost
are hidden behind purportedly objective scientific conclusions, see generally id. In this
way, inequality of political power is masked, leading in many instances to inadequate
cleanup of Superfund sites. Donald Brown examines the weakness of EPA's approach to
cleanup standards under Superfund and the extent to which public policy questions are
determined by technical experts and hidden in technical language. "If the analyst does not
identify how he or she resolved all [scientific] uncertainties, then trans-scientific policy or
ethical discourse about the nature of the danger posed by the site may be distorted by what
appears to be neutral scientific descriptions of the site's contamination." Id. at 282.
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highly technical and complicated matters. 125 Poor and minority communities are again at a substantial disadvantage because of a relative
lack of political power, lack of information on technical matters,126
and limited litigation resources.l27

4. Environmental Jobmail
The phenomenon of environmental jobmail, sometimes termed
"environmental blackmail," is yet another factor that results in dispiirate exposure to environmental hazards. It presents itself in various
contexts and in various forms. Environmental jobmail may involve
the use of superior economic power to persuade communities to accept noxious facilities for the promise of jobs to local citizens, or a
local employer's overt or implied threat to leave the area if its environmental practices are questioned by the community.128 Until recently, the issue of environmental protection in poor and minority
communities had been framed as an issue of jobs versus the environment.129 Communities with extreme poverty, high unemployment, a
shrinking tax base, and decaying business infrastructure, are more vulnerable to the argument that proposals for environmental reforms will
result in plant closures, layoffs, and economic dislocation. 130 Accepting the jobs-for-environment tradeoff presents a tragic predicament for those living in low income and minority communities: risk
125. /d. Brown demonstrates how statutory preferences and mandates can be circumvented- resulting in an inadequate cleanup remedy- through a case study of the Douglasville Disposal Site, Union Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania. /d. at 287-301.
The more technical [Superfund controversies] become, the more removed they
become from public view and less capable of being understood by local citizens
whose interests may be affected. Perhaps as a consequence of the complexity of
the issues in the Douglasville ROD, for example, the only group that submitted
any comments on the sufficiency of the remedy was . .. a group comprised of
some of the potentially responsible parties.
/d. at 303; see also Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18
EcoLOGY L.Q. 173 {1991) {discussing impediments to public participation in the
Superfund cleanup process).
126. Persons affected by contamination from a site listed on the National Priorities List
(NPL) may qualify for a technical assistance grant to help interpret information regarding
the site. 42 U.S.C. § 6917{e) {1988). However, there may be substantial limitations to
receiving a grant. See supra note 284 {discussing the availability of technical assistance
grants).
127. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority CommUI!ities, in RACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 7, at 82-95. Dr. Bullard remarks that a combination of compensation and monetary inducements is a strategy
proposed to minimize opposition to hazardous waste facilities siting; but the troubling
moral question is not adequately addressed: "[S)hould one part of society (the affluent)
pay another part of society {the disadvantaged) to accept risks that others can afford to
escape?" /d. at 84.
129. /d. at 83.
130. /d. (citing R. KAZIS & R. GROSSMAN, FEAR AT WoRK: JoB BLACKMAIL, LABOR,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (1982)).
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one's job (and the economic viability of the community) if environmentally harmful activities are challenged; or risk one's health (and
the community's health) if environmentally harmful activities are not
challenged. Environmental justice activists have disputed the framing
of the issue as a "jobs or clean environment" choice, but continue to
address the very real concerns of economically vulnerable communities.131 They take the position that health is not an acceptable tradeoff
for a job, and that a contrary view is not only morally wrong but
makes little economic sense in the long run.t32
The goal of environmental justice in poor and minority communities illustrates well the interconnectedness of the physical environment, market economic behavior, bureaucratic behavior, political
forces, the dynamics of institutional racism, differing cultural world
views, the ability to obtain information, and limited access to political
and economic resources. It becomes clear that there is no one solution to environmental injustice. In light of the relative disparity in
economic and political resources, unchecked market forces drive environmental hazards to low income and minority communities. Existing
regulatory structures and pollution control strategies have not provided sufficient environmental protection. A partial solution may lie
in enhancing legal tools available to the strongest advocates of environmental justice: the community residents. Access to the courts
under the authority of environmental citizen suit provisions has served
mainstream environmentalists and now should be explored for a more
targeted mission-environmental justice.
The use of environmental citizen suits, however, must be viewed
with an important caveat. Environmental justice activist and attorney
Luke Cole makes a convincing argument that traditional forms of litigation often disempower community~based groups when lawyersthe experts-step in and take over.133 He points out that environmental justice struggles are primarily political and economic, not legal,
and as a general proposition recommends against lawsuits.134 His general observation has even greater force for those environmental citizen suits that are technically complex. Here the potential for the
131. See supra note 42 (discussing the need for a participatory process in addressing
environmental concerns and the need to address economic impact on communities).
132. See, e.g., Principles of Environmental Justice Adopted at the First National People
of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, in ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SuMMIT,
supra note 29, at xiii-xvi.
133. See generally Empowerment As the Key, supra note 22; Open Letter from Bay
Area Environmental Justice Activists, to Environmental Law Clinic Proponents at Boalt
Hall Law School, Golden Gate Law School, and Stanford Law School (Dec. 20, 1993) (on
file with author) (letter from 12 community groups discussing the potential for well-intentioned legal clinics to foster a "dependency mentality" in their clients).
134. Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 18, at 541.
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scientific and technical issues to overshadow political objectives is
greatest. However, when attorneys undertake to represent low income and minority communities in a manner that is sensitive to the
political-organizing aspects of a case, environmental citizen suits can
serve to educate and strengthen morale.135 The approach taken in this
article is to examine environmental citizen suits as a genre, then to
investigate the practical limitations given the particular environmental
statute at issue, and finally to contemplate the use of citizen suits
within the context of an ongoing political struggle that will outlive any
particular lawsuit.
II

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS

EPA, charged with enforcement of most federal environmental
laws, lacks the ability to enforce all environmental laws to the maximum extent possible. 136 Understanding that there would be undesirable underenforcement of environmental laws because of limited
regulatory resources, Congress equipped many federal environmental
laws with citizen suit provisions, which essentially confer "private attorney general status" on the citizenry.137 Under citizen suit provi135. See id. at 526-30. Luke Cole places traditional environmental litigation at the top
of the litigation hierarchy. !d.
136. From an economic perspective, broad categorical-and hence, overinclusiverules are economically efficient when considering the costs associated with evaluating and
developing regulatory actions (rulemaking costs) as well as the costs associated with compliance. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3 (3d ed. 1986).
Although full enforcement is not economically efficient, EPA, burdened with statutory
mandates far in excess of its resources as well as political restraints, falls far short of
achieving optimal enforcement. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental
Laws, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 833, 880-95 (1985) (discussing causes of inadequate agency enforcement and contemporary views of regulatory enforcement, including an economic
view, an activist view, and a behavioral view).
137. A plaintiff suing under environmental citizen lawsuit provisions has been referred
to as a "private attorney general." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972).
Citizen suit provisions in major environmental laws include: Act To Prevent Pollution of
Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
· Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, id. § 11046 (1988); Endangered Species Act of
1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1988); Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, id. § 300j-8 (1988); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); and Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRON·
MENTAL CITIZEN SUITS app. 1 (1991) [hereinafter AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN
SuiTs] (listing citizen suit provisions under all federal environmental statutes). Some environmental statutes do not contain citizen suit provisions, notably the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 {1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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sions, private individuals have statutory authority to prosecute
members of the regulated community for certain violations of requirements of some environmentallaws. 138 In addition to "enforcement"
suits against violators, citizens also have the authority to undertake
"action-forcing" suits against public officials-such as the Administrator of EPA-for alleged failure to perform nondiscretionary duties
under the environmental law in question. 139 Although private attorney general status is not without controversy, private enforcement ·remains an important part of environmental regulation.t4o
Early legislative history reveals the practical and philosophical
controversy behind the private attorney general concept of environmental citizen suit provisions. 141 Some legislators viewed the private
citizen action as a welcome supplement to regulatory agencies' inevitable underenforcement due to lack of resourceS. 142 Other lawmakers
saw the provisions as imposing yet another burden on judicial resources.143 Commentators, as well, differ in their views on the value
of the citizen as enforcer. Some view private enforcement as a dan138. See infra note 148.
139. Environmental citizen suit provisions allowing suit against the Administrator for
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty are similar to the jurisdictional basis of the
Mandamus and Venue Act, allowing federal district courts to hear suits "in the nature of
[common law] mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988). In addition to allowing suits against an age~cy official_ for fai~ur~ ~o per~orrn nondiscretionary
duties, some environmental laws exphcttly provtde for JUdtctal revtew of an Administrator's action in promulgating standards and limitations. See, e.g., 42 U .S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp.
V 1993); 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1988) (including review of denial or issuance of permits). But
see 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(0) (1988) (prohibiting action-forcing suits under RCRA to
challenge the siting of a hazardous waste facility or to restrain or enjoin the issuance of a
permit for such a facility). (\ ~rivate party_ also may ~bta~? r~~iew under general jurisdictional statutes that allow dtstnct court revtew of acttons ansmg under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). However, citizen suit
provisions under environmental legislation are preferable because they allow fee shifting
from one party to another under certain circumstances. See infra part Ill.C (discussing
attorney's fees).
140. See generally JEFFREY G. MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAw lNsT., CITIZEN surrs:
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987); Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 136; AxLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS, supra note 137; BNA
REPORT, supra note 16; Symposium, Citizen Suits: The Privatization of Environmental Law
Enforcement, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & Lrno. 253 (1993). For a criticism of environmental citizen
suits, see Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TuL. L.
REv. 339 (1990).
141. See generally MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 140, § 2.1, at 3-6.
142. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 0IV., CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE .HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 226 (1974) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 1970 CLEAN AIR Acr]. In the September 21, 1970 Senate debates, Senator Muskie noted the inadequate enforcement on the state and local levels and
stressed the need for more enforcement tools, a federal presence, and backup authority.

I d.
143. Jd. at 273-79. In the September 21, 1970 Senate debates, Senator Hruska submitted statistics on court congestion in opposition to citizen suit provisions. Jd.
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gerous intrusion into spheres of sovereign authority; others see private
enforcement as a device that enhances public participation and ultimately legitimizes the regulatory state.144 Citizens suit enforcement
was recently criticized as ill designed and part of an uncoordinated
enforcement scheme that distorts environmental regulation by overenforcement of some environmental laws and that results in an "offbudget entitlement program for a particular constituency." 145
The final forms of citizen suit provisions in many statutes reflect
the inevitable compromise in the debate about the wisdom of private
enforcement in the environmental context.146 Before 1970,147 citizen
suit provisions were common to some nonenvironmental laws, but
generally only allowed actions by individuals injured by a violation of
144. Professors Boyer and Meidinger summarize the debate nicely:
Private delegations of enforcement power may be as suspect as private delegations of rulemaking authority because they bypass the existing structure of limited
authority and political accountability that confines the powers of the regulatory
state .... [On the other hand, t]o the extent that regulation serves "the people"
rather than "the industry" or "the bureaucrats," it gains legitimacy. Conversely, it
forfeits that legitimacy when it becomes captive to the will of the industries or
bureaucrats. From this perspective, private enforcement may be viewed as the
ultimate legitimating device, since it gives the effective power to initiate regulation back to the people themselves.
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 136, at 842-43.
145. Greve, supra note 140, at 385. The author argues that laws are usually overinclusive, thus full enforcement is not socially useful and results in more costs than benefits.
Moreover, private enforcers are not generally accountable as are their public counterparts.
/d. at 344. To the extent that a scheme of private enforcement is badly designed (i.e.,
providing incentives for pursuing one type of enforcement suit but not providing incentives
for pursuing other beneficial types of enforcement suits), private enforcement generates
overenforcement. !d. at 344-45. An example of overenforcement is prosecution of permit
violations under the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) program. Because NPDES permit violations are relatively easy to prove, it is
often in the defendant's economic interest to settle for less than the penalties a court could
impose. See infra part II.A.1 (discussing Clean Water Act enforcement suits). Pursuant to
the settlement, the funds are then donated to programs that fund environmental improvement projects instead of the U.S. neasury. The result, argues Greve, is that enforcement
actions under Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions have led to overenforcement of the
NPDES permit program while subsidizing national environmental groups. Greve, supra
note 140, at 356, 380-81. Other types of suits may be neglected by national environmental
advocacy groups because they do not yield the same benefits. /d. at 342, 371.
146. The focus of this article is on citizen suit provisions contained in four major environmental statutes: Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); and RCRA, id. § 6972
(1988). These statutes were chosen because they are the major environmental laws most
pertinent to environmental hazards that affect low income communities and communities
of color, namely, residences near waste sites, lead exposure, air pollution, and consumption
of fish from contaminated waters. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 7-14; see also
supra note 45 (EPA Workgroup's findings). Although pesticide exposure was identified as
an area of grave concern, FIFRA does not contain a citizen suit provision. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
147. The prototype of the environmental citizen suit provision is § 304 of the Clean Air
Act, first enacted by the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments. Similar provisions were subsequently drafted into other environmental statutes with varying degrees of modification.
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a federallaw. 148 Environmental citizen suit provisions are different in
an important respect. They grant citizens the ability to act as real private attorneys general to sue on behalf of the community at large,
rather than to vindicate individual rights resulting in economic loss.149
Thus, environmental citizen suit provisions typically provide a means
to obtain injunctive relief and do not afford the citizen an avenue to
recover damages resulting from violations of environmental laws. 150
Logically, then, citizen suits are fueled by the altruism of the citizen
enforcer. Although desirable as a philosophical matter, this might
work systematically against the citizen enforcer who is hampered by
lack of resources and has to decide whether litigation is worthwhile.151
In addition to limitations as to damages, environmental citizen
suit provisions do not give private individuals carte blanche authority
to sue polluters or government enforcers for any reason. From the
perspective of the regulated and the regulators, substantive limitations
and strict procedures on citizen suits are desirable and control private
enforcement in a manner that complements rather than supplants
public enforcement. Procedural and substantive limitations vary depending upon the statute at issue and whether the citizen suit is
against a polluter (to force compliance requirements) or against a regulatory official (to perform a nondiscretionary duty). Many such limitations raise environmental justice concerns. As is discussed in detail
below, the limitations on private enforcement, when considered from
148. A common example of citizen suits allowing damage actions is suits under the civil
rights laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (mandating that the party violating the statute "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress"); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (holding that compensation for actual damages constitutes the basic purpose of§ 1983). However, a successful party's failure to prove actual damages will only entitle him or her to nominal damages.
Carey, 435 U.S. at 247. In addition, prevailing parties may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees at the court's discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. V 1993). In 1991, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 , which allows a claimant who has suffered intentional
employment discrimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages. /d. § 1981a
(Supp. V 1993).
149. See MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 140, § 1, at 1.
150. Generally, environmental citizen suit provisions give courts authority to consider
an injunction against the defendant, and under some statutes, penalties to be paid to the
U.S. Treasury. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (allowing for injunctive relief and penalties); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing for injunctive relief and penalties); RCRA, id. § 6972(a) (1988) (allowing for
injunctive relief and penalties). However, CERCLA does not allow for penalties. 42
U.S.C. § 9659(c) (1988). Courts have refused to fashion common law damage remedies
from violations of federal environmental laws. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat') Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that no private action for damages
exists under the Clean Water Act); Commerce Holding Co., Inc. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp.
441 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that there is no private action for damages under RCRA).
151. See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990). Professors Gillette and Krier discuss how public risk
litigation, generally, is biased against victim access to courts. /d. at 1044-54.
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the perspective of low income communities and communities of color,
inhibit private enforcement action that might otherwise lessen distributional inequities in environmental protection.1sz
A.

Enforcement Actions Against the Polluter
After sufficient notice, 153 and if a government agency is not already diligently prosecuting an action against the violator,1S4 any per152. The assertions of this article rest on the fact that community groups in low income
communities and communities of color (as a class) tend to have less education and thus less
access to technical knowledge of environmental matters and agency processes, and tend to
have less financial resources than community groups in wealthier, predominantly White
communities. See generally VoiCEs FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra note 7. Thus, the more
complicated, technical, and time-consuming a case, the more an underfinanced community
group will be at a disadvantage. Prosecuting complicated actions requires the use of expensive expert witnesses and involves substantial discovery of technological and scientific
matters. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 75, § 104[2). Complicated environmental cases are typically prosecuted by large, national environmental organizations who
have the economic resources to finance the suits and the legal expertise in a highly specialized area of law. Greve, supra note 140, at 369-70.
153. Generally, a citizen must first provide at least 60 days notice to the alleged violator, the state (where appropriate), and EPA. See, e.g. , 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988) (requiring 60-day notice for Clean Water Act enforcement suits unless the suit concerns new
source standards or toxic and pretreatment standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (requiring 60-day notice for Clean Air Act enforcement suits unless the suit concerns hazardous air pollutant standards violations and violations of SIP compliance orders); id. § 6972(b) (1988) (requiring 60-day notice for RCRA enforcement suits unless the
suit concerns hazardous waste management); id. § 9659(d}(l} (1988) (requiring 60-day notice for CERCLA enforcement suits). Failure to comply with notice provisions may be
jurisdictional. In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that notice provisions of environmental statutes should be strictly interpreted. See
Karen P. Ryan, Note, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County: Interpreting the Notice Provisions of
Environmental Statutes, 8 PACE ENVIL. L. REv. 255, 255-56 (1990).
154. Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA enforcement suits are precluded if
the Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a
federal or state court. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B); 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B). The Clean Water Act and RCRA include criminal actions in the
limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B). Court proceedings
under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act must seek compliance with standards,
limitations, or orders; and court proceedings under RCRA must seek compliance with permits, standards, regulations, conditions, requirements, prohibitions, or orders. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b)(1)(B); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A)-(B).
Some courts have expanded the meaning of "court" to include agency proceedings.
See, e.g., Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979); Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n v. Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that a compliance action bars a citizen suit). In some cases, courts have declined to extend
"diligent prosection" defenses to administrative proceedings when the agency's authority
to provide relief was more limited. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that EPA lacked
power under the Clean Water Act to issue penalties and enforce consent decrees, and
citizens are not provided the same participation rights); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that an administrative consent agreement does not preclude suit); Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton
Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a compliance order does not bar a
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son may bring a private citizen enforcement action against a member
of the regulated community to enforce requirements of the applicable
law. 1ss Requirements are often, but not always, found in the permits
required under the act in question. Some permit violations are easily
proven, but other enforcement actions involve matters outside the
ambit of clear violations of unambiguous permit requirements and

citizen suit, but active pursuit of administrative penalties does). Some court decisions appear to be grounded in a suspicion of lack of impartiality at the agency level. Sierra Club v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1685 (W.O. La. 1985).
The diligent prosecution limitation to citizen suits appears logical under a theory that
private enforcement is only appropriate as a supplement to public enforcement, but some
have questioned the effect of a diligent prosecution limitation, considering the dynamics
between the regulator and regulated over time. Professor Rodgers argues:
[W]hen the game is played over time under the constraints of reciprocity, shortrun pound-of-flesh policies are abandoned in favor of more "cooperative" strategies featuring compliance most of the time and enforcement only occasionally.
Those outcomes that evolve to the advantage of the principals may coincide only
approximately or not at all with formal legal obligation. A wayward citizens
group introduced into this game would be likely to identify a " best" strategy that
would depart from the position taken by the other players. Citizen organizations,
too, may become cooperative game players rather than isolated iconoclasts, and
both kinds of groups may appear in the same lawsuit. The national environmental organizations may put in a tub-thumping, short-term appearance in the longstanding regional environmental lawsuit advocating a quick-kill policy that is an
anathema to the citizen advocates who would have to live with it. Thmed around,
the national environmental groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, or the Sierra Club may be in pursuit of a
comprehensive bargain that requires a strategy greatly different from the peripheral sniping that is the best course for an outsider who has no hope of cracking
the inner circles.
1 WILLIAM H. RoDGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER§ 3.4, at 211 (1986
& Supp. 1992) (hereinafter RODGERS, AIR AND WATER) (footnotes omitted).
However, CERCLA precludes citizen suits upon diligent prosecution of "actions"
(not just court actions) by the President to require compliance with CERCLA or the Solid
Waste Disposal Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (1988). There is no requirement that EPA file
a court action. RCRA imminent hazard suits are similarly barred by an unusually broad
range of court and administrative actions.
155. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988), employs the phrase "any citizen," while the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), RCRA, id.
§ 6972(a) (1988), and CERCLA, id. § 9659(a) (1988), all use the phrase "any person."
Enforcement actions under the Clean Air Act are for violations of "emission[s] standard[s]
or limitation[s]," or orders respecting such standards or limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(l).
Enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act are for violations of an effluent standard
or limitation, or orders respecting same. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). Enforcement actions
under RCRA are for violations of any effective "permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, prohibition or order." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). In addition, enforcement
suits under RCRA also may be brought against persons who are "contributing to" the
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment
(known as RCRA imminent hazard suits). ld. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Enforcement actions
under CERCLA involve violations of any "standard, regulation, condition, requirement or
order" under the Act. ld. § 9659(a)(1).
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standards.156 Sometimes requirements are found in administrative or
court orders issued under the act in question.ts7
Regardless of whether the enforceable requirement is easy to isolate or more difficult, the community must first become aware of a risk
to the public and associate the risk with a suspected violation. A community group with limited resources will find it difficult to obtain information about public risks that may not be readily apparent, and
secondly, will find it difficult to mobilize to influence agency response
or initiate court proceedings.158 Thus, the first crucial step in enforcement of environmental laws in poor and minority communities is that
the citizens must have the knowledge and resources to detect noncomplying industrial activity within their community.1 59 Detecting noncompliance ranges from relatively easy to nearly impossible
depending upon the type of polluting activity involved.
1.

Clean Water Act Enforcement Suits

Under the Clean Water Act, 160 the detection and prosecution of
permit violations are easy relative to other enforcement actions. As
such, they constitute a disproportionately large percentage of citizen
156. Compare Clean Water Act NPDES violation enforcement actions, see infra part
II.A.1, with RCRA endangerment suits, see infra part II.A.4.
157. For example , administrative or court cleanup orders issued pursuant to CERCLA
may have enforceable requirements. See infra part II.A.3.
158. In discussing the inherent bias against citizen access to courts or agencies, professors Gillette and Krier note:
[T)he typical characteristics of public risk-impacts that are latent, diffuse, widely
dispersed, of low probability, and nonexclusive-limit the ability of potential and
actual public risk victims to gain access to the courts. Our point here is that they
can also frustrate the efforts of victims to mobilize for the purpose of influencing
agency decisions about risk. Whatever the objective of the mobilization effort . . .
considerable amounts of time, effort, and money will be required.
Gillette & Krier, supra note 151, at 1067-68 (citations omitted).
159. At a meeting of the subcommittee on enforcement of the National Environmental
Justice Advisory Committee, the author suggested that, in addition to federal enforcement
efforts targeted at low income and minority communities (termed "EJ communities" by
EPA), community groups could be trained in compliance monitoring. Environmental justice activists Richard Moore of SNEEJ and Pat Bryant of the Gulf Coast Tenants Organization responded that they had in the past repeatedly requested such training. Scott
Fulton, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, then announced that the Agency was developing a pilot project, termed "Partners in
Protection," which is an educational program that involves demonstration of sampling and
monitoring techniques to minority institutions and local environmental groups. Minority
academic institutions will be funded to train local communities and will be given compliance data. The project was scheduled to begin in two EPA regions in the fall of 1994. The
project description did not indicate the types of compliance monitoring training that would
be provided. National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee Meeting (Aug. 4-5,
1994) (project description on file with author).
160. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat 1566 (1977) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. V).
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enforcement actions. 161 Any facility discharging regulated pollutants
into a body of water from a discrete conveyance must first obtain a
Clean Water Act permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program.162 In addition to limiting the
amount of pollutant discharged with a facility's effluent, an NPDES
permit requires its holder to test regularly its effluent and to submit
reports with the recorded actual pollutant concentration. The reports
are generally available to the public.163 It is relatively easy, with minimum training, for a citizen to check and compare the facility permits
with the discharge reports if the citizen (or c~mmunity group) suspects that violations may be causing undue pollution. 164 If there is a
violation, the citizen should be able to establish liability at the summary judgment phase of a case simply by submitting the permit and
the discharge monitoring reports indicating a discharge beyond permit
limitations. 165 It would be relatively easy to train citizens in poor and
minority communities to detect and prosecute Clean Water Act
violations.
A citizen or community group may also seek penalties to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. This gives private enforcers some leverage in prosecuting Clean Water Act violations.166 Often, the
defendant (i.e., the discharging facility) and the plaintiff will settle the
citizen's suit for a sum generally less than the anticipated penalty
amount. Because of the prohibition on recovery of damages, the
plaintiff is unable to receive funds from settlements directly. The settlement amount, therefore, upon court approval, is submitted to a special fund for environmental mitigation projects (sometimes called
credit projects) instead of the U.S. Theasury. 16 7 National environmental organizations have been successful in establishing and funding en161. BNA REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11; Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENvn.. L. REv. 23, 35-53 (1985).
162. 33 U.S.C. §§ 13ll(a), 1342(a) (1988).
163. ld. § 1318 (1988).
164. Fadil, supra note 161, at 37-38 (describing ease of proof of NPDES permit
violations).
165. See BNA REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11; Student Pub. Interest Research Group
of N.J. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. Raytheon
Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050 (D. Mass. 1984).
166. But see Beverly M. Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits Under the Clean Water
Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 1, 58 (1989-90) (discussing the inability of citizens to collect civil penalties for purely
past violations of the Clean Water Act as inhibiting leverage accorded to citizen enforcement efforts).
167. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 136, at 932-33; Greve, supra note 140, at 356-59.
But see Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniel Midland Co., 780 F. Supp. 95, 101-02
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to approve a Clean Water Act citizen suit settlement providing
for payment of money to three private environmental groups where there was no provision
for payment of penalties to the U.S. Treasury).
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vironmental mitigation projects with Clean Water Act citizen suit
settlements. However, poor and minority communities generally do
not have the same capacity to conceive, design, and administer environmental mitigation projects within their communities. 168 Therefore,
such communities might not have the same incentives to prosecute
Clean Water Act enforcement actions.
In addition, Clean Water Act enforcement suits might be inadequate to address problems in low income and minority neighborhoods
because the standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act are
not sufficiently protective for classes of persons who consume more
than the "average" daily amount of fish. Water quality criteria are
based primarily upon scientifically determined "safe" concentrations
of regulated pollutants discharged into a water body.l 69 The determined safe concentration levels are based on assumptions about how
frequently the general population consumes fish caught from a given
water body.17o However, many low income and minority communities
near waterways are likely to depend upon subsistence fish consump168. It takes considerable time and effort to conceive, design, and set up the administrative mechanisms for an environmental mitigation project. National environmental organizations or well-funded community groups may undertake the task, but this is one
potential goal that, despite the overall agenda to attain political and economic parity with
wealthier communities, may not be feasible for a community group on a tight budget to
achieve.
169. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1994). Generally, permit conditions
are based on technology-based effluent limitations as long as the applicable standards do
not cause the water body to exceed designated water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316,
1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The water quality standards are set with reference to federally promulgated water quality criteria. /d. § 1312 (1988). If the water quality criteria are
underprotective, then the discharge by multiple sources, all in compliance with technologybased effluent limitations, may not exceed water criteria but still present a threat to area
residents with a higher than average intake of fish caught from local waters.
170. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 13.
EPA develops its water quality criteria and encourages the states to set water
quality standards assuming consumption over a 70-year period of two liters per
day of ambient, untreated water and 6.5 grams per day of fish caught in the same
body of water .... In order to determine the amount of fish consumed, EPA
examined available studies and decided to use the 1977-78 survey conducted by
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). All the studies examined
had shortcomings.... That survey indicated that the average individual consumed
6.5 grams of estuarine fish per day and 14.3 grams of all types of fish per day.
/d. Fish consumption surveys indicate an association between average daily rates of freshwater fish consumption and race/ethnicity. /d. at 12-13. For example, if fish caught in a
certain area are contaminated with a bioaccumulative pollutant, then consumption of the
fish will lead to exposure to the pollutant. The more that the fish are included in the diet,
the higher the exposure to the pollutant. EPA found that, on average, Asians are the
highest consumers of fish, followed in order by Native Americans, African-Americans, and
Whites. /d. In addition, certain ethnic populations tend to consume fish with a higher fat
content. Fish with a high fat content bioaccumulate lipophilic (fat-loving) pollutants to a
higher degree, thus causing a higher exposure to the pollutants in populations that prefer
fish with a high fat content. /d. There are no adequate studies of urban or rural poor that
could elucidate the relationship between fish consumption and poverty. However, it is
likely that there are significant numbers of rural and urban poor people who are supple-
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tion well above the consumption of the "average person" used by
EPA in setting acceptable levels of pollution. 171 Consequently, even if
all permitted facilities are compelled by citizen enforcers to discharge
in strict compliance with their NPDES permits, the populations near
waterways may not be adequately protected because of greater than
average fish consumption.172 In such a case, local citizens could not
effectively address the threat to their health by prosecuting owners of
local discharging facilities under citizen suit provisions because the facilities would be operating lawfully within the requirements of the
Clean Water Act.
Ironically, a potential problem raised by the ease of Clean Water
Act enforcement suits is that national environmental organizations
might be encouraged to target resources (at least those resources
budgeted for enforcement suits) to NPDES Clean Water Act violations that are easily proven and have the potential to generate funds
for environmental projects.173 Thus, underfunded community groups
that must rely on pro bono assistance might face a disinclination on
the part of environmental organizations to undertake more complicated lawsuits, such as those that involve exposures from multiple and
diverse sources of pollutants.174
2. Clean Air Act Enforcement Suits
Under the Clean Air Act, a private citizen can sue a person alleged to be in violation of an emission standard or limitationP 5 But
until the Title V permit program enacted by the 1990 amendments to
the Clean Air Act is fully implemented, an enforceable federal "emismenting their daily consumption of animal protein by catching and consuming local fish.
/d.
171. /d.; see also Patrick C. West eta!., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption:
Evidence from a Statewide Survey of Michigan, in RACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,
supra note 7, at 100-13 (discussing the statistical interaction effect between race, place of
residence, and length of residence in the state).
172. In such a case, the citizens group might have challenged the promulgation of the
underprotective water quality standard. As noted earlier, most local citizens groups were
not involved in the formulation of laws and regulations; they lacked the resources to challenge promulgations of standards at the national level. Even if the community group had
knowledge of the proceedings and the technical and scientific expertise to challenge the
underprotective standard, the group might still have other practical obstacles, like the logistics of prosecuting a suit in the District of Columbia, where venue lies for nationally
applicable regulations for water quality criteria under the Clean Water Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
173. See Fadil, supra note 161, at 35-53 (discussing the rise of citizen suits against polluters under the Clean Water Act).
174. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the exposure of urban residents to pollutants from multiple sources).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In addition, undertaking construction of new or modified major emitting facilities without required Clean Air Act permits is
actionable. /d. § 7604(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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sion standard or limitation" 176 is not easily identified or prosecuted.
Title V of the 1990 amendments establishes a comprehensive permit
program for air emissions. Because the permit program is not expected to be fully implemented for several years, 177 this article evaluates private enforcement as it presently exists, then discusses the
possible effects of the Title V Clean Air Act permit program on private enforcement.1'8 It is important to bear in mind, however, that
successful enforcement suits, both presently and when the permit program is in place, depend upon the ability of the community to detect
the presence of harmful air pollutants, to find the source of the pollutants (the facility), to identify a federally enforceable requirement,
and ultimately, to prove a violation of that requirement.
a.

Citizen Suits Under the Existing Clean Air Act Programs

Presently, not all facilities emitting air pollutants179 are subject to
uniform national standards o.r require a permit under the Clean Air
Act. 180 Moreover, although one might think that an "emission standard or limitation" refers to a quantifiable, permitted concentration of
a regulated pollutant emitted into the air at a particular rate, this is
not always the case. The general definition of "emission standard or
limitation" under the Clean Air Act also includes requirements that
are not easily subject to measurement, such as requirements relating
to operation or maintenance, design and equipment, work practices,
and operational standards. 181 As a result, identifying the enforceable
requirements for a particular business operation is often difficult.
176. Id. § 7661 (Supp. V 1993).
177. See infra note 208.
178. Such a permit program is likely to substantially affect private enforcement under
the citizen suit provisions.
179. Under the Clean Air Act, air pollutant means:
(A]ny air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation
of any air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has identified such precursor
or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term "air pollutant" is used.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. V 1993). Despite the inclusive definition, under pre-1990 law
EPA chose to actively regulate only about 20 air pollutants: 6 criteria pollutants, see infra
note 186, 8 hazardous air pollutants for which the Administrator promulgated national
standards (asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven emissions, inorganic arsenic, mercury,
radionuclides, and vinyl chloride), 4 nonhazardous noncriteria pollutants from designated
facilities (sulfuric acid mist from sulfuric acid plants, fluoride emissions from phosphate
fertilizer plants, total reduced sulfur emissions from Kraft pulp mills, and fluoride emissions from primary aluminum reduction plants), and hydrocarbons from automobiles.
JoHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N. OREN, CLEAN AIR Acr 1990 AMENDMENTS: LAw
AND PRACI'ICE § 2.2 (1991 ).
180. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
181. In the general definition section:
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possible effects of the Title V Clean Air Act permit program on private enforcementP8 It is important to bear in mind, however, that
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limitation" under the Clean Air Act also includes requirements that
are not easily subject to measurement, such as requirements relating
to operation or maintenance, design and equipment, work practices,
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requirements for a particular business operation is often difficult.
176. Id. § 7661 (Supp. V 1993).
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178. Such a permit program is likely to substantially affect private enforcement under
the citizen suit provisions.
179. Under the Clean Air Act, air pollutant means:
[A]ny air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation
of any air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has identified such precursor
or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term "air pollutant" is used.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. V 1993). Despite the inclusive definition, under pre-1990 law
EPA chose to actively regulate only about 20 air pollutants: 6 criteria pollutants, see infra
note 186, 8 hazardous air pollutants for which the Administrator promulgated national
standards (asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven emissions, inorganic arsenic, mercury,
radionuclides, and vinyl chloride), 4 nonhazardous noncriteria pollutants from designated
facilities (sulfuric acid mist from sulfuric acid plants, fluoride emissions from phosphate
fertilizer plants, total reduced sulfur emissions from Kraft pulp mills, and fluoride emissions from primary aluminum reduction plants), and hydrocarbons from automobiles.
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181. In the general definition section:
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The first task is to classify each source of air emissions within the
plant in question under a complicated scheme. 182 Generally, new
The terms "emission limitation" and "emission standard" mean a requirement
established by the State or the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or
concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis, including any
requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work practice or operational standard promulgated under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) (Supp. V 1993). In addition, the Clean Air Act citizen suit provision is
more broadly defined, allowing citizen suits for a wide range of violations of requirements:
For purposes of this section, the term "emission standard or limitation under this
chapter" means(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard of
performance or emission standard,
(2) a control or prohibition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel additive, or
(3) any condition or requirement of a permit under [a PSD program] or [a
nonattainment program], section 7419 of this title (relating to primary nonferrous smelter orders), any condition or requirement under an applicable implementation plan relating to transportation control measures, air quality
maintenance plans, vehicle inspection and maintenance programs or vapor recovery requirements, section 7545 (e) and (f) of this title (relating to fuels and
fuel additives), section 7491 of this title (relating to visibility protection), any
condition or requirement under subchapter VI of this chapter (relating to
ozone protection), or any requirement under section 7411 or 7412 of this title
(without regard to whether such requirement is expressed as an emission standard or otherwise); or
(4) any other standard, limitation, or schedule established under any permit
issued pursuant to subchapter V of this chapter or under any applicable State
implementation plan approved by the Administrator, any permit term or condition, and any requirement to obtain a permit as a condition of operations[,]
which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable by reason
of section 7418 of this title [relating to federal facilities]) or under an applicable
implementation plan.
Jd. § 7604(f) (Supp. V 1993).
182. "Stationary sources" mean buildings, structures, facilities, and installations emitting any air pollutant, as opposed to mobile sources, like automobiles and aircraft. See id.
§ 7602(z) (Supp. V 1993). Compare id. § 7411(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) with id.
§ 7521(b) (1988). A citizen suit by a local citizens group is more likely to be against stationary sources regulated under subchapter I than against the types of industries regulated
under other subchapters (e.g., the automobile industry under subchapter II or utility plants
under subchapter IV); enforcement suits under other subchapters are more likely to be
brought by national environmental groups and are not discussed in this article.
"New stationary sources" are sources in which construction or modification is commenced after publication of regulations prescribing standards of performance for the particular industry category. ld. § 7411(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For example, "a
primary lead smelter is considered a new source under the law if the construction or modification of that smelter began after October 16, 1974, the date the EPA first promulgated
standards of performance for primary lead smelters." SQUILLACE, supra note 75, at 53
(citation omitted). Modification means physical changes or changes in operation methods
that increase or add emissions of air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2), (4) (1988 & Supp.
v 1993).
"Existing source" means any source other than a new stationary source. Jd.
§ 741l{a)(6) {1988).
A "major stationary source" is generally a facility that has the potential to emit 100
tons per year or more of any air pollutant. ld. § 7602(j) {1988). However, specific statutory provisions of the 1990 amendments modify the definition of a major stationary source.
For example, in serious ozone nonattainment areas, a major stationary source is one that
has the potential to emit 50 tons or more per year of volatile organic compounds (an ozone
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sources of air emissions within a plant must be built according to federal technology-based standards. In addition, the owner of a plant
containing sources of air emissions that are both newly constructed
(or modified) and have the potential to emit large amounts of certain
air pollutants, must obtain a permit under the Clean Air Act before
commencing construction. 183 But the majority of stationary sources of
precursor); in severe areas, 25 tons or more per year; and in extreme areas, 10 tons or more
per year. /d. § 7511a(a)-(c) (Supp. V 1993); see also id. § 7512a(c) (Supp. V 1993) (50 tons
or more per year of carbon monoxide in serious areas in which stationary sources contribute significantly to carbon monoxide levels); id. § 7513a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991) (70 tons or
more per year of particulate matter from sources or groups of sources in a contiguous
area).
A "major emitting facility" is generically described in the same manner as a major
stationary source. /d. § 76020). However, major emitting facilities in attainment areas
(subject to part C PSD program) include 28 types of sources (e.g., coal-fired utility plants
and municipal incinerators) that have the potential to emit 100 tons or more per year of
any air pollutant and other (nonenumerated) sources that can emit 250 tons or more of any
air pollutant. /d. § 7479(1) (Supp. V 1993).
A "major source," subject to exceptions, usually refers to one or more stationary
sources in a contiguous area under common control that have the potential to emit 10 or
more tons of a hazardous air pollutant or 25 or more tons of a combination of hazardous
air pollutants. /d. § 7412(a){l) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). An "area source" is a source emitting hazardous air pollutants that is not a major source. /d. § 7412(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
183. New stationary sources must meet new source performance standards (NSPS).
Major stationary sources, having located in an area that exceeded a designated national
ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) at the time of construction, must use the lowest
achievable emissions reduction available (LAER). Major emitting facilities having located
in areas not exceeding NAAQS at the time of construction must use the best available
control technology (BACf). Facilities emitting certain hazardous air pollutants must not
emit in a manner that will violate a national emission standard for an Administrator-listed
hazardous air pollutant (NESHAP).
New or modified stationary sources emitting pollutants must comply with technologybased new source performance standards, generally determined by industry category. 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-.748 (1994). NSPS's are
preferably expressed as emissions standards (by regulations that numerically limit concentrations of pollutants in air emissions), but, if infeasible, may be expressed as "a design,
equipment, work practice or operational standard, or combination thereof." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(a)(1); id. § 7411(h)(1) (1988). However, particular technological systems may not
be required as a NSPS. /d. § 7411(b)(5) (1988). Instead of requiring a federal permit, each
state develops a procedure for implementing and enforcing NSPS's. ld. § 7411(c){1)
(1988). Waivers from designated NSPS's may be granted for technological innovation. /d.
§ 7411U) (1988). To determine the applicable requirement, a citizens group must first determine if the facility was constructed after promulgation of NSPS 1s for its industry category, then whether a waiver was granted.
Major stationary sources desiring to locate in nonattainment areas are first required to
meet certain offset requirements and operate with the lowest achievable emissions rate in
order to obtain a construction permit under the Clean Air Act. /d. § 7503 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). The permit should reflect the applicable emissions standard.
Major emitting facilities desiring to locate in an attainment area must undergo a review process and demonstrate that potential emissions will not exceed a specified increment, must employ the best available control technology, and must obtain a Clean Air Act
construction permit. /d. §§ 7470-7491 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the PSD permit program, an emission standard or limitation for each facility is determined to be the maximum
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air pollution (which includes small existing sources) has no uniform
federal standards, does not require federal permits and, if regulated, is
regulated primarily through state implementation plans.184
The regulation of small existing stationary sources emitting certain air pollutants will depend primarily upon how each state decides
to achieve or maintain compliance with national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS).I85 NAAQS pertain to common air pollutants
that enter the air from diverse sources (termed "criteria pollutants").186 Under the Clean Air Act, each state must submit to EPA a
state implementation plan (SIP), which contains a variety of strategies
and controls designed to reduce emissions of criteria pollutants to
achieve or maintain compliance with NAAQS. 187 Control strategies
degree of reduction of pollutants that the administrator determines is achievable for the
facility on a case-by-case basis, not to exceed emissions allowed by any new source emission standard or hazardous air emission standard. The permit should reflect the applicable
emissions standard and any monitoring requirements. /d. § 7479(3) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
Facilities emitting a hazardous air pollutant for which a health-based national emission
standard for hazardous air pollutants was promulgated under pre-1990 law must not emit
in a manner that will violate the NESHAP (subject to some exceptions and waivers). /d.
§ 7412(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the prior Act, the Administrator was required to
publish a list of hazardous air pollutants for which he intended to establish an emission
standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (1988). The 1990 amendments specifically list 189 hazardous air pollutants, direct EPA to categorize sources into major sources and area
sources, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1)-(2), and require the promulgation of emission standards for
all major sources and area sources by the year 2000, id. § 7412(c)(l), (e)(1)(E) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Major sources must use the maximum achievable control technology
(MACf) and standards for area sources will be based on generally available control technology (GACf). Pre-1990 hazardous air emissions standards are preserved but may be
made more stringent. /d. § 7412(g) (Supp. V 1993). For modified major sources, either
EPA or the state will define MACf on a case-by-case basis if no emission standard has
been promulgated at the time of modification. /d. § 7412(g)(2)(A). However, by voluntarily participating in an early reduction program, some sources will have the opportunity to
have a six-year extension for complying with new standards. /d. § 7412(i)(5) (Supp. V
1993).
184. See generally STENSVAAO & OREN, supra note 179, § 2.5. As early as 1981, one
commentator noted that approximately 2000 new sources per year fell under Clean Air
Act permit requirements, while at least 10 times that many sources were created annually.
William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059,
1089 n.95 (1981).
185. NAAQS are described as the maximum concentration of criteria pollutants applicable for various time periods that is not to be exceeded more than a specified number of
times annually. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PouCY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 676 (1992) (hereinafter PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW).
186. To date, NAAQS have been promulgated for six criteria air pollutants: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, suspended particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead. /d. at
773. By statute, the Administrator must promulgate NAAQS for emissions that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and come from numerous and
diverse sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
187. Each state first submits to EPA a list of geographic areas in which criteria pollutants in the ambient air exceed NAAQS. These areas are designated nonattainment areas.
42 U.S.C. § 7507 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air
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are diverse and depend in large part upon whether the air quality in
the geographical area exceeds the NAAQS for a pollutant (a nonattainment area subject to stringent SIP requirements) or not (subject to
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) requirements).188 Each
state may have an assortment of strategies designed to control pollutants, which may range from permit programs requiring certain emitting facilities to limit emissions of criteria air pollutants, to automobile
inspection and maintenance programs, to public transportation and
traffic control plans, to programs requiring particular equipment for
certain industrial activities.189 Herein lies the dilemma for the citizen
enforcer.
A community group wishing to remedy localized harmful air
quality would first have to determine the nature of the offending pollution and where the pollution originates. The determination might
be easy where there is one plant emitting air pollutants in the area,
but would be much more difficult where there are multiple emitting
facilities in a small area. Alternatively, a citizen group might decide to
investigate selected industrial operations in the area to determine if
any are in violation of the Clean Air Act. If a local plant is large and
relatively new, or has recently undergone modification or expansion,
the owner might have been required to obtain Clean Air Act permits
prior to commencing construction of emission sources within the
plant. In such a case, the citizen group could check the permits to
ascertain the pollutants emitted, along with any applicable technolAct, some nonattainment areas are further classified by the degree of nonattainment; for
example, nonattainment areas for ozone may be classified as marginal, moderate, serious,
severe, or extreme. Id § 7511(a) (Supp. V 1993). Nonattainment areas for carbon monoxide and particulate matter may be designated as either moderate or serious. /d. § 7512(a)
(Supp. V 1993). Depending upon the severity of nonattainment, a state has a certain
amount of time to bring its air quality in nonattainment areas into compliance with applicable NAAQS. See, e.g., id. (mandating that moderate nonattainment areas for carbon monoxide must attain NAAQS by December 31, 1995 and serious areas must achieve
attainment by December 31, 2000). See generally id §§ 7501-7515 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
For geographical areas in which the ambient air has concentrations of criteria air pollutants at or below NAAQS, these areas are deemed to be in attainment, but each state
must act to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in these areas. See generally id.
§§ 7470-7479 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
188. See generally id §§ 7501-7515 (nonattainment); id. §§ 7470-7492 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (prevention of significant deterioration).
189. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 1976), on remand, 422 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 76
F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1310 (1977) (holding that where state and
city officials in New York made it sufficiently clear that they would carry out the strategies
of a SIP, a metropolitan transportation control plan contained therein was subject to citizen enforcement). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (Supp. V 1993) (plan submissions and
requirements for ozone nonattainment areas); id. § 7512a (Supp. V 1993) (plan submissions and requirements for carbon monoxide nonattainment areas); id. § 7513a (Supp. III
1991) (plan provisions and schedules for plan submissions for particulate matter nonattainment areas).
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ogy-based standards and monitoring requirements.190 Alternatively,
the state might have its own permit system in place. But reliance on
requirements in state-issued permits is risky because presently there is
no mechanism to coordinate permit terms with applicable SIP provisions; SIP requirements may change, while permits do not.t9t
If a plant owner is not required to obtain a permit under the
Clean Air Act or the SIP, the process of isolating federally enforceable
requirements is more complicated. The citizen group must first find
out if the plant is emitting regulated pollutants and, if so, the sources
and concentrations of the pollutants, and the processes resulting in the
emissions. Next, the community group must review the SIP to determine if the particular plant's emissions are limited, or if the industry
category to which the business belongs is regulated in any manner.192
The citizen group must then attempt to determine if the requirements
contained in the SIP constitute enforceable standards or limitations
under the Clean Air Act. 193 In this respect, state implementation
plans have been characterized as "notoriously vague, not to mention
fickle and misleading."194 Even where standards and limitations in
the SIP are clearly defined as federal Clean Air Act requirements,
standards are often expressed in general terms, and emission monitoring requirements may be equally general or nonexistent. 195
190. The ease of discovering a permit violation will depend upon the permit conditions.
It will be relatively easy to discern a violation if the permit contains quantifiable air emission limitations with clear monitoring and reporting requirements. It will be harder to
discern a permit violation where the requirements relate to operation and maintenance,
design and equipment, or work practices, see supra note 181 and accompanying text, or
where monitoring or reporting requirements are not clearly stated or are ambiguous, see
infra note 195.
191. Pedersen, supra note 184, at 1093; RoDGERS, AIR AND WATER, supra note 154,
§ 310, at 261-62 (describing backlog of SIP revisions).
192. Although states differ, when designing a mix of control strategies to attain
NAAQS or prevent significant deterioration of NAAQS, requirements may be stated by
reference to industry category rather than by specific facilities. Alternatively, however, a
SIP may allocate emissions limitations for stationary sources within the same industry and
region on an ad hoc basis. Stephen Fotis, Private Enforcement of the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 127, 169 (1985).
193. See, e.g., City of Highland Park v. 'frain, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 927 (1976) (holding that an underground garage venting pollutants into the air is
not a violation of an emission standard or limitation); Wilder v. Thomas, 659 F. Supp. 1500
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an allegation that a development project would aggravate carbon monoxide hotspots within New York City did not
constitute an enforceable SIP provision); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Deukmejian, 731 F.
Supp. 1448, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1990) {holding that, although the plan clearly required stationary sources to take contingency measures if the state did not make reasonable further
progress to attain compliance with NAAQS, citizen plaintiffs could not "point to any language that expressly links the number of such measures to the attainment of NAAQS or
expressly commits to sufficient contingency measures to attain NAAQS").
194. RoDGERS, AIR AND WATER, supra note 154, § 3.4, at 222.
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Under pre-1990 Clean Air Act provisions, EPA monitoring and emissions reporting were not mandatory for all sources. Moni-
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Finally, even where SIP standards are specific and monitoring is ·
required, the problem of obtaining reliable data to detect and prove
the violation remains. 196 Sometimes, requirements normally pertaining to the type of air emissions unit involved might be excused if there
are decreases in emissions from other units within the plant.197 Thus,
the fact that the facility owner does not have the type of pollution
control equipment required by law for a particular source category
might not constitute a violation. Even monitoring data indicating an
excess of emissions allowed under the SIP for a particular source category might not establish a violation of a requirement. As a result, one
commentator has observed that even where monitoring and reporting
is required, "[i]dentifying noncompliance often require[s] assembling,
correlating and interpreting monitoring data in light of the applicable
standards. Developing a basis for alleging noncompliance [can] be a
cumbersome and sometimes uncertain process. "198 A report by the
Environmental Law Institute found that few Clean Air Act regulations "require periodic reports on emission levels and there is no uniform system of record keeping of hard, reliable compliance data.
Tests are relatively expensive and obviously cannot be performed by
prospective plaintiffs."199
As a result of the difficulty in determining the nature and source
of air pollution, isolating a federal requirement, and further proving
the violation of an enforceable "standard or limitation," an attorney
representing a citizens group in prosecuting a Clean Air Act enforcement action takes a substantial risk that after an expensive investigation, consultation with experts, and perhaps protracted litigation, a
toring emissions directly from the smoke stack is extremely expensive; thus, emissions
might be estimated instead by visual observation and theoretical calculations. Fotis, supra
note 192, at 165.
.
196. See generally CoMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN CoNTROLLING MAJOR AIR POLLUTION SOURCES (1979) (describing inaccuracies in determining compliance by major stationary sources and demonstrating that
many sources' compliance was based upon unverified and unreliable data and that these
sources were actually in violation).
197. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
198. Scott M. DuBoff, The 1990 Amendments and Section 304: The Specter of Increased
Citizen Suit Enforcement, NAT. REsouRcES & ENV'T, Fall1992, at 34.
199. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INSTITUTE, CITIZEN Surrs: AN ANALYSIS oF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES N-4 (1984) [hereinafter
ELI REPORT].
Although air emissions and compliance data is collected by the government under
the Clean Air Act's National Emissions Data System (NEDS), and Compliance
Data System (CDS) this information is considered highly unreliable and "stale."
Often, said an interviewee, CDS data is based simply on subjective, visual observation, because to conduct a proper "stack test" would be too expensive at the
estimated cost of $12,000-$15,000.
ld. at V-14; see also RoDGERS, AIR AND WATER, supra note 154, § 3.4, at 209; Fotis, supra
note 192, at 165.
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court would conclude that there was no enforceable standard or limitation, or that the defendant did not violate the permit or SIP requirement.200 In such cases, the citizens group cannot obtain relief or
recover costs.201 Consequently, poorly funded community groups
(and their attorneys) presently have a substantial disincentive to prosecute Clean Air Act violations.202
An additional disincentive to identifying and prosecuting violations, not applicable to national environmental groups prosecuting
like cases, is that the facility in question might employ community residents. If this is the case, compliance monitoring might place some
community residents in fear of losing their jobs and a citizens group
might be reJuctant to challenge the practices of local emitters.203
b.

Possible Improvements Under the 1990 Clean Air Act Permit
Program

Although national environmental organizations might have the
expertise and economic resources to assume the risk inherent in Clean
Air Act enforcement suits, resources of national environmental
groups are more likely to be used for lawsuits other than Clean Air
Act enforcement actions.204 National environmental groups often sue
under general judicial review provisions challenging the promulgation
of national standards, apparently because such suits have a potentially
200. For example, in 1981 the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund initiated a number of
citizen suits against utilities for violations of the Clean Air Act. ELI REPORT, supra note
199, at 1-6. The Sierra Club lost the four cases that went to trial in large part because of the
procedural issues involving the underlying validity of SIP provisions. /d. ("The first decade of experience had given environmental organization enforcers little confidence in
[Clean Air Act] citizen suits as a tool.").
201. Technically, costs under the Clean Air Act citizen suit provisions may be awarded
to any party "whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. ·
§ 7604(d) (1988). One may argue that the citizens group need not be a "prevailing party"
or "substantially prevailing party" as is required under other environmental law citizen suit
provisions, like RCRA or CERCLA. Id. §§ 6972(e), 9659(f) (1988}. However, in Rucke/shaus v. Sierra Club the Supreme Court held that: "[A]bsent some degree of success on the
merits by the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees
under § 307(f)." 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983). Although the Court was construing judicial
review provisions, the same rationale would arguably extend to citizen suit provisions.
202. Representative Waxman (D-Cal.} summed up the situation this way:
In theory, even prior to the 1990 Amendments, the [Clean Air Act] provided an
opportunity for citizen suits against private sources. However, this authority was
rarely used. One reason is that it has proven difficult for citizens to ascertain the
control requirements applicable to a source because these requirements were
often buried in complex state implementation plans. Also, even where the requirements were known, it was generally not possible-short of hiring engineers
and conducting monitoring-for citizens to determine compliance status.
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721, 1747 (1991).
203. See supra part II.A.2.a; see infra part II.B.l.
204. ELI REPORT, supra note 199, at 11-10 (fig. D), III-29 (tbl. 5}; Fadil, supra note 161 ,
at 32.
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broader impact.2°5 Furthermore, when national environmental groups
do prosecute enforcement suits under citizen suit provisions, the suits
are often those involving violations of the Clean Water Act NPDES
program.206
The permit program mandated by the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act might remove some of the present obstacles to Clean
Air Act enforcement suits. States were to submit permit programs to
EPA for approval by November 15, 1993.2 07 Once a state's permit
program is adopted (or a federal permit program instituted),2°8 facilities subject to permit requirements have one year to submit a complete permit application.209 Ideally, the permits ultimately issued will
clearly define Clean Air Act standards and limitations; clearly define
federal requirements pertaining to testing methods, monitoring, record keeping, and reporting; and separate and distinguish "state only"
requirements not subject to federal citizen enforcement suits. 210 Like
the Clean Water Act NPDES permit program, reference to the applicable permit and emission reports should provide citizen enforcers adequate information to detect and prosecute violations. In addition to
the permit program, the 1990 amendments also grant citizens authority to seek penalties and specifically authorize part of the penalties to
be diverted to fund beneficial mitigation projects. 211 In these respects,
the amended Clean Air Act citizen suit provision might provide similar structural incentives as the popular Clean Water Act enforcement
authority. Unfortunately, however, even after the permit program is
in place, other provisions and regulations might undermine citizen enforcement efforts.
For example, states may exempt nonmajor sources from the Title
V permit program until EPA completes rulemaking on how to fold the
205. GRAD, E NVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 75, § 702(3).
206. Greve, supra note 140, at 352-54 (tbl. 1).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (Supp. V 1993).
208. EPA has one year to review the state program for approval. !d. § 7661a(d)(l).
209. /d. § 7661b(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). The first permit applications are likely to be
due in winter 1994, but because states may require permit applications to be submitted at
different times, many companies remain uncertain as to the deadline. Russell S. Frye &
Leslie S. Ritts, State Clean Air Act Programs Undefined, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 21,
21. Whether a permit is complete will be determined within 60 days of submission of the
permit application. 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(a)(4) (1994). Permit applications must identify all
pollutants emitted by the facility regulated under the Clean Air Act, applicable pollution
control requirements, test methods for determining compliance, control equipment and
emissions-related information, and anticipated alternative operating scenarios. !d.
§ 70.5(c) (1994). The facility may operate under a limited permit application shield pending issuance of the permit. !d. § 70.7(b) (1994). Although all terms of a "part 70" permit
are enforceable by the Administrator and citizens under the Clean Air Act, the permitting
authority is to designate terms and conditions not required under the Clean Air Act and
not federally enforceable. /d. § 70.6(b) (1994).
210. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (1994).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g) (Supp. V 1993).
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nonmajor sources into the permit program.21z In an area where air
quality is adversely affected by numerous small sources, and where
new small sources are presently subject to Clean Air Act new source
performance standards (NSPS), citizen enforcers might not have the
benefit of Title V-mandated, clearly defined, permit conditions to aid
in enforcement efforts.213
Another potentially problematic provision of Title V is the "permit shield." This provision provides the permitting authority to state
in a permit that compliance with the permit is deemed compliance
both with the enforceable requirements of the permit and with requirements explicitly excluded by the permit.214 The permit shield has
been criticized to the extent that it may be interpreted to exempt a
source from specifically applicable provisions if the permit makes reference to a more general but applicable statutory provision.21 5 A liberal interpretation of the permit s~eld gives a permit applicant the
benefit of agency omission in the permitting process.216
It is fair to conclude that the highly technical nature of air pollution regulation, coupled with the decentralized nature of SIP's and
permit decisions, systematically discourages citizen enforcement.
Moreover, implementation of the Title V permit program will do little
212. 40 C.F.R. § 70.3(b) (1994). Further, when EPA promulgates new source performance standards and hazardous air pollutant standards for sources that are nonmajor, the
Administrator has the authority to exempt such sources from the permit provisions of title
V. !d.; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 21,715-16 (1991) (stating that nonmajor sources in nonattainment areas will receive deferral from the title V permit requirements if the state can effectively enforce SIP obligations without using federally enforceable operating permits); see
also supra note 182. Exempting small sources from title V deadlines and mandates is especially troubling when one considers that: "Because many major stationary sources have
adopted reasonably good pollution controls, future progress will depend to a significant
extent on improved regulation of smaller source[s)." Latin, supra note 85, at 1698.
213. States may subject nonmajor sources to the permit program, but the requirements
could be more stringent than federal requirements and likely not federally enforceable. 40
C.F.R. § 70.1(c) (1994).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (Supp. V 1993); 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(f) (1994). The permit shield
will not preclude prosecution of Clean Air Act violations occurring before permit issuance,
of requirements of the acid rain program, and of requirements relating to information
gathering. 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(f)(3). Emergency order requirements are exempt by statute.
42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f).
215. James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Clean
Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 281,300 (1992). However, the
permit shield will apply provided the applicable requirements are included in the permit
and are "specifically identified in the permit." 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(f)(1)(i). Thus, an argument
can be made that the permit shield should be narrowly construed and that applicable requirements must be clearly identified. Otherwise, if new requirements become applicable
to the facility and the permit term has more than three years remaining, the permitting
authority must reopen permit proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
216. A permit may be reopened upon a determination that the permit contains a material mistake or where it must be revised to assure compliance with applicable provisions of
the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(b)(9), 7661c(a) (Supp. V 1993). However, reopening a permit is a cumbersome process. Miskiewicz & Rudd, supra note 215, at 301.
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to change the regulatory dynamics that impeded implementation of
the pre-1990 Clean Air Act.217 Citizens in poor and minority communities are likely to remain at a disadvantage as they generally have
fewer resources and access to the expertise needed to determine compliance and prosecute enforcement actions.21s
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act Enforcement Suits
The primary focus of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly
known as Superfund, is to clean up contaminated sites.219 Enforce217. Latin, supra note 85. In a discussion of the conflicts between SIP and title V
permit programs, professor Latin observes:
The decentralized nature of SIPs and permit decisions will often lead EPA to
refuse to substitute its own policy preferences for state or local judgments, and I
believe the burden of proof will rest with EPA to demonstrate state choices on
permit terms are legally inadequate. Administrative "laws" concerning an
agency's need for a credible scientific basis for controversial decisions and need to
minimize erosion of political support will militate against EPA reversal of questionable state judgments. Moreover, the low visibility of most permit terms will
not induce either state or federal agencies to withstand industry criticism and
political leverage in many cases. Thus [control technique guidelines] and Agency
oversight procedures may create a higher level of consistency than would otherwise occur, but I predict that many inconsistent treatments in permit terms will be
the regulatory norm for the foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding the "loose cannon" quality of many pollution permits, I expect permit terms increasingly to displace SIP plans as the central implementation
mechanisms and points of controversy in the nonattainment program. Unlike
more general SIP requirements, permits will impose specific controls on specific
dischargers. I anticipate that polluters will take an active part in the permit development process in an attempt to negotiate the least onerous terms possible, while
environmental groups will only be able to challenge agency determinations or
"deals" on a selective basis. This asymmetry of participation will induce many
dischargers and regulators to devote the most attention to the permit process.
Given the administrative "laws" pertaining to manipulative behavior by private
parties, bureaucratic aversion to criticism, regulatory unwillingness to cause social
dislocation, and agency desires to demonstrate progress in order to strengthen
political support, some states are likely to impose relatively permissive terms in a
permit process that may be more flexible, less visible, and less vulnerable to
meaningful EPA oversight than the SIP program. I found no indication that Congress recognized that the permit-issuance process provides a new opportunity for
dischargers to persuade state regulators to reconsider and weaken present air pollution control requirements.
/d. at 1703-04 (emphasis omitted).
218. Telephone Interview with Deeohn Ferris, Alliance for Washington Office for Environmental Justice (Aug. 17, 1994). Ms. Ferris pointed out that the technical nature of a
citizen suit puts the posture of the suit squarely into a battle of the experts, with the corporate defendants having more money to hire experts. Additionally, the more technical the
lawsuit, the greater the inclination of citizen plaintiffs to tum the matter over to lawyers or
the regulatory agencies; and community organization suffers as a result. Another problem
Ms. Ferris identified is that EPA and the defendant companies are often left to figure out if
air emission levels have been exceeded, and again the community residents are left out of
the process.
219. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 7, 35 (1982). Once there has been a release of a hazardous substance on a site, EPA may
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ment actions under CERCLA do not involve violations of permit requirements as is common under environmental laws regulating the
release of pollutants, like the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.220
Until EPA initiates an action to clean up a contaminated site, there
are no "requirements" for the persons responsible for the contamination (potentially responsible parties) to violate. Because CERCLA
does not actually prohibit the release of hazardous substances, citizens
cannot initiate an enforcement action against potentially responsible
parties to compel the cleanup of a contaminated site.221 Citizen suit
provisions under CERCLA, termed "one of the crueler farces of contemporary environmentallawmaking,"222 limit enforcement actions to
circumstances where the regulatory agency (EPA) first obtains an order against a potentially responsible party to abate an imminent and
substantial endangerment, and the potentially responsible party subsequently violates the requirements stated in the order.223 As a practiclean up the site with funds from the Superfund and then sue potentially responsible parties to recover cleanup costs and replenish the fund. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1988). Potentially responsible parties include the current owner or operator of the facility
(contaminated site), past owners or operators of the facility, transporters who brought
waste to the site, and generators who arranged for disposal of waste at the site. /d. § 9607.
Alternatively, EPA has the authority to compel a party to clean up a site by an administrative or court order. /d. § 9606 (1988).
If EPA elects to clean up the site, it may undertake short-term "removal" actions or
long-term "remedial" actions or a combination of both. Removal actions (like temporary
evacuation or limiting site access) are actions allowed in limited circumstances where it is
necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to public health. /d. §§ 9604(a),
9601(23) (1988). Remedial actions, which may involve containment or treatment of the
contaminated site, are subject to statutory cleanup standards. /d. § 9621 (1988). In order
for EPA to recover costs from potentially responsible parties, the cleanup must be done in
accordance with requirements of the National Contingency Plan (NCP). /d.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). Under the NCP, long-term remedial actions may be taken only at sites
listed on the National Priorities List. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1994).
The CERCLA citizen suit provision was first adopted by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
§ 206, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1703 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1988)).
220. 'JYpically, no federal, state, or local permits are required for removal or remedial
actions conducted entirely onsite. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e).
221. CERCLA does not prohibit the release of h~rdous substances. H.R. REP. No.
253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3206. Because
CERCLA does not allow citizens to sue to abate imminent and substantial endangerments,
citizens cannot directly sue potentially responsible parties to compel a cleanup. Cf 42
U.S.C. § 6973 (1988) (RCRA imminent hazard provisions).
222. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE
§ 8.14(C), at 708 (1992) [hereinafter RoDGERS, HAZARDous WAsTE]. See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba & Mary E. Kelly, The Citizen Suit Provision of CERCLA: A Sheep in Wolf's
Clothing?, 43 Sw. L.J. 929 (1990).
223. If EPA (or another federal agency) or a state agency elects to clean up a site and
seek recovery of costs against a potentially responsible party, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607, a citizens group challenging the cleanup would sue the government agency under an actionforcing suit if the cleanup was not in compliance with CERCLA requirements. See infra
part II.B.2. Thus, the only "requirements" directly imposed upon a potentially responsible
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cal result, citizens on or near contaminated areas can obtain relief
under CERCLA citizen suit provisions only after EPA elects to take
action.224 This is especially troubling in view of the findings that
Superfund cleanups in minority areas take significantly longer than in
nonminority areas, and that less comprehensive remedies (like containment rather than treatment) are more often required. 225 Moreover, since minority and low income communities are
disproportionately located near commercial hazardous waste facilities
and uncontrolled toxic waste sites, these communities are more likely
to be adversely affected by the inadequacies of CERCLA enforcement actions. 226
4.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Enforcement Suits and
Imminent Hazard Suits

For communities located near solid waste and hazardous waste
facilities, a citizen suit under the authority of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) could provide a remedy in the event
of regulatory inaction under CERCLA. RCRA is the federal statute
that regulates the disposal, storage, and treatment of solid and hazardous wastes. 227 Under RCRA citizen suit provisions, the citizen group
may enforce any RCRA "permit, standard, regulation, condition, reparty would be pursuant to an abatement order under CERCLA § 106. 42 U.S.C. § 9606.
Noncompliance with abatement orders is rare, as the potentially responsible party risks a
substantial fine for failure to comply with an order. /d. § 9606(b).
224. There are two situations where a citizen may have a direct action against a party
without government intervention, but neither situation is likely. The first case occurs
where a citizens group undertakes to clean up a site and sue a potentially responsible party
for recovery of costs. 42 U.S.C. § %07(a)(4)(B). It is unlikely that a citizens group in a
low income or minority area would have the resources to undertake expensive cleanup of
contaminated properties, especially in view of the requirement that cost recovery is conditioned upon compliance with the National Contingency Plan. /d. However, for an interesting discussion of the use of CERCLA for medical monitoring cost recovery, see
Crawford, supra note 22.
The other situation involving a direct action is where a person in charge of a facility
has knowledge of a reportable release of a hazardous substance and fails to notify the
National Response Center as is required under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988); 40
C.F.R. § 302.6 (1994). A citizens group would likely report the release directly instead of
prosecuting an enforcement suit where they would have to prove the person in charge had
knowledge of the release. Even if a citizens group decided to sue for failure to report, a
court might apply precedent under the Clean Water Act that precludes enforcement actions for "wholly past violations." Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484
U.S. 49 (1987); see, e.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that
only current violations are authorized by the CERCLA citizen suit provision); Gaba &
Kelly, supra note 222, at 942-43 (analyzing the Lutz decision).
225. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 34 (summarizing findings in Toxic WASTES AND RACE).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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quirement, prohibition or order."228 In addition to enforcement suits,
RCRA citizen suit provisions authorize private citizens to prosecute
an action against any person who is contributing (or has contributed)
to the handling of a solid or hazardous waste in a manner that
presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or to
the environment.229
Each existing hazardous waste facility must have a RCRA permit
to operate.230 A citizen group in a community located near a hazardous waste facility might choose to investigate the facility's compliance
with RCRA and prosecute an enforcement action if the facility is violating its permit conditions. However, RCRA enforcement suits have
not been aggressively pursued. 231 Commentators have suggested that
practical proof problems may hinder RCRA enforcement suits, as vio-

228. ld. § 6972 (1988) provides that any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf:
[A]gainst any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter(.]
Generally, RCRA, part of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, prohibits the treatment, storage,
or disposal of hazardous wastes without a permit or interim status. ld. § 6925 (1988).
RCRA also regulates generators and transporters of hazardous wastes. ld. §§ 6922-6923
(1988). Hazardous waste that is regulated under RCRA is defined by a complicated mix of
statutory provisions and regulations. See, e.g., id. §§ 6903(27), 6921 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 261
(1994). The universe of substances defined as hazardous wastes and regulated under
RCRA is less inclusive than the universe of hazardous substances defined under CERCLA.
Cf 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (CERCLA definition of hazardous substances).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) provides that any person may commence a civil action
on his own behalf:
(A]gainst any person, including the United States, and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment(.]
230. ld. § 6925.
231. In a 1987 report on citizen actions, 1209 notices of intent to sue under the Clean
Water Act, CERCLA, and RCRA (submitted to EPA) were reviewed. BNA REPORT,
supra note 16. Of the 1209 notices, 265 were brought under RCRA, which could have
been RCRA enforcement suits, RCRA imminent hazard suits, or RCRA action-forcing
suits. Id. at 19. The majority of claims, 882, were brought under the Clean Water Act. !d.
Although RCRA citizen suit provisions are of more recent vintage than Clean Water Act
citizen suits (RCRA citizen suit provisions were first enacted in 1976 and Clean Water Act
citizen suit provisions were first enacted in 1972), Clean Water Act citizen enforcement
suits were not prosecuted in large numbers until1983. ELI REPORT, supra note 199, at IIIlO (indicating that Clean Water Act known notices and suits prior to 1983 were less than 20
per year, yet 108 filings occurred in 1983 and 87 filings occurred in the first quarter of
1984). As of April 30, 1984, there were 27 known RCRA notices of suit. !d.
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lations are not easily discernable from the documentation required of
RCRA permitted facilities.232
Further, RCRA enforcement actions contain procedural limitations. In addition to a standard sixty-day notice provision,233 civil or
criminal court proceedings prosecuted by EPA or the state will preclude a citizen enforcement suit,234 and "wholly past" violations of
RCRA permits are not actionable under citizen suit provisions.23s
A more promising avenue lies in the RCRA citizen suit imminent
hazard authority. The standards to be applied under RCRA citizen
suit imminent hazard provisions should be the same as the standards
under the EPA Administrator's authority to address imminent
hazards. 236 EPA has taken the position that its authority under
RCRA's imminent hazard provision may remedy hazards brought on
by releases to land, water, or air.237 In this respect, RCRA's imminent
hazard authority is "essentially a codification of common law public
232. RoDGERS, HAzARDous WASTE, supra note 222, § 7.6, at 17 (citing D.W. STEVER,
LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION & HAZARDOUS WASTE 5-133 (1986)).
233. Citizens must provide notice to EPA, the state and the alleged violator of intent to
sue and wait 60 days before filing an enforcement suit. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(A). However, the 60-day notice provision is explicitly waived for violations of hazardous waste
facility violations. /d.
234. /d. § 6972(b)(1)(B); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1357, 1359
(E.D. Ky. 1989); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1985) (looking to the coercive powers of the administrative agency and to procedural similarities to characterize an agency proceeding as a
court action under the citizen suit provision). However, the citizen is given a right to intervene in such suits. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B).
235. Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (RCRA violations);
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (Clean Water
Act violation). Conversely, the imminent hazard provisions pertains to any person who
"has contributed or is contributing to the past or present handling" of a solid waste or
hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
236. H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
The authority of the Administrator to address imminent hazards provides in relevant
part:
[U]pon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage
or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to
take such other action as may be necessary, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1988); cf. id. § 6972(a)(I)(B); see supra note 229.
237. Any solid or hazardous waste released into land, water, or air that poses an imminent hazard may support an imminent hazard suit. 56 Fed. Reg. 24,393-95 (1991) (enforcement authority guidance); 40 C.F.R. § 26l.l(b)(2)(ii) (1994) (EPA Administrator's
imminent hazard authority); see Orchard Lane Road Ass'n v. Pete Lien & Sons, Inc., 16
F.3d 416 (lOth Cir. 1994).
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nuisance remedies."238 Unlike common law nuisance doctrine, however, RCRA's imminent hazard provisions may reach a broader range
of defendants, specifically government agencies waiving sovereign immunity, and past or present generators, transporters, owners, or operators of waste facilities.239 Therefore, the advantage of RCRA citizen
suit imminent hazard actions is that citizen groups may reach a wide
range of defendants for dangerous conditions emanating from both
operating and abandoned waste facilities. 240 Since minority and low
income communities are located near uncontrolled toxic waste sites in
greater numbers,241 and EPA has been slow to respond under its
CERCLA authority,242 RCRA imminent hazard citizen authority has
the potential-at least theoretically-to fill the enforcement gap.
The potentially far-reaching range of the RCRA citizen suit imminent hazard provision is curbed, however, by more stringent notice
provisions243 and by an unusually broad "diligent prosecution" defense. The diligent prosecution defense is typically a way of stating
that environmental citizen enforcement actions are precluded when
enforcement agencies are diligently prosecuting actions in court.244 In
addition, however, RCRA imminent hazard suits are precluded when
there is an administrative response under RCRA or CERCLA.245
238. S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5019, 5023. For discussion of the relevance of common law and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts standards, see Joel A. Mintz, Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites and the RCRA
Imminent Hazard Provision: Some Suggestions for a Sound Judicial Construction, 11
HARv. L. REv. 247 (1987).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B); see supra note 229.
240. H.R. REP. No. 198, supra note 236, at 48.
241. See supra note 34.
242. See supra note 58.
243. Citizens must provide notice to EPA, the state, and persons allegedly contributing
to an imminent hazard, and must wait 90 days before filing suit unless the hazard involves
the violation of hazardous waste provisions, in which case suit may be filed immediately
after notice. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A).
244. For a discussion of preclusion of citizen enforcement actions upon an agency's
diligent prosecution, see supra note 154.
245. Citizen authority enacted in 1984 to prosecute imminent hazard suits under
RCRA cannot be invoked while the EPA Administrator or state is prosecuting a RCRA
imminent hazard suit (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988)) or a CERCLA imminent hazard suit (pursuant to id. § 9606 (1988)); is engaging in a CERCLA removal action (pursuant to id. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); or has incurred costs to initiate a CERCLA
remedial investigation and feasibility study (pursuant to id.) in the course of a remedial
action (pursuant to id. § 9601 (1988)). ld. § 6972(b)(2)(B)-(C). But these statutory limitations have been construed narrowly by the courts. See, e.g. , Merry v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that mere initiation of a remedial
investigation/feasibility study without further action on the part of EPA does not adequately amount to "diligence" to prohibit plaintiff's claim); Utah State Dep't of Health v.
Ng, 649 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (D. Utah 1986) ("The prohibition is not intended to bar an
action alleging an imminent and substantial endangerment which may exist following the
termination of any removal action at the site, where no future remedial action is planned."
(citation omitted)); Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
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Where there is such a response, the citizen group may prosecute an
imminent hazard action only to the extent that the hazard presented is
not adequately addressed by the scope and duration of the administrative order,24 6 or may intervene only if their interest is not adequately
protected.247 In addition, an imminent hazard suit may be precluded
as long as the facility is operating within the scope of its permit.248
Once procedural requirements are met, the citizen group would
have to establish: (1) "that the conditions at the site present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment;" 249
(2) "that the endangerment stems from the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of a solid or hazardous waste;"250
and (3) that "the defendant has contributed or is contributing to such
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal."251 The imminent and substantial endangerment standard is subject to varying
judicial interpretation,252 but courts generally hold that a plaintiff
1574 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss despite completion of an E PA
study because diligence is a fact issue).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B); see, e.g. , Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F.
Supp. 1531, 1539 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that a citizen suit is not precluded despite a
CERCLA order where citizens sought additional remediation of subsurface water contamination, "because they are not challenging the scope of the already existing actions ordered
by the EPA, and seek only to add to those actions").
247. The citizen may intervene upon showing an interest in the subject action and establishing that disposition would impair an ability to protect that interest, unless the state
or the Administrator can show that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E). But see United States. v. Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding, seven days after the RCRA intervention provision was adopted, that citizens
have no right to intervene in a government-prosecuted imminent hazard suit). The RCRA
imminent hazard intervention provision is more restrictive than intervention provisions
under RCRA citizen enforcement authority. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1).
248. Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir. 1993).
249. Cf United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (discussing the
requirements for maintaining a suit under the Administrator's imminent hazard authority,
RCRA § 7003).
- 250. /d. The definition of hazardous waste presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment and subject to EPA and citizen enforcement authority is not limited to hazardous waste defined for purposes of regulation under RCRA. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,090
(1980) (preamble to hazardous waste regulations). Solid and hazardous wastes giving rise
to a cause of action under RCRA imminent hazard provisions may be more broad than
hazardous substances giving rise to an action under CERCLA. United States v. Aceto
Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that the three pesticides in
question were considered solid or hazardous wastes under RCRA, but were not hazardous
substances under CERCLA).
251. Cf Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1313.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that, even though the substantial endangerment standard is broadly stated, the
Administrator's authority to address an imminent hazard under § 7003 establishes substantive liability); United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
lnst.) 20,819,20,821 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981). Contra United States v. Solvents Recovery
Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D.C. Conn. 1980) ("(S]ection 7003 does not itself estab-
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need not prove an emergency or irreparable injury.zs3 Even where
the plaintiff sustains no actual harm, a release of a hazardous waste
that presents a risk of exposure and eventual harm may suffice.25 4
Where a defendant is not the owner of the site, but is someone
who sent hazardous waste to be disposed of (a generator), the plaintiff
must establish a causal connection between each defendant generator
and the endangerment. This is established upon proof that the generator's hazardous substances are at the site and might have contributed
to a situation presenting an endangerment.2ss
Another practical concern to underfunded plaintiffs is that imminent hazard suits, especially those involving complicated pathways of
exposure, multiple contaminants, and multiple defendants, may be
factually and technically complex. For example, it is often difficult to
detect the existence of a dangerous situation posed by minute

Iish standards for determining the lawfulness of the conduct of those sued by the United
States.").
253. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d at 165.
254. EPA has taken the position that under its own grant of authority to address imminent hazards, see 42 U.S.C. § 6973, the risk of harm must be imminent but the harm itself
does not have to be imminent and could occur after a period of latency. 56 Fed. Reg.
24,395-96 (1991); see, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H.
1985) (holding that a plume of contaminants in the vicinity of a pond used for recreation
and where many residents relied on wells or a groundwater system for drinking water
presented an imminent hazard despite a lack of evidence that any resident was in immediate danger of drinking contaminated water); United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (holding that an escape of dioxin from the premises
presented an imminent hazard despite a lack of proof of actual harm sustained, where the
plaintiff established that the escape was in quantities that, under an acceptable but unproved theory, might be carcinogenic, teratogenic, mutagenic, and fetotoxic); United States
v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 193-94 (D.C. Mo. 1985), on remand, 628 F.
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985), later proceeding, 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding
that an endangerment is substantial when the environment, including birds and wildlife, or
the public may be exposed to a risk of harm by virtue of a release or threatened release).
In determining whether a release presents a substantial endangerment, the court will consider the amount of waste released, the nature and degree of the hazards, and the routes or
potential routes of exposure. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 194. But cf Price v.
United States Navy, 818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. cat. 1992) (holding that effective barriers to contaminated soil underneath a house prevented the contamination from presenting
an imminent and substantial endangerment).
255. See United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 466 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (holding
that the proximate cause defense is available to a defendant in an EPA- prosecuted RCRA
imminent hazard suit). But cf United States v. South carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D.S.C. 1984) (applying a relaxed proof of causation standard in
CERCLA cost recovery actions). However, causation is inferred from a wide range of
circumstances. See, e.g., Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (S.D. cal. 1991) (inferring that past owners of a gas station had contributed to soil contamination because the
contamination was a direct result of activities relating to operation of the gas station);
Vermont Poultney v. Staco, 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Vt. 1988) (holding that the presence
of mercury in domestic septic tanks and homes of former employees was sufficient to
demonstrate the liability of the manufacturer).
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amounts of highly toxic substances in the air, soil, and groundwater.256
Low income and minority communities, disproportionately located in
high density industrial areas burdened by pollution from a multitude
of sources, would face more difficulty establishing causation.
In addition, RCRA citizen suit provisions have a significant limitation. The citizen enforcer is specifically prohibited from challenging
a hazardous waste facility siting decision or issuance of a permit.257
The limitation, an obvious attempt to curb NIMBY-ism,258 was
drafted into RCRA citizen suit provisions due to the increasing difficulty in siting hazardous waste facilities. The limitation, however, has
had the effect of closing an avenue of redress to communities who
may be targeted for siting because of the socioeconomic or racial characteristics of their residents. Although two proposed amendments to
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) attempted to remedy this situation,259 at present where the socioeconomic and/or racial characteris256. However, the EPA Administrator, when receiving information of an endangerment, must promptly post notice at the hazardous waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(c).
257. RCRA specifically provides:
No action may be commenced under [the RCRA citizen suit provisions] by any
person (other than a State or local government) with respect to the siting of a
hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a disposal facility, nor to restrain or enjoin
the issuance of a permit for such facility.
/d. § 6972(b)(2)(D) (1988).
258. Although difficult to verify empirically, it is the success of NIMBY-ism in affluent
White communities that many activists believe is a significant cause of environmental inequity. Telephone Interview with Deeohn Ferris, Alliance for Washington Office for Environmental Justice (Aug. 17, 1994). Ms. Ferris points out that there are no studies that
attempt to determine (for a particular area and within a particular time frame) the total
number of proposed sitings and successful sitings in relation to the racial and economic
composition of the surrounding neighborhoods. However, reports such as the Cerrell report, see supra note 108, indicate that the decisionmakers in corporations and local governments are acutely aware of the success of NIMBY challenges in affluent neighborhoods
and the advantages of shifting siting proposals to poor neighborhoods.
259. 1\vo proposed amendments to SWDA sought to remedy the situation. One version would have amended SWDA subtitle G by adding a provision allowing a citizen residing in a state where a solid waste facility (including hazardous waste facilities) is proposed
to be constructed in an "environmentally disadvantaged community" to petition for denial
of the permit. See H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). An environmental law judge
would conduct a hearing and approve the petition upon finding that the proposed facility
may adversely affect human health or the air, soil, or water in the community. /d. at 4-5.
However, even upon a finding of adverse effect, the judge could deny the petition if there
is no alternative location in the state that poses fewer risks and if the facility will not
release contaminants or engage in activity likely to increase the cumulative impact of contaminants. /d. at 5. "Environmentally disadvantaged community" is defined as an area
within two miles of the borders of the proposed site and where the percentage of ethnic
minorities in the population exceeds the percentage in the state or United States, or if 20%
or more of the residents are living at or below the poverty line, or if the per capita income
of 80% of the residents is below the national average. /d. at 6-7. Also included in this
definition are communities that already have an operating hazardous waste facility, an
abandoned hazardous waste facility, a site where a release (under CERCLA standards)
has occurred, a municipal solid waste facility, or a facility whose owner is required to submit a toxic chemical release form under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
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tics of a community are a significant but undisclosed factor in a siting
decision, citizens will have little recourse once the siting decision is
made.
Briefly, RCRA violations may require detection expertise beyond the capability of community residents. Challenges to facility sitings are precluded under RCRA citizen suit provisions. But if the
community is aware of a dangerous situation and the appropriate authorities take no action, the RCRA imminent hazard provision might
provide an important avenue of redress. Although a balancing of the
equities does not always result in the citizens' favor,Z60 the wide range
of injunctive relief available might make the economic expenditures
worthwhile.261
B. Action-Forcing Suits Against Regulatory Officials
In addition to enforcement actions against regulated entities, citizen suit provisions allow action-forcing suits against regulatory officials for failure to perform nondiscretionary duties.2 62 Whether any
particular provision involves a discretionary duty is sometimes diffito-Know Act for releases likely to adversely affect human health. /d. at 7-8. In short, low
income communities, communities of color, or communities that have existing sites that
pose a hazard could petition for denial of a permit. Effectively, the provision would not
give a citizen authority to prosecute a citizen suit (or override the RCRA citizen suit provision limitation), but would allow for stay of the permit proceedings pending a determination on the petition. Presumably, the petition would have to be submitted before the
permit is issued. There are no provisions in the proposed legislation precluding review of a
denial.
The other proposed amendment to SWDA would have amended subtitle C to provide
for the preparation of a community information statement as part of the permitting process
for offsite hazardous waste facilities. See H.R. 495, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Among
other things, the community information statement would describe: effects of the facility
on the community; human health impacts associated with wastes; options and mitigation of
impacts; demographic characteristics of the community according to race, ethnicity, and
income; presence of solid waste facilities or sites where hazardous substance releases (defined by CERCLA) have occurred; and the permittee's compliance record. /d. at 3-4.
260. Gache v. Town of Harrison, 813 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that
injunctive relief may be denied where the plaintiff does not establish irreparable harm).
261. In one suit brought by EPA against former and current owners of a former landfill, the court suggested that a balance of the equities may weigh in favor of court-ordered
funding of a diagnostic study of public health threats. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,
212-13 (3d Cir. 1982). One court held that the Administrator need not show inadequate
remedies at law because an express statute, not common law equity doctrine, provided for
an injunctive remedy. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 1984).
But see United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143-44 (N.D.
Ind. 1980) (holding that the imminent hazard provision is jurisdictional, not substantive).
262. See supra note 139. Conceptually, action-forcing suits are not suits in the nature
of private attorney general enforcement actions. They are ~ore i~ the natu~e of a ma~da
mus action. Since mandamus actions are common for nond1scret10nary dulles, the actJ?nforcing authority of citizen suit provisions is not as controversial as enforcement authonty.
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cult to determine, and ultimately the courts are left with the task.263
In recent years, courts have been increasingly deferential to agency
determinations under federal environmental statutes.264 Accordingly,
citizens dissatisfied with the level of environmental protection have
had little recourse against regulatory officials when an official's action
lies within the realm of her discretion.265

1.

The Regulatory Statutes: Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and
RCRA Action-Forcing Suits
·

Action-forcing suits under regulatory statutes usually involve
nondiscretionary duties, duties such as meeting statutory deadlines,266
and the duty to take some action.267 For example, environmental organizations have been successful in forcing the EPA Administrator to
promulgate standards and regulations.268 But the findings supporting
263. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 325 (2d Cir.
1976) (rejecting EPA's argument that it has discretion in listing lead as a pollutant to be
regulated under Clean Air Act § 108).
264. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: 1Wenty
Years of Law and Politics, 54 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1991) (discussing the judicial
shift from respect for policy decisions of Congress and elevation of environmental values to
skepticism of legislative choices, neutrality toward environmental values, and concomitant
deference toward EPA decisions).
265. Citizens may challenge agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1988). However, such challenged actions are subject to intensely deferential
standards of review, such as the substantial evidence standard and the arbitrary and capricious standard. ld. § 706 (1988). Even if such actions are successful, the citizens group
typically must finance the lawsuit, which presents an obstacle to underfunded community
groups.
266. See, e.g., RODGERS, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 222, § 7.6(D)(2), at 17-20
(noting that the prominent examples of RCRA nondiscretionary suits are the deadline
suits).
267. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892, 896-900 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989) (commenting on the nondiscretionary duty to make some
decision concerning revision of sulfur dioxide NAAQS); see also RODGERS, AIR AND
WATER, supra note 154, § 4.5, at 72 (describing clearly defined Clean Water Act
mandatory deadlines, and duties to adopt definitions and decide whether certain materials
are pollutants); id. § 3.4, at 223 (describing Clean Air Act mandatory deadlines, duties to
implement policies and promulgate plans, and the duty to initiate rulemaking proceedings); RoDGERS, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 222, § 7.6, at 18 n.81. Professor Rodgers
counts 170 nondiscretionary duties under RCRA, but, due to the fine line between discretion and nondiscretion, estimates the number, conservatively, between 150 and 200. Roo.
GERS, HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 222, § 7.6, at 18 n.81.
268. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (requiring EPA to
issue final standards for radionuclide emissions under the Clean Air Act); Citizens for a
Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (requiring EPA to promulgate
regulations under the Clean Air Act); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. Costle, 647 F.2d 675
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981) (requiring EPA to issue regulations under
the Clean Air Act for spare parts and emissions control maintenance); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that EPA
has a duty to adopt a definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act); Train v.
Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 11-25 (1976) (holding that EPA has a
duty to decide if nuclear waste materials are "pollutants" under the Clean Water Act) .
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the standards and the substantive content of the standards and regulations generally involve agency expertise and discretion.269 Similarly,
sometimes there is a nondiscretionary duty to determine compliance
with the statute270 or to make a finding concerning a violation, but the
Administrator's decision itself involves discretionary judgment.271
Many of the action-forcing suits under regulatory environmental statutes are intended to goad the agencies to take some action in the first
instance (otherwise, there is no action to review under more general
review provisions). Not surprisingly, many action-forcing suits are
brought by national environmental organizations concerned with the
potentially broad impact of regulatory agency action and standard-setting rather than by community-based groups engaged in addressing
local problems.2n
Action-forcing suits are often luxuries that underfunded citizen
groups cannot afford to undertake. Although the timely issuance of
standards and requirements is desirable, community-based environmental justice organizations are often preoccupied attempting to remedy exigent local conditions, usually on shoestring budgets. Even if a
community group has sufficient resources to launch an action-forcing
suit against the Administrator for failure to perform a nondiscretion269. However, a challenge to the standard or regulation may be made under judicial
review provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. See supra note 139.
270. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 271 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding
that EPA has a duty to determine whether state SIP's comply with the Clean Air Act).
271. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313, 323
(W.D. Wis. 1975) (holding that EPA has a discretionary duty to decide whether a violation
occurs, but a mandatory duty to make a finding of violation and, if a violation occurs, to
notify); Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Coalition v. New York City Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 705 F. Supp. 988, 990-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that EPA's duty to find a
violation of a Clean Air Act order to comply with a SIP is discretionary).
272. Ironically, recent court decisions restricting standing to environmental plaintiffs
may change this situation. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that
Congress cannot confer standing under environmental citizen suit provisions. 112 S. Ct.
2130, 2143-46 (1992). Environmental plaintiffs must now establish a "case or controversy"
under Article III. To do so, a citizen must allege and prove an imminent and substantial
injury in fact. /d. at 2143-44. Since a generalized interest in environmental protection is
insufficient, national environmental organizations may have difficulty establishing a concrete injury in fact. See generally cass Sustein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, 'Injuries,' and Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992). Citizens groups in poor and
minority neighborhoods are more likely to have members concretely affected by underprotective national standards or agency inaction. This situation, in turn, may encourage more
coalitions between national advocacy groups and environmental justice activists, thereby
bringing environmental justice concerns into the policy debate of suits that have a national
effect. Cf Conservation Law Found. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 38, 40-43 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that environmental groups do not have standing to force EPA to assess CERCLA risks at
all federal facilities and that only members living near specific facilities have standing to
seek relief); United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
National Wildlife Federation did not present sufficient specific allegations of environmental injury to have standing to challenge an appeal of a CERCLA consent decree).

~

72

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 22:1

ary duty, such nondiscretionary duties may not be the highest priority
for environmental justice advocates.
Ironically, and perhaps not coincidentally, it is squarely in the
realm of the Administrator's discretion that environmental justice issues arise for consideration and debate. For example, the 1990 Clean
Air Act amendments provide opportunities for EPA to consider environmental equity issues, but implementation of equity considerations
is entirely discretionary.273 There are two areas of particular concerri
that have a potential to disproportionately affect low income and minority communities and that involve agency discretion. First is the
ability of a local or state authority (with the Administrator's approval)
to establish an air emissions trading program that allows polluting
sources to sell their pollution credits to other sources. Emissions trading programs open the possibility of increasing concentrations of emissions in one part of an air basin through trading pollution credits from
another part of the basin, thereby potentially creating "hot spots"274
in poor and minority communities.
Second, the EPA Administrator has discretion to approve alternative permitting approaches for new and modified major sources in
nonattainment areas that have been classified as zones identified for
targeted economic development, which are, by definition, impoverished areas. Generally, if a major emitting facility desires to locate in
a nonattainment (dirty) area, it must first establish that its air emissions will be more than offset by emission reductions from existing
273. The EPA Workgroup made suggestions in implementing the 1990 amendments:
(1) "SIPs could contain simple tracking mechanisms for evaluating their effect on racial
minority and low-income populations relative to white and higher-income populations";
(2) EPA may consider equity issues in establishing requirements for state permit programs;
(3) E PA may establish clear standards for evaluating the equity impacts of permits for
construction of new major sources in nonattainment areas; (4) EPA may provide states
with information on the socioeconomic impacts of different control options for use in formulating SIP's; and (5) EPA may consider equity where EPA has input into the structure
of emissions trading programs initiated by state and local governments. SuPPORTING Doc
UMENT, supra note 5, at 22-23. Under provisions that direct EPA to set air quality standards, conduct research programs, and investigate and prepare reports on toxic air
pollutants, EPA may incorporate equity considerations. /d. at 22-25. As in many provisions, a citizens group may sue under the action-forcing provisions should EPA fail to undertake a particular directive, for example, the failure to conduct a research program on
the problem of toxic air pollutants in urban areas pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). But once undertaken, the Administrator's discretion
in design and implementation of the directive is broad and is likely to be upheld unless it is
deemed to be arbitrary and capricious.
274. SUPPORTING DoCUMENT, supra note 5, at 23. See generally Nancy J. Cohen,
Emissions Trading and Air Toxics Emissions: Reclaim and Taxies Regulation in the South
Coast Air Basin, 11 J. ENVrL. L. 255, 264-67 (1993) (explaining how a proposed trading
program for reactive organic compounds in southern California could lead, overall, to
higher levels of hazardous air pollutants and concentrated hot spots in some areas of the
air basin).
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sources in the area (i.e., an "offset" ratio of more than 1:1).275 This
offset requirement ensures that nonattainment areas make reasonable
progress in attaining compliance with NAAQS.276 Under special statutory provisions, however, a zone targeted for economic development
in a nonattainment area might become host to new or modified major
sources without the owners having to obtain a greater than one to one
offset ratio.277 The result is that citizens groups in these poorer areas
might not be able to force the EPA Administrator (through an actionforcing suit) to require offsets, a suit that could be prosecuted if pertaining to a nonattainment area not targeted for economic development. As the availability of offsets decreases in nonattainment areas,
states might utilize growth allowances in poor nonattainment areas,
resulting in more sources than would normally occur. There is no indication that environmental justice issues were considered or that environmental justice organizations were directly involved in the
legislation of this Clean Air Act provision.278 As a result, community
groups are left largely to depend upon the Administrator's initiative in
considering environmental equity and implementing protective measures under the Clean Air Act.
In a more general vein, communities of color and poor communities are left to rely on agency discretion in considering environmental
justice issues in the promulgation of standards and the enforcement of
environmental laws. Thus, the authority that citizen suit provisions
confer to institute action-forcing suits under regulatory statutes has
little potential to address environmental justice issues in a direct manner. A community-based organization may institute an action-forcing
suit if the Administrator fails to promulgate standards mandated by a
federal environmental statute. In such a case, the citizen group could
prosecute an action-forcing suit, followed by review of agency action if
the standard promulgated is underprotective. Such an effort would
severely strain the resources of the community group. Perhaps the
275. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
276. /d. § 7502(c)(2} (Supp. V 1993).
277. SuPPORTING DocuMENT, supra note 5, at 24. New and modified major sources
locating in zones targeted for economic development might be subject to subsection
(a)(1)(B) and not to subsection (a)(1}(A}, which requires greater than one to one offsets.
42 U.S.C. § 7503(a}(1}(B). EPA has taken the position that in a nonattainment area, which
has an inadequate SIP, a major source may not take emissions credit for existing growth
allowances unless the area is in a wne targeted for economic development. 57 Fed. Reg.
13,554 (Apr. 16, 1992). In addition, new growth allowances are generally restricted unless
the area is a wne targeted for economic development. /d.
278. There is no specific legislative history on ~s particular provision. The provision
might be in response to an expressed concern that it will be exceedingly difficult for an
active air emissions market to develop in economically stagnant areas. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. LIROFF, AIR PoLLUTION OFFsETS: TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING 27 (1980). Regardless of the reasons for, or merits of, the provision, the decision was made at the level of
national policy without participation of the affected communities.

.....

74

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 22:1

best solution in such a case is for the community residents to join
forces with a national environmental organization that has the expertise and financial resources to undertake such an expensive and daunting task.279

2. A Remedial Statute: CERCLA Action-Forcing Suits
The cleanup of contaminated sites under CERCLA may be accomplished in several ways: (1) by a cleanup funded by EPA (using
Superfund money) accompanied by a cost recovery action against the
potentially responsible parties; (2) by a cleanup pursuant to an agreement among the potentially responsible parties; or (3) by an order
compelling a potentially responsible party to undertake a cleanup of
the site under EPA supervision.280 One might contemplate that a
community faced with exposure from a contaminated site could institute an action-forcing suit to compel EPA to take action to clean up
the site. However, CERCLA authorizes EPA to take action but does
not expressly mandate the cleanup of contaminated sites.zs1 Once
EPA elects to clean up a site (either through the Superfund process or
by supervising the cleanup assumed by the potentially responsible parties), CERCLA and the National Contingency Plan (NCP) requirements govern the adequacy of the cleanup.282
Until EPA initiates action, a citizen's action-forcing suit is premature.283 Even then, there are barriers to an action-forcing suit to challenge the legal adequacy of the anticipated cleanup.284 The first two
279. See infra part III.A.
280. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
281. Generally, the EPA Administrator is authorized but not required to: (1) take responsive action upon discovery of a release or threatened release of hazardous substances,
(2) use Superfund monies to clean up a site, and (3) proceed against potentially responsible
parties in a cost recovery action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). Alternatively, EPA may seek a
court or administrative abatement order compelling a party to undertake necessary action.
Id. § 9606(a) (1988).
282. The 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act added a section that
does not contain specific numerical cleanup standards, but is a descriptive approach, requiring that cleanup standards must attain "legally applicable or relevant and appropriate
state or federal standard[s), requirement[s], criteria, or limitation[s)." Id.
§ 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
283. An exception to this is that EPA must take steps to assure that federal agencies
assess contamination of facilities that the agencies own or operate, and the Administrator
is to evaluate the facilities for possible listing on the National Priorities List. ld. § 9620(d)
(1988).
284. EPA must publish notice and an explanation of the proposed cleanup plan and
afford a reasonable opportunity for public comment. ld. § 9617(a) (1988). Persons affected by a release from a contaminated site listed on the NPL may apply for a technical
assistance grant to interpret information regarding the nature of the hazard, remedial investigation and feasibility study, record of decision (ROD), remedial design, selection and
construction of the remedial action, operation and maintenance, or removal action at such
facility. /d. § 9617(e) (1988). The grants may be up to $50,000, but are subject to a 20%
contribution requirement by the applicant, which may be waived. /d. § 9617(e)(2). How-
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obstacles are procedural. First, a citizens group cannot sue prior to a
cleanup, but must wait until the government has completed a distinct
phase in the cleanup process. 285 This puts the citizens group in the
position of asking the court to have EPA undo what has already been
done, usually at considerable expense.286 Second, the community
group will face practical difficulties unless the community is near or in
the Washington, D .C. area, where venue lies for action-forcing suits
under CERCLA.287
The third impediment is substantive. Although CERCLA and
the NCP requirements have strong language concerning the nature
and degree of remediation, upon closer examination EPA has much
more discretion than it would appear from reading the statute.288 For
ever, applicants for technical assistance grants must meet recordkeeping and financial accountability requirements, and must be incorporated as nonprofit organizations for the
purpose of addressing the Superfund site for which the grant is provided. 40 C.F.R.
§ 35.4020 (1994). See generally id. § 35, subpt. M (1994). These and other requirements
may preclude community-based organizations from r~ceiving grants. Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation in
Superfund Cleanups, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 671,678-79 (1994) (stating that deficiencies in
the grant process include a lengthy and labor intensive application process, procurement
procedures that make it difficult to hire a technical advisor, and reimbursement procedures
that delay grant payments to communities). After the notice and comment period, EPA
may issue a record of decision that summarizes the final cleanup plan.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (1988). For comments on applying the limitation, see H.R.
REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276. For example, "a challenge could lie to a completed excavation or incineration response in one area,
as defined in a Record of Decision, while a pumping and treating response activity was
being implemented at another area of the facility." Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3276.
Professor Jarman points out that this unfortunate provision has a silver lining. Sometimes, the threat of a suit after the completion of an expensive phase of a cleanup remedy
brings the community group into negotiations involving remedy selection at an earlier
stage than would normally occur.
286. For example, if the government chooses a particular method of treatment- incineration to treat contaminated soil-a citizen group must wait until the expensive incineration process is completed to challenge the adequacy of the method.
287. Action-forcing suits under CERCLA may be brought only in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b) (1988). This venue provision is more
restrictive than the jurisdiction and venue provisions under other major environmental
statutes. Under the Clean Air Act, district courts have jurisdiction to hear action-forcing
suits for agency actions unreasonably withheld, unless the delay pertains to promulgation
of ambient air standards. In the latter case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction. Id. §§ 7604(a), 7607(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under
the Clean Water Act, jurisdiction for action-forcing suits lies in the district courts unless the
suit challenges the promulgation of standards, which must be brought in a court of appeals.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1369(b)(1) (1988). Action-forcing suits under RCRA may be
brought either in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or
in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
288. Under CERCLA: "Remedial actions in which treatment which permanently and
significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants is a principal element, are to be preferred over remedial actions not
involving such treatment." 42 U.S.C. § 962I(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). "If the Presi-
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example, there is a clear statutory preference for treatment over containment of contamination, but the choice of remedy is ultimately discretionary.289 Similarly, there is a requirement that remedial actions
selected "shall" attain a degree of cleanup "which assures protection
of human health and the environment," 290 but the judgment as to
what constitutes a sufficiently protective cleanup involves discretion.
This discretion has troubling significance considering the National
Law Journal's findings suggesting that containment is the preferred
remedy in minority areas while treatment is the preferred remedy in
nonminority areas. 291
C.

Attorney's Fees and Costs Under Citizen Suit Provisions

The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act allow an award of
attorney's fees and costs where appropriate.292 Citizen suit provisions
of the Clean Water Act, RCRA, and CERCLA provide for an award
of attorney's fees and costs to prevailing parties or substantially prevailing parties.293 Environmental "fee shifting" provisions are a needent selects a remedial action not appropriate for a preference under this subsection, the
President shall publish an explanation as to why a remedial action involving such reductions was not selected." /d. Thus, there is a clear statutory preference for treatment of
contamination rather than containment, but the only apparent nondiscretionary duty
under CERCLA § 121(b) is that the President "shall" conduct an assessment of permanent
solutions, treatment, and recovery technologies that will result in permanent reduction of
toxicity, mobility, or volume of hazardous substances. Id. There are statutory requirements for the content of the assessment, but the selection of the alternative appears to be
discretionary. Id.
289. !d.
290. !d.
291. See supra notes 7, 58 and accompanying text.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988). The "where appropriate" standard may have been
inserted into the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act to allow a court to award
attorney's fees against plaintiffs who bring frivolous claims or to favor a plaintiff who prosecutes a claim in the public interest, regardless of the outcome of the case. MILLER &
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw INST., supra note 140, § 9.2, at 98. When interpreting the "where
appropriate" standard for plaintiff recovery, however, courts similarly decline recovery for
purely procedural or "trivial" victories, but may award recovery where the plaintiff,
although not completely prevailing, obtains some success on the merits. See Ruckelshaus
v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 (1983). Thus, citizen plaintiffs may be denied recovery
and risk having to pay defendant's fees if they settle a case without establishing a fairly
clear causal connection between the claim and the outcome.
293. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988);
CERCLA, id. § 9659(f) (1988). The prevailing party standard parallels the civil rights standard and has been interpreted in the same manner. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986). This is problematic because in
traditional civil rights cases the plaintiffs prevail by vindicating personal rights and obtaining financial compensation. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317
(4th Cir. 1988). Thus, absent a final judgment, plaintiffs must typically establish a causal
relationship between the litigation they bring and the outcome finally realized. Oregon
Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1987); American Constitutional
Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1981) (commenting on the plaintiff's actions as
a contributing factor in bringing about desired changes or as a material factor in bringing

------------

--

1995)

- -

-

ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN PROVISIONS

77

essary incentive to environmental enforcement because few private
plaintiffs can afford to finance expensive environmental litigation that
typically results in nonmonetary benefits to the public at large (rather
than damage awards to the individual plaintiffs).294 Once a plaintiff
demonstrates to the court that an award is appropriate (when the
plaintiff prevails in some respect or the lawsuit is a contributing factor
to the defendant's ultimate actions), then the court may award reasonable attorney's fees. The appropriate amount of fees is calculated as
the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate, the "lodestar" amount.295 The hourly rate is based on the attorney rates of the
area where the action is brought, not where the plaintiff's attorney
practices. 296
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the lodestar amount
cannot be adjusted to account for the contingency nature of many environmental citizen suits. 297 A blanket prohibition on contingency adjustments has obvious disadvantages for underfunded citizens groups
who are unable to guarantee their attorney compensation other than
court-awarded fees.
about defendants' actions); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 104 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that
the plaintiffs' efforts contributed to a favorable outcome in a significant way). Plaintiffs
must also demonstrate a recovery on at least one substantial claim, not only on relatively
minor claims. Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 697 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1982) (civil
rights suit).
294. See generally AxLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CmZEN SuiTS, supra note 137, § 8.01;
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 136.
295. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2640-41 (1992).
296. See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383, 392 (2d Cir.
1985).
297. In Dague, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court's upward adjustment of a
lodestar amount to reflect the fact that plaintiff's attorneys were retained on a contingent
fee basis and assumed the risk of receiving no payment for their services. 112 S. a. at
2643-44 (1992). The district court had found that the risk of not prevailing (in a Clean
Water Act and Solid Waste Disposal Act enforcement case) was substantial and, without
an opportunity for enhancement, plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulty in obtaining counsel. I d. at 2640. The Supreme Court announced that a contingency adjustment
is not appropriate because an attorney's "contingent risk" is the product of two factors: (1)
legal and factual merits, and (2) difficulty of establishing those merits. See id. at 2641. The
second factor is already reflected in the lodestar amount, and an adjustment to compensate
for the first factor would encourage nonmeritorious claims. Id. Justice Scalia's reasoning
in Dague does not consider that only successful plaintiffs receive fee awards. Michael D.
Axline, Decreasing Incentives To Enforce Environmental Laws: City of Burlington v.
Dague, 43 J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 257, 265 (1993) [hereinafter Decreasing Incentives]. In a
dissent to the majority opinion in Dague, Justice Blackmun observed:
Even the least meritorious case in which the attorney is guaranteed compensation
whether he wins or loses will be economically preferable to the most meritorious
fee-bearing claim in which the attorney will be paid only if he prevails, so long as
the cases require the same amount of time. Yet as noted above, this latter kind of
case- in which potential plaintiffs can neither afford to hire attorneys on a
straight hourly basis nor offer a percentage of a substantial damage recovery-is
exactly the kind of case for which the fee-shifting statutes were designed.
Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Even when one considers the altruistic and environmental motivation of attorneys in accepting cases for representation, underfunded
community groups are still at a disadvantage. An attorney motivated
by the environmental cause would likely choose to prosecute those
cases in which he or she is able to obtain an hourly rate (or at least a
negotiated flat rate) from the client in the absence of court-awarded
fees. 298 Consequently, community groups from wealthier communities are more likely to be in a better position to obtain representation
by supporting the contingent nature of court-awarded fees with an alternative fee arrangement. Very wealthy citizen plaintiffs can pay the
lawyer's normal hourly rates; middle income citizen plaintiffs may be
able to offer a lower hourly rate or a fiat rate (partial pro bono); and
low income citizen plaintiffs are unlikely to be in a position to offer
any payment for attorney fees, as any available funds are likely to be
marked for litigation expenses. It is in the attorney's best economic
interest to take the case of the wealthy client or the middle income
client.
The citizens group must find an environmental lawyer who is willing to take the case without any guarantee that the plaintiffs will prevail. Few private attorneys are willing to undertake expensive lawsuits
on behalf of underfinanced citizens groups, especially without the incentive of a contingent fee arrangement or an hourly rate agreement
backed by a retainer.299 Public interest legal services organizations,
which normally serve low income clients, often lack the resources and
sometimes the expertise to undertake complex environmental litigation.300 This leaves citizens groups with little recourse but to seek pro
bono assistance from environmental organizations with substantial resources and litigation missions.30l Although recently national environmental organizations have provided assistance to citizens groups,

298. This assumes that the attorney or law firm is motivated by the environmental
cause, but not necessarily by the environmental justice cause. In addition, some environ-mental law public interest law firms have made it a policy to pay costs associated with
environmental suits across the board, in which case underfunded community groups may
not be at a disadvantage.
299. This may differ from attorneys who will undertake civil rights suits on behalf of
individuals who do not have economic resources. Civil rights lawsuits are not as likely to
involve complicated scientific and technical issues, and may come to a resolution more
quickly. Moreover, civil rights attorneys may be better able to handle many civil rights
cases at one time, whereas large environmental suits will take up more time, resulting in
lost opportunities for the lawyer.
300. See Empowerment As the Key, supra note 22, at 659-60.
301. The national environmental organizations most prominent in litigating environmental cases are the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense
Fund, and Sierra Club. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 75, § 1.04.
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the environmental organizations have no obligation to do so and may
have different litigation priorities.302
Underfinanced citizens groups face other practical problems. Recovery of legal costs occurs, if at all, at the end of the lawsuit. Meanwhile, the citizens group must be able to finance the lawsuit, which
may require significant discovery costs, expert witness fees, and transportation costs (if the suit is not local). Although compensation for
the delay factor may be subsumed in the lodestar amount if attorney's
fees are awarded, the problem of up-front financing is still a significant obstacle for underfunded community groups. 303
Clearly, fee shifting is an incentive to private enforcement generally, although arguably not enough of an incentive considering the expense involved in undertaking complex environmental litigation. The
Supreme Court has further limited the incentive structure by prohibiting contingency adjustments. The practical difficulty of financing
complex environmental citizen suits, combined with substantive and
procedural limitations of enforcement suits generally, presents substantial impediments to court access for community-based environmental justice groups in low income and minority communities.
Considering that enforcement suits or imminent hazard suits under
RCRA are direct and efficient ways to address the localized effects of
environmental inequities, the incentive structure of citizen suits could
be adjusted to provide better court access at the local level, thus serving to lessen the disparity in environmental protection.
III

POSSffiLE SOLUTIONS

EPA could begin a serious environmental justice initiative by creating a comprehensive educational program wherein community residents would be trained to detect noncompliance of common federal
regulatory environmental laws, like the Clean Air Act. Courts and
administrative bodies could use discretion under environmental citizen suit provisions to consider environmental justice issues in award302. MILLER & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 140, § 2.3, at 10 (discussing
use and evaluation of citizen suits). "NRDC initially focused its attention on major industrial discharges with repeated violations of national pollutant discharge elimination system
(NPDES) permits in New York and New Jersey." ld. § 2.3, at 11.
303. In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II) , the Court noted that: "[C)ourts have regularly recognized the delay factor, either by
basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the fee based on historical rates to reflect
its present value." 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987). Nevertheless, without a contingency factor,
amicus briefs filed in the Dague case note that even public interest attorneys need to pay
their bills and that as an economic reality, attomeJS will decline meritorious contingency
cases in favor of hourly-fee-paying clients. Decreasing Incentives, supra note 297, at 27071.
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ing attorney's fees and determining penalties. In addition, Congress
may amend environmental legislation to address environmental justice concerns and may do so without leaving environmental statutes
vulnerable to NIMBY challenges. Admittedly, these proposed solutions are "band-aids" for a pervasive and complicated phenomenon.
However, the solutions are consistent with the environmental justice
perspective, which calls for a direct response to the social context in
which environmental laws are enforced.304
A.

Training Communities To Detect Noncompliance

The first step in a successful private enforcement program is to
make citizens knowledgeable about environmental laws and capable
of monitoring facilities in their areas to determine compliance with
environmental laws. EPA, along with state agencies that administer
federal environmental laws, could greatly enhance enforcement in
poor and minority neighborhoods by training community residents in
sampling and monitoring techniques.305 The training should ideally
focus on the more complicated regulatory regimes, like the Clean Air
Act and RCRA, which are presently underutilized by citizen enforcers. Training programs could be targeted to those communities suffering pollution from multiple and diverse sources, areas with large poor
and minority populations, and/or areas where there is a history of excessive noncompliance. It is crucial that training be comprehensive
and sufficiently detailed so participants can achieve a high level of certainty in detecting violations. Although training programs will not address all obstacles, such as environmental jobmail and siting
inequities, they have the potential to aid in the empowerment of communities, which is critical to a lasting environmental justice initiative.
B.

Equity Lodestar Adjustment

At least one commentator has persuasively argued that, to encourage private enforcement, it is imperative that Congress enact legislation authorizing contingency enhancements to attorney's fee
awards.306 Removing the disincentive caused by the Supreme Court's
304. See supra part II.C.
305. See supra note 159. The strategy of the pilot training program proposed by EPA
attempts to develop community capacity by funding local minority academic institutions to
train local communities in sampling and monitoring, and by supporting local environmental law clinics to work with communities seeking to redress problems not addressed by
regulators. However, if EPA or state officials were to work directly with community
groups, instead of through intermediary academic or legal institutions, vital communication
links could be enhanced and accountability would not be shifted to nonregulatory
institutions.
306. Decreasing Incentives, supra note 297, at 273. Professor Axline argues that an
unmodified hourly rate lodestar system is not a sufficient incentive because it does not
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prohibition on contingency enhancements will undoubtedly benefit
low income and minority communities by providing greater access to
courts. More specifically, however, an attorney's fee lodestar adjustment may be targeted to remedy environmental inequity. In the absence of congressional amendment of citizen suit provisions, judges
could allow an upward lodestar adjustment, not as a contingency adjustment, but specifically to encourage and reward private attorneys
who undertake enforcement actions in low income and minority
neighborhoods (i.e., an "equity adjustment").
The Supreme Court noted that the fact that a case involves an
issue of public importance has no bearing upon the issue of the risk of
loss or whether that risk should be compensated.307 In contrast, however, public policy would be central to an equity adjustment and
therefore a reason to adjust the lodestar. If one accepts distributional
equity in environmental protection as a legitimate and important public goal, then an upward lodestar adjustment is appropriate.
Fee shifting in the private attorney general context serves several
important purposes, not the least of which is the incentive for citizens
to bring suits that provide a recognized social benefit. In the case of
environmental citizens suits, the recognized social benefit is the enforcement of environmental laws. One can assume that Congress
(and the courts) had this general purpose in mind in developing the
present fee shifting system based on a market rate lodestar calculation.308 However, in allowing attorney's fees based on the lodestar for
environmental citizen suits across the board, Congress did not specifically address environmental justice concerns: that minority and low
income communities suffer disparate environmental hazards due in
part to a relative lack of resources as a class. Therefore, an upward
adjustment is necessary to further another important policy objective
that is not already subsumed in the lodestar calculation. 309 An adjustment should be sufficient to provide an incentive to encourage attoraccount for the contingency nature of citizen suits. He argues that standard enhancement
of 10% or 15% would provide sufficient incentive for lawyers to take citizen suit cases
while avoiding protracted litigation over the myriad variables impacting the risk of loss in
individual cases. ld. at 268.
307. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 716.
308. Congress endorsed lodestar market rate calculations of attorney's fees. See S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908. The
lodestar may be adjusted by factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
In Dague, Justice Scalia noted that there was a strong presumption that the lodestar
represented the appropriate fee, but conceded that there may be instances where a lodestar adjustment may be warranted. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641
(1992). He went on to hold, however, that "an enhancement for contingency would likely
duplicate in substantial part factors already subsumed in the lodestar." ld.
309. In Blum, Commissioner, New York State Department of Social Services v. Stenson,
Justice Powell suggested that, in view of precedent allowing enhancements in cases of exI
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neys to represent low income and minority neighborhoods, thereby
reducing environmental risk in such communities and tending to
equalize disparate environmental risk. Such an incentive will serve
Congress' intended purpose of equitable environmental protection,
which was not accomplished under present law. Stated another way, if
incentive creation is ~ legitimate fee shifting rationale, then it is appropriate to "fine tune" the incentives to achieve distributional equity
in environmental protection.31o
Moreover, increasing the incentive by an equity adjustment will
not offend other rationales underlying fee shifting, which include discouraging unnecessary litigation, making a wronged party whole after
injury, punishing unjustified or undesirable behavior, and generally
deterring undesirable conduct.311 Encouraging citizen suits by community-based groups in poor and minority neighborhoods may further
deter the practice of targeting such communities for polluting activity
because of lax compliance and less costly cleanups. In addition to providing litigation incentives and deterrence, an equity adjustment can
be justified because in such cases defendants, as a class, have the advantage of superior resources.3 12
In determining whether an equity adjustment is appropriate,
judges could consider such factors as the socioeconomic makeup of
the community affected by the violation or agency action (or inaction)
and whether the community bears a disparate environmental risk burden. Upon such a finding, courts could award a standardized lodestar
equity adjustment, which would be sufficient to provide an incentive
and still be in the range of a reasonable attorney's fee.
ceptional success, the Court could not agree with petitioner's position that an upward ad·
justment from the lodestar is never permissible. 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).
310. Implicit in environmental laws is the principle that unavoidable environmental
risk should be distributed equitably. Citizen suit provisions were designed to ensure enforcement of environmental laws in all segments of society. Fee shifting provisions were
included as an incentive to spur private enforcement of meritorious claims. Because of a
complicated variety of factors, there are less rigorous environmental enforcement and
more environmental hazards in low income and minority neighborhoods. Some environmental hazards could be removed by stricter enforcement of environmental laws in poor
and minority communities. An upward lodestar adjustment would act as an incentive and
spur private enforcement in low income and minority communities, helping to equalize the
disparity in environmental risk.
311. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 652.
312. Dean Rowe observes that: "(W]hen a legislature perceives a regular imbalance, it
can seek to match adversaries more evenly by adopting some form of fee shifting to prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of the legal process." Rowe, supra
note 311, at 664 (citing, as an example, the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481,
94 Stat. 2325 (1980)). The same rationale can be applied in the context of environmental
justice, especially when one considers that: "[T)he defendants are members of the class of
violators and of those whose conduct deserves deterrence; economic sense dictates placing
the cost of enforcement at least on the sector whence came the violations." Id. at 673.
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Viewed in this light, an equity adjustment is essentially a costinternalizing measure. The class of defendants who would pay greater
attorney's fees as a result of the upward lodestar adjustment is the
class of defendants who historically benefitted from locating activities
in poor and minority neighborhoods where residents were less successful in opposing the activity and enforcement was less rigorous.
The plaintiffs' attorney would not get a windfall because the adjustment would still be in the range of "reasonableness." Attorney's fees
slightly above market rate are not unreasonable, as the presence of an
upward adjustment suggests. Moreover, an adjustment would offset
possible disincentives of representing communities with complicated
legal problems compounded by economic, social, cultural, and political barriers.313
In summary, the possibility of an equity adjustment could serve to
remove the present disincentives for private attorneys to represent underfunded groups in low income and minority communities seeking
redress for severe and complex environmental problems. Perhaps
more importantly, the purposes underlying environmental laws, civil
rights laws, and constitutional principles of equality all would be
served.
C.

Penalty Enhancement for Targeting

Another judicial or administrative response possible under environmental statutes is to consider environmental inequities in the assessment of penalties.314 The judge (or authorized official) might
consider, for example, evidence that the polluter has a history of permit noncompliance in poor and minority communities. The racial and
socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community could be
included in the criteria for assessing penalties. The possibility of
higher penalties in poor communities and communities of color could
have a deterrent effect that might offset the corresponding incentive
to locate in low income and minority communities because of actual
or perceived underenforcement. Thus, the use of judicial and administrative discretion in imposing penalties may help redress environmental inequity by signaling that noncompliance in vulnerable
communities will not be tolerated.

313. See generally Empowerment As the Key, supra note 22.
314. In detennining penalties under environmental statutes, those statutes and regulations often provide for consideration of matters such as justice may require including the
nature and circumstances of the violation. See supra note 115.
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Nondiscretionary Duties

Similarly, inequities resulting from otherwise legal practicessuch as decisions to site polluting facilities in low income and minority
communities and discretionary (but arguably inadequate) agency response-must be addressed. Possible solutions lie in carefully crafted
amendments to major environmental statutes, which could create nondiscretionary duties with statutory deadlines. The duties should include compiling evidence concerning exposure to the pollutants
regulated under the particular environmental statute and adverse
health effects caused by such exposure, by race and income, on a national level.3l5
Other nondiscretionary duties under major environmental statutes might require the preparation of equity assessments before approving permits for air or water emissions or hazardous waste
management.316 The equity assessments should contain: (1) an assessment of the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the community; (2) the existing sources of pollution in the community; and (3) a
discussion of alternative available sites, including racial and sociological characteristics, and existing pollution sources in the alternative
sites. The equity assessment process should strive to determine
whether the community bears a disproportionate risk burden considering principles of risk assessment, risk management, and statutory
goals. The equity assessment process should allow challengers to the
permit to formulate and propose alternatives. Optimistically, a procedural duty of this type increases the chances that equity considerations
will be brought to the fore, while at the same time retaining administrative flexibility by not specifically mandating a particular substantive
decision on the merits of the permit approval. But a real possibility
exists that an equity assessment would become an administrative
"hoop to jump through" on the way to a predetermined decision.
A substantive .nondiscretionary duty would be to mandate specific action upon a dual finding of a disproportionate risk burden and
a community disadvantaged due to lack of political or economic resources. Specifically mandated action might include disapproval of
the permit, more stringent permit conditions, or specific remedial action.317 Nondiscretionary duties could take many forms, depending
315. EPA is currently undertaking discretionary projects of this nature on a regional
level. See supra note 50 (summarizing EPA equity projects).
316. A prior proposed amendment to SWDA (which includes RCRA) would have provided for a "community information statement" during the course of RCRA permit proceedings for offsite facilities for the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste. See
supra note 259.
317. For a prior similar proposed amendment to SWDA that would have allowed a
petitioner to challenge the siting of a RCRA hazardous waste facility, see supra note 259.
The proposal would not have created a nondiscretionary, substantive duty to deny the
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on the particular distributional consequences identified under the various federal environmental laws, and depending on whether the disparity is tied to race, income, or a combination of the two.
Thus, a mandate of this type would more directly respond to social forces and address disparity in exposure to environmental
hazards, a legitimate environmental regulatory mission.3ts A finding
that a community is disadvantaged necessarily entails a look at sociological factors, like the mean income of the affected neighborhood,
the predominant racial characteristics of the neighborhood, the presence of residents on local zoning boards, and other indicia of the relative political strength of the community.
In theory, such a provision would work like a limited waiver of
immunity in the realm of conventional agency discretion. As a practical matter, the provision would not unduly usurp agency discretion; it
would simply make agency action exacerbating environmental risk
disparity subject to judicial review, while otherwise retaining normal
agency prerogatives. Examples of targeted nondiscretionary duties
might include the following: a low income or minority community suffering from exposure to multiple environmental hazards could be
given citizen suit authority: (1) to initiate an action-forcing suit to
compel EPA to deny a pending National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit application (or to impose strict conditions on the
permit); or (2) to compel the veto of a permit to site a RCRA facility.
Action-forcing suits of this nature could also remove the prohibition
on preenforcement review of containment (instead of treatment) of a
contaminated site or a removal action under CERCLA in certain
cases.
The positive aspects of a nondiscretionary duty of this nature are .
that the duty can be carefully tailored under specific statutes to prevent a wholesale NIMBY abuse of the provision. The findings necessary to trigger the nondiscretionary duty could be specific, and the
agency response could be equally specific. For example, in response
to studies that indicate that the siting of hazardous waste facilities is
permit upon certain findings, but would have allowed the administrative law judge a range
of options. Id. Moreover, "environmentally disadvantaged community" under the proposal is defined in reference to numerical criteria, such as the relative percentages of minority
residents and income, and does not consider other indicia of lack of political strength. Id.
318. EPA has expressed a commitment to the principle that low income and minority
communities should not bear a disproportionate risk of exposure to environmental
hazards. W o RKG ROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 ("Environmental equity is an important
goal in a democratic society."). If the commitment is genuine, EPA should have no objection to such a nondiscretionary duty. Administrator Carol M. Browner identified the elimination of " 'environmental racism' as one of her top priorities [and] vowed to 'weave
environmental justice concerns throughout all aspects of EPA policy and decision-making:•" Stephen C. Jones & Jeffrey Hsu, EPA Targets 'Environmental Racism', NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 9, 1993, at 28, 28.
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disproportionate by race, a nondiscretionary duty under RCRA might
be to veto a permit for a hazardous waste facility if the equity risk
assessment demonstrates that the siting will result in a disparate risk
burden in a community that is low income and/or predominantly minority (when there is a geologically adequate alternative site). A nondiscretionary duty under the Clean Air Act, in response to urban area
studies indicating disparate exposures to air pollutants by race, could
be a permit veto, offsets, particularly stringent emissions reduction
technology, or a denial of a pollution credits program where contrary
action would exacerbate the disparate risk burden in a particular geographical area (which may be a smaller geographical area than designated in the applicable state implementation plan). This could reduce
or prevent concentrations of air pollutants from multiple sources in
inner-city areas. A nondiscretionary duty under the Clean Water Act
might entail a requirement that the authorized agency take more stringent action where an equity assessment discloses that a local population's consumption of fish is greater than average; the
nondiscretionary duty in such a case might be a moratorium on
NPDES permits, more stringent effluent limitations, or the imposition
of additional limits on daily effluent discharges even where the water
quality standards are otherwise met.
The nondiscretionary duties, coupled with an equity lodestar adjustment, could give community groups in low income and minority
communities crucial leverage-a concrete and durable leveragerather than the present vulnerable position of community-based
groups that depend upon the discretion of EPA in studying environmental inequities and the good will of national environmental groups
in undertaking representation.
CONCLUSION

The issue of environmental racism or environmental injustice has
gained momentum due to years of sustained efforts at the local level.
The momentum is also due in part to some media coverage in recent
years and challenges to the environmental community by environmental justice organizations. In response, EPA and national environmental groups have taken initiatives by instituting discretionary projects,
diversifying boards and staff, and in some cases, hiring attorneys to
work on equity issues. There is, however, no assurance that the efforts
will continue should the issue of environmental justice retreat from
the p11blic eye. It is the sustained vigilance of community-based activism that will ultimately lead to environmental justice. The timing is
critical for reform of environmental laws to provide low income communities and communities of color durable leverage in their attempts
to remedy environmental disparities.
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One method of reform is to create mechanisms that will give
community groups greater access to courts. It is the leverage accorded by enhanced access to courts, rather than actual litigation, that
will serve to correct environmental inequities by removing the economic and political incentives that drive environmental hazards to
these communities. Enhanced court access can be accomplished in a
controlled and targeted way by a standardized lodestar adjustment to
the attorney's fee calculation to give attorneys a sustained incentive to
represent low income communities and communities of color. Citizen
suit provisions may aid in realizing environmental justice by providing
authority to challenge carefully crafted nondiscretionary statutory duties to: (1) compile information concerning disparities in environmental exposures and adverse health effects; (2) create a process of
gathering and using information about environmental equity during
routine decisions; and (3) create substantive nondiscretionary duties
to respond to disparate risk burdens by taking specific regulatory
action.
Ultimately, environmental protection depends upon enforcement. Thus, communities of color and low income communities must
have the opportunity and the resources to control private enforcement
initiatives in their own communities in order to attain lasting environmental justice.

